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Author's note, 2013 
Poverty and social security was published in November 1992 (though the title page states1993).  The rights to publish have reverted to me, and I am making it freely available onthe internet.  The book has dated in some respects, but I have not attempted to update it.  Much ofwhat the book had to say about the idea of poverty, the contribution of social securityand the methods that can be used is still relevant.  After I had written the book, I cameto change my views on poverty in particular, under the influence of the multi-dimensional, multi-faceted views that came to the fore in international organisations. By the time I came to write The idea of poverty (Policy Press, 2007) I was firmlycommitted to a different normative and analytical framework.  I would not now evenattempt to combine the treatment of poverty and social security in the same book.   One of the arguments I was taken by when I wrote this book has been translated intoa different framework.  When ‘budget standards’ were first tested, they seemed not towork in the way that I expected - the term came to stand for the kind of normativebudgeting that was associated with Rowntree’s household budgets.  Subsequently, however, the approach - looking at what people actually do, rather than what expertssuppose they might do - has yielded valuable insights into minimum income standardsand the nature of a ‘living wage’.  See, e.g., D Hirsch, 2013, a Minimum income standardfor the UK in 2013, York:  Joseph Rowntree Foundation.  I have not changed the text in any way.  Paul Spicker
Preface (1992)This book is concerned with the ways in which poverty can be defined and identified, andthe responses which have been  made to the problems of poverty in the development offinancial assistance for people who are poor.  The first part of the book is concerned withthe idea of poverty, the way it has been operationalised, and the kinds of responseswhich might be made to it.  The second part is concerned with social security: itsconnection with poor relief, the way in which benefit systems operate, and the extent towhich such systems do effectively relieve poverty.  On the face of it, this seems straightforward enough as a field for a critical study; oncloser examination, though, the focus may seem difficult to justify.  The definition of thesubject matter depends crucially on a set of conventional interpretations about the ideasof 'poverty' and 'social security'.  If the idea of 'poverty' was to be examined adequately,it probably ought to be considered in much wider terms than a consideration of financialassistance would imply; equally, any proper consideration of income maintenancetouches on many topics beyond the relief of poverty.  The justification for a narrowerfocus is in large part centred on a particular kind of problem: the discussion of what sortof benefits should be provided for the relief of poverty, and at what level they should beprovided.  This problem has been dominant historically in the development of services,and continues to be a major concern in the debates about social security now.  Thedebates around this issue have to a large extent affected the way in which the issues ofpoverty and poor relief are discussed.The purpose of the book is, then, to discuss a set of problems and responses.  It doesthis principally by considering a range of inter-related concepts.  For reasons which Iexplain in the text, the book does not offer any authoritative definition of the problems,an approach which I know might drive some readers to distraction.  The method hasmore to do with social philosophy than with social science.  What it does is to outlineoptions and ways and thinking about the issues, in the hope that it will help to establishan understanding of the relationship between poverty and social security, and informdiscussion in the future.  Part of the focus, too, is comparative.  My own experience is from Britain.  I havefound it useful to draw on that experience for many of the examples, but concentrationon Britain alone is not really adequate to understand either the problems of poverty orthe methods which are available to respond to them.  Many of the arguments made aboutsocial security in Britain - like the case for Child Benefit, or arguments against means-testing - rely on a received wisdom based on a restricted range of policies, and the mosteffective way to put them into perspective is to draw on material from other countries.  The book is intended mainly for an academic audience: it should be of interest tothose studying social policy, sociology, politics and public administration, and there areelements which may be useful to students of economics and philosophy.  On the principlethat a better understanding should make for better policy - though I really ought to knowdifferently by now - it may also be helpful for those who are involved in policy-makingand administration for the poor.
Paul Spicker
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Part 1:  Poverty
6
Chapter 1
IntroductionThese are examples of the circumstances which some people live in.  They are fictional,but they are drawn from life.Jane is a single parent, aged 25.  She married at 18, had two children who are now agedfour and two, but then her husband left her.  She now lives in a council flat in a high-riseblock on the outskirts of town.  The flat has a full range of amenities, including centralheating, but she cannot afford the heating and it has become damp.  She has fewfurnishings.  There are no shopping facilities nearby; she has no transport and publictransport is expensive, so she goes out very little.  She receives benefit but it is reducedbecause her husband is supposed to pay her maintenance.  He only pays irregularly; ifshe is short of money, she manages by skimping on food.  Robert is 47; a skilled boilermaker, he became unemployed two years ago when hisshipyard closed and now he finds that his skills are no longer required in the labourmarket.  He has undertaken some retraining but finds at his age that no employer iscurrently interested in employing him.  Elizabeth, his wife, works as a cleaner at a lowwage, but her wages are insufficient to maintain the two of them.  They are satisfactorilyhoused, and still have a full range of possessions, though their car was sold six monthsafter Robert became unemployed.  They have no savings left and are pessimistic abouttheir prospects for the future.  Edith is 81.  She lives alone in a large house, where she has lived for most of her life.  Herhealth has been failing, and she is unable to go upstairs, so she has had the bed moveddownstairs and lives solely on the ground floor.  She has a pension, and although shedoes not have many of the modern amenities that other have, like a refrigerator or awashing machine, she feels she is quite comfortable.  However, the house needs repairs,which she cannot afford to have done.  The fire is too difficult for her to light, and sheuses a one-bar electric fire, sparingly because it is expensive.  She is concerned aboutbreak-ins in the area, and locks her door after 5.30 p.m., using several locks and chains.Peter, a single man aged 55, has been discharged from mental hospital.  Initially he livedin a private flat, but he was evicted when his landlord wished to sell the property, andsubsequently he has been homeless.  He receives assistance benefits on a daily basis, forwhich he has to spend a part of each day queuing in the Social Security office.  He spendssome nights sleeping out, and some nights in a private hostel where he has a dormitorybed.  He washes at a public convenience each morning, but he has no change of clothes,and cannot wash them effectively.  During the day, he prefers to sit in shopping centresfor warmth, but he is usually asked to leave, and so he spends much of the day wanderingfrom place to place in the town.  Eileen is 18.  She left home at sixteen because of the violence of her father since then hasmoved from place to place, sometimes staying with acquaintances, sometimes sleepingout, at times renting when she has been in work.  The kinds of work she is able to find,however, have generally been temporary - waitress, shop assistant, bar staff - and lowpaid, because of her age and sex.  She has no possessions other than her clothes. Simon is 43, and suffers from multiple sclerosis.  When younger, and for some time afterthe initial diagnosis, Simon was working as a teacher, earning a respectable salary.  Hisphysical capacity has gradually deteriorated to the point where he cannot move around,wash, dress himself or go to the toilet unaided, and Anne, his wife, who was also a
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teacher, has had to give up her work in order to look after him.  They have one child, a girlof thirteen, who is at an age where she is expensive to maintain.  They have a well-equipped household, but their income has dropped substantially and their savings havegradually been exhausted by the requirements of Simon's special needs.  They are nowfinding it difficult to manage.Unmesh works in a relative's clothing factory for a low wage.  His wife, Surinder, doeshome work.  Together they receive more than they would receive in benefit butsubstantially less than the average wage.  Some benefits may be available, but they areimmigrants and restricted in their rights to claim.  They live in a two-bedroomed housewhich they bought on a private arrangement and have now paid for; the house is cold,damp and in a state of disrepair.    I am going to refer to people in these kinds of circumstances as 'poor', which some mayfind too strong a word, but which at least helps to identify the kinds of problem whichthis book is concerned with.  At the risk of compounding confusion, the discussion ofpoverty has to to begin in the middle of a debate.  The idea of 'poverty' has been so muchdiscussed in academic and political circles that it has become difficult for any readers toapproach the topic without some preconceptions.  The first task of anyone who wants toapproach the issue from a new perspective is to disentangle some of the differentstrands.  
Poverty and ideologyConventionally, definitions of poverty have  been categorised in two main forms:absolute and relative poverty.  Absolute  poverty is a minimum subsistence level basedon essentials for survival.  It has been characterised in an OECD report as a definition 'interms of some absolute level of minimum needs, below which people are regarded asbeing poor, for purpose of social and government concern, and which does not changeover time' (1).  The example which the OECD give is the poverty line in the United States,which is based in the cost of a minimum diet determined by the Department ofAgriculture.  The academic examples most usually cited, rightly or wrongly, are the earlywork of Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree.  Booth is thought to have specified aminimum standard of living which was necessary for a person to have basic essentials;Rowntree, a standard of poverty calculated from minimal norms for subsistence.  (Bothcharacterisations are disputable.)  (2)The alternative is a relative concept, which defines poverty in terms of its relation tothe standards which exist elsewhere in society.  This used to be understood primarily interms of inequality: Roach and Roach, for example, define relative poverty as a standardapplying to 'the bottom segment of the income distribution' (3), and the LuxembourgIncome Study measures poverty as a proportion of average personal disposable incomeper capita (4).   Townsend, by contrast, uses the term in quite a different way.  He refersto poverty as a form of 'relative deprivation', 'the absence or inadequacy of those diets,amenities, standards, services and activities which are common or customary in society.'(5) One of the most important assumptions made about the 'absolute' and 'relative'models of poverty is that they represent, not only concepts of poverty, but specificpolitical positions.  The 'absolute' model is associated with the right wing: the 'relative'model, with the left.  The 'right wing' tends to see poverty as a fairly limited problem, andthe kinds of response demanded by the state will be restricted in scope.  The 'left wing'tends to view poverty as widespread; it is attributed to structural problems in society;and state interventions need to be extensive in order to redress the disadvantages ofthose who are poor.  There are always grounds for suspicion about any attempt to represent politics in twodimensions, and this kind of analysis should prompt immediate scepticism.  Neither 'left'nor 'right' wing politics can be seen as monolithic positions - the right wing, for example,
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includes examples both of liberal individualism and traditionalist authoritarianism,whereas the left wing includes both pro-state collectivism and libertarian opposition togovernment (6).  In describing these ideas of poverty as related to the 'left' or 'right'wing, I am referring to a commonly occurring constellation of ideas, and it is importantto understand how these ideas relate as a package in order to understand the kinds ofargument which have been raging about poverty.  The connection between ideological positions and concepts of poverty is derivedthrough two basic models of welfare - the residual and institutional.  Residual welfaresees welfare as a safety net, which is only for those people who need it after they havefailed to meet their needs through their own or their family's resources.   Institutionalwelfare rests on the view that everyone has needs at some time - everyone is at sometime a child, sick, old, possibly unemployed - and that this is a social responsibility.  Onthe face of it, both residual and institutional models begin from very similar precepts -that the provision of welfare is required to respond to the different kinds of needexperienced by people in certain kinds of contingency - and it might be argued that thereis little direct incompatibility between the two positions; one might believe ininstitutional welfare in some respects and residual welfare in others.  It is common, forexample, in Britain to find simultaneous support for the institutional health service andopposition to the institutional aspects of social security, like Child Benefit; the servicesare judged by different criteria (conversely, residual benefits like free prescriptions areviewed in a different light to other benefits delivered on similar terms) (7).  Equally,different criteria might also be applied to different aspects of a service area: a personmight, for example, advocate simultaneously both a generally available health service tocover institutional needs and supplementary safety-net provisions for exceptional casesnot covered in the normal course of medical care, like special injuries to sportsmen ormusicians; or (as is indeed common in social security provision) a general system ofincome support backed up by residual benefits meeting special contingencies.   The residual model has however come to be associated with a particularly restrictiveview of welfare - one which Titmuss referred to as the 'residual burden' model of welfare(8).  If welfare is to be seen primarily as a safety net, a distinction might be madebetween those who 'succeed' - in the sense of not requiring welfare - and those who 'fail',because they do.  The implications of requiring welfare are both that people have failedto manage their affairs in society - whether through bad luck, ill health, ignorance,inadequacy, incompetence or laziness - and that they then become a burden on otherswho have to support them.  The residual model is increasingly linked with the idea of'dependency' and the 'dependency culture', ideas imported from the US which condemnfinancial dependency as something which undermines individual responsibility andcompetence. The absolute model is seen as reinforcing the arguments for residual welfare becausea residual model depends on the definition of some cut-off point or level below which asafety net comes into operation and above which it does not.  This requires a justificationfor not committing resources above the line.  If the aim of services is specifically toprovide for those who are in need because they do not have enough resources, then adefinition is required of what is 'enough'; this is provided by a measure of subsistence. The relative concept of poverty, by contrast, is associated with institutional welfareand left-wing policies.  In a relative model, people are defined as poor, a condition whichis defined in terms of social expectations, in relation to others in their society who are notpoor.   Poverty is, then, a product of social organisation, and in particular of the unequalstructure of society.  The association with an institutional approach to welfare is justifiedby Titmuss on the basis that conditions of dependency are produced through socialprocesses and must be accepted as social responsibilities. The connections between these positions are not self-evident; they reflect, rather, thepolitical history of the concepts.  It might be argued with equal force that an assessmentof subsistence needs can support a radical position: Rowntree's approach was usedspecifically to demonstrate the inadequacy of state provision and to press for greaterbenefits.  This kind of analysis has been duplicated by Piachaud for children (9);
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Townsend himself notes that 'there are many people in the United Kingdom ... who feelthe real pinch of hunger today' (10).  Equally, there is no reason to suppose that anemphasis on relative poverty leads to more generous benefits - the construction placedon the idea by certain right-wing critics (like John Moore, formerly Secretary of State forSocial Services) has been that if poverty is only relative, it doesn't really matter (11).  Senargues, in my view quite correctly, that  'a general increase in ill-health due towidespread expansion of economic hardship, which leaves a person's relative positionunchanged, must still be seen as intensifying that person's poverty' (12).  A relativeassessment might undermine the position of the poor in circumstances where there isa decline in standards throughout a society.  The effect of the political associations of the different models is to create theimmediate concern that any advocacy of an absolute model, or a concept based onsubsistence, provides a foundation for a minimalist response.  For Peter Townsend, thisis a major objection to Sen's work on the idea of poverty.  Sen had suggested that 'hunger'was a major issue in the relief of poverty, behind which other values might take lowerpriority.  Townsend wrote in response:'The problem about this reiteration of the virtues of an "absolutist core" to themeaning of poverty is the underestimation of the importance of needs other than forfood ... Without operational specification of the range of needs and resources requiredto satisfy those needs Professor Sen's argument carries the dangerous implicationthat meagre benefits for the poor in industrial societies are more than enough to meettheir (absolute) needs ...'  (13)Sen's reply (14) was one of bafflement - how could Townsend possibly attribute such aposition to him?  He took it, not unreasonably, that Townsend had not understood whathis argument is.  But I think there is more involved than a simple misunderstanding. Townsend has come to think of poverty within the constraints of certain models, whichassociate absolute and relative concepts with specific ideological views; and, on the basisof those models, he takes it that a theory which exhibits some of the features of thesemodels will be led, willy-nilly, towards their other features.  Hence his comment thatSen's argument 'opens the door to a tough State interpretation of subsistence rations'(15).  In one sense, this may be true; a government of the new right faced with Sen'sargument will doubtless draw on those aspects of the argument which appeal to theiroverall perspective and approach and reject those which do not.  The same might, ofcourse, be true of their arguments from a relative position, as Moore's commentsindicate.  But, whether or not Townsend is right politically, this is not necessarily a basisfor the rational analysis of the concept of poverty. The association of concepts of poverty with different ideological positions presentsa set of dilemmas.  It may be possible, in theory, to begin with a blank slate, and to try towork out a coherent, cohesive set of propositions about the nature of poverty; but thevoyage has to be charted through troubled waters, and at any stage, the propositions arelikely to be pulled under by the current of associated concepts.  It would be naive toassume that this book will not in the same way be construed as a contribution to apolitical debate, for in one sense it is; and it may be necessary to demonstrate, not onlythat alternative approaches to the conceptualisation of poverty can be more coherent,but that they do not entail pernicious consequences.  This point will be returned to laterin the book.
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Chapter 2
The nature of poverty
Defining povertySome people are poor.  Recognising what something means in practice is often mucheasier than defining or analysing it,  which is one of the main reasons for having begunwith illustrative examples.  When we say that people are poor, deprived, suffering fromhardship, or in need, we usually have a fairly good idea of what we mean; but words likethis may well mean different things to different people, and it is difficult to take this kindof ordinary language and make it perform the precise functions which are required insocial analysis.  Sometimes, when people define topics, they search for a common characteristic, an'essential' feature which distinguishes the issue clearly from others.  It would be possible,if this was true, to define people as 'poor' if they met a particular criterion or set ofcriteria, and as 'not poor' if they did not.  For example, poverty is sometimes related toa 'poverty line', so that everyone whose income is below a certain level is considered tobe 'poor', and everyone above the line is not.  But this kind of approach leads to obviousproblems - because some people do have low income without being thought of as 'poor'. It might be thought that all it is necessary to do is to add further criteria besides income. This will refine the definition of poverty, and it will improve the tools which are availablefor identifying it, but it will not settle the issue.  The problem is not that poverty is notsimply a matter of low income; poverty is not 'simply' a matter of anything.  Mostcomplex ideas, used in everyday language, do not have a single essential meaning whichis subject to definition.  They have variations and shades of meaning; the more widely theidea is used, and the wider the range of conditions to which it refers, the more likely itis that any definition will include some conditions which should not be included, andexclude others which should be.  Readers who hope to find in this book an authoritative,'scientific' definition of poverty will be disappointed.  The use of the term varies, theconcept is liable to be contested, and the issues cannot be resolved beyond dispute. 'Poverty' does not describe a particular kind of attribute which people have or do nothave; the term is used to describe a range or cluster of conditions.  A person starving inEthiopia, a discharged psychiatric patient living in a derelict house because there isnowhere else to go, a Greek hill farmer, a single parent trapped in an isolated councilestate, or a pensioner unable to afford heating, might all be said to be 'poor' in somesense; but it is not necessary to suppose that they are all poor in exactly the same sense. The kinds of problems they face, the reasons for those problems, and the sorts ofresponse which have to be made, may well be different.  The examples in chapter 1 mayhave some features in common, but it is difficult to point to any unifying factor and say,'this is what makes these people poor'.  That is not to say that the problems are not inter-related: but they are not all alike, either, and conditions found at one edge of the clustermay appear, on closer examination, to have little directly in common with features foundat the other end.  In philosophical writing, this kind of connection between clusters ofinter-related ideas is referred to, after Wittgenstein, as a kind of 'family resemblance'.It should not be supposed from this, though, that the idea of 'poverty' is usedindiscriminately, or that it does not really mean anything.  People may disagree about thenature of poverty, but there are cases in the Third World - cases where people arewithout food, clothing or shelter - where there is hardly any disagreement, and which inmany ways are paradigmatic of poverty.  Some commentators would disagree as towhether these cases bear any resemblance to conditions in industrialised countries (1),but there are nevertheless some widespread uses of the term in developed countries, andthere is still a high level of consensus that certain types of problem can be described as
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'poverty'.  It is not really important whether poverty in one country is the 'same thing'as in another country; poverty is not a 'thing' at all, but a way of describing people'sconditions.  Poverty is not only a descriptive category; it is also a moral one.  The term 'poverty',Piachaud writes, 'carries with it an implication and moral imperative that somethingshould be done about it.  Its definition is a value judgment and should be clearly seen tobe so ... ' (2)  Many of those who deny that people in the kinds of circumstances I haveoutlined are 'poor' object to the term, not just because they have a particular idea of howthe word might be used, but because they do not accept the implication that somethingmust be done about these circumstances.  This moral element does not mean thatpoverty is impossible to define; but it does indicate that, whatever the definition given,there is likely to be some room for debate as to the kinds of condition included in it andthe kinds of responses which it is appropriate to make.
The elements of povertyIn order to understand a concept it is necessary to examine how it is used - the kinds ofissue which the idea of  'poverty' refers to.  Baratz and Grigsby (3) identify a wide rangeof factors 'closely associated' with poverty - which is not to say that these factors definepeople as being poor, but only that they are likely to occur in the circumstances wherepeople are poor.  They include the following:
Severe lack of physical comfortshelter that does not provide adequate protection from elements; is poorly lighted,ventilated and overcrowded, or filthyhungerhighly unpleasant neighbourhood (excessive noise, litter, traffic, etc.)highly unpleasant environment on job (extreme temperatures and odours, limitedworking space, etc.)clothing wardrobe that does not provide adequate protection from elements
Severe lack of healthhigh probability of short life-spanfrequent illnesschronic illnesspermanent physical or mental disability
Severe lack of safety and securityunsafe housingunsafe neighbourhoodlack of protection against major loss of assetsunsafe working environmentunsafe air or waterlack of protection against major decline of real income
Severe lack of welfare valuespersonally unacceptable ratio of earned to total incomepersonally stigmatising form of financial dependencyinability to perform a socially valued function (e.g. paid work)lack of good quality educationnon-possession of symbols of medium-high social statushighly unfavourable self-conceptionlow aspirations for, or hopelessness about, potentiality for upward socio-economicmobilitysevere family instability (e.g. 'broken home')
Severe lack of deference valuessevere restrictions on economic and social opportunity and activity (esp.discrimination)exclusion from participation in the political process
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victim of injustice in the law enforcement processnon possession of socially valued skilllack of good quality educationsocially stigmatising form of financial dependencynon possession of symbols of medium-high status.If it is right to suggest that poverty refers to a cluster of concepts rather than a singledefinable problem, it is unlikely that any list of factors could precisely capture theexperience of poverty, and I do not want to imply approval or acceptance of the list offactors as it stands.  There are some items which are vague (like 'unsafe' housing), andothers which seem oddly specific (the references to conditions at work are inappropriatefor large numbers of poor people who have no employment); some problems have beensubstantially left out (like dependent old age), while there are others (like thoseprincipally concerned with psychological factors, of which more shortly) which I am notsure should be there.  The value of Baratz and Grigsby's approach is not that itconstitutes an indisputable or authoritative description of poverty, but that it helps tofocus on the kinds of area which people are concerned about when discussing the issue. I suggested earlier that problems like the lack of food, clothing and shelter areparadigmatic cases in the concept of poverty.  Baratz and Grigsby's schema of povertyincludes these factors, but it extends much more widely; it includes not only problemswhich are like them, such as problems with air or water, but many which are not at alllike them, for example low aspirations or lack of skills.  Material and social problems arenot wholly distinct, because there is much in the definition of a person's social positionwhich depends on material factors, like the stigmatising nature of certain kinds of incomeand the importance of certain kinds of goods as status symbols, and equally much in thenature of material goods which has a social meaning, like the relative quality of housingand the environment.  There is besides a substantial level of overlap between thecategories - not only in those factors which are directly repeated, but also in inter-relatedproblems (like inadequate shelter and unsafe housing).  A person who suffersdeprivation in relation to housing, income and health would probably suffer from at leasthalf of the problems listed here.  The experience of poverty is not one of constant, unvarying deprivation of a specifiedkind, but a series of deprivations.  Baratz and Grigsby's schema points to a number ofissues - like material deprivation, health, security, social problems, status, and power -which are closely bound up with the experience of poverty, and which need to be takeninto account in any adequate discussion of the issues.  All the factors can be seen, to agreater or lesser extent, as potential consequences of being poor, but some might also beseen as factors which lead to poverty, and others - like hunger, lack of clothing andinadequate housing - as factors which are virtually descriptive of poverty; that is to say,they are the kinds of thing by which poverty is identified.  In practice these may bedifficult to separate, and there may be a vicious circle.  For example, bad housing is oftenfound in poor neighbourhoods, because this is the housing least to be chosen, and thosewith the resources to choose go elsewhere; these neighbourhoods become, by virtue oftheir poverty, focuses for certain kinds of social problem, attracting greater attentionfrom the police and welfare agencies, which reinforces the stigma.  Individual povertymay lead to an unfavourable self-conception, which in turn reinforces lack of opportunityand helps to keep people in poverty.  A thoroughgoing analysis of poverty (which is notmy aim here) would have to distinguish the causes of poverty, aspects of deprivation andconsequences, all of which contribute to the constellation of factors identified withpoverty.  
Aspects of deprivationThe idea of deprivation implies that people are lacking welfare - 'welfare' itself being awide-ranging term,  generally referring to people's well-being.  Poverty can largely bedescribed in terms of deprivations, although the moral content of poverty implies a
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degree of seriousness which is not necessarily the case with deprivation alone.  It seemsquite reasonable to think of people as 'deprived' if they are lacking some material goodsor resources - for example, if they do not have access to recreational facilities - but thatis not the same as saying that they are 'poor'.  The following argument was put to me,during research into deprived areas, by the representative of a community organisationin rural Perthshire:'Most children have a walk of around half a mile from school to the outskirts ... - theirwalk thereafter could be an additional mile.  There is no school bus provided even forthe youngest children whose daily walk is partly along a road with no pavement orverge. ... The youngsters ... have no leisure facilities. ... The village hall ... is poorlyheated ... and ... requires extensive redecoration. ... Compared perhaps to some areas,(this) is not a deprived area ... However, in terms of facilities it is a deprived area withrelatively little money being spent on it compared to similar communities in the cityareas.'  (4)This is a legitimate use of the term 'deprivation', but it is not normally the kind ofdeprivation which is thought of when referring to 'poverty'.  The difference appears tobe, not a difference in kind, but rather a value judgment as to the relative importance ofthe issues.  If any of the people I considered at the outset should not be classified as'poor', it would not be because they have no problems, but because their problems arenot thought to be as serious as those of others.  I know, for that reason, that mydescription of them as 'poor' can be disputed; but the debate should really centre on howserious the problems are and what should be done, rather than what word we use todescribe them.People experience many different kinds of deprivation: the kinds of problem whichBaratz and Grigsby describe are physical, material, psychological and social.  Materialdeprivation is perhaps the most important in relation to poverty, not because it is theonly kind which poor people experience, but because the paradigmatic cases of poverty -like the lack of food, clothing or shelter - are material.  The lack of physical welfare, or ill-health, has much in common with materialdeprivation.  The World Health Organisation defines health as 'a state of completephysical, mental and social well-being' (5), which fails to distinguish health from generalwell-being at all; in so far as lack of health indicates a more general lack of welfare, itcould be argued that it can be used in a similar way to poverty.  Certainly, aspects of illhealth - like malnutrition, infant mortality, early death, or frequent and chronic disability- constitute some of the common factors by which poverty is identified, being at the sametime a cause of poverty, an aspect of deprivation, and a potential consequence of poverty. Psychological forms of deprivation include not only mental health (about which thearguments relating to physical health also apply), but also aspects of personality andemotional relationships.  Baratz and Grigsby include a number of such factors: thecategory of 'welfare values' is explicitly related to the self-appraisal of people who arepoor.  Although such problems may follow from poverty, it seems wrong to include self-conception in any description of what poverty is; a person with a suicidally low self-conception would still not become poor on that account, and a person with poor housing,income and health with a favourable self-conception does not seem to be richer or poorerthan someone else with all these problems and an unfavourable one.  (The issue is notsimply a problem of definition; it is important in determining responses to poverty,because it implies that measures to improve people's self-concept do not in themselvesalleviate poverty.)  The same is true, I think, of factors concerning personal relationships. At the same time, there are related forms of social deprivation - particularly of thekind which Baratz and Grigsby refer to as 'deference values' - which have to beconsidered within an understanding of the problems of poverty.  It may be difficult inpractice to distinguish  different kinds of deprivation, because people whose welfare isimpaired - for example, people who are disabled, mentally ill, or lacking in education andstatus - are liable to suffer from disadvantages in society, and because people who lackmaterial welfare are vulnerable to other forms of deprivation.   People have needs forrelationships, for security, or for personal development; such needs are expressed
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through social structures like family, community, education, the workplace, and thestructure of opportunities.  It seems fairly evident that these kinds of deprivations arevery closely associated with the problems of poverty, to the point where poverty hasbeen expressed as an inability to participate fully in society (6); in the EuropeanCommunity, the idea of 'poverty' is increasingly identified with 'exclusion' (7).    Some aspects of people's social position are valued in ways which are very similar tothe way they regard material goods; they are referred to as 'positional' goods.  Thedeprivation of status, reputation, or power can be no less important than the lack of food,clothing or shelter.  One of the tests of important positional goods is that people areprepared to devote resources to obtaining them, often in preference to material goods. In Victorian times, among the greatest of fears was entry to the workhouse - in which onewould be fed and nourished often far better than one would outside - and a pauper'sburial.  In modern Britain, people might opt to be homeless rather than to acceptaccommodation in the worst local authority areas - 'worst' not in the sense of physicalcondition (which is in the UK principally the preserve of the private sector), but of socialreputation.  Poverty may be primarily material in its nature, but it cannot be seen solelyin material terms.  
Needs and resources'Needs' are those things which are necessary to avoid deprivation.  The interpretationof the things that people  'need' is likely to be contentious, because it is subject to manycompeting definitions: definitions from the people in need themselves, from experts andprofessionals, and from wider social norms (8).  It is debatable, too, how far such itemsshould be thought of as 'necessary', and how far they are simply important or desirable. Taken in all, the idea of need is hardly less complex than that of poverty, but in thiscontext there is one important issue which distinguishes the concept of 'need'; it is that'needs' are needs for something.  If people are hungry, they need food; if they arehomeless, they need housing.  The range of potential needs is enormously wide: examples include food, shelter,medical care, education, social and environmental services, consumer goods, recreationalopportunities, neighbourhood amenities, and transport facilities, employmentopportunities , clothing, fuel, or personal disposable income (9).  'Welfare' might bespoiled irretrievably for want of a particular item - which is probably true of lack of food,shelter, fuel, and certain forms of medical care -  but it can also be seen as cumulative,and the lack of some items may be compensated for by the presence of others (forexample, excellent neighbourhood amenities might make up for inadequate transportfacilities; consumer goods might conceivably make up for other recreationalopportunities; and a combination of factors like a personal disposable income, consumergoods, recreational facilities and neighbourhood amenities may, for some, be preferredto employment opportunities).  Because of this, there cannot be a definitive list of thethings people need, even if some needs are generally more important than others. Relating poverty to 'need' helps to focus attention on a significant issue: itsrelationship to resources.  Poverty is associated with certain kinds of deprivation, but itis not simply identifable with specific needs, because there are different ways in whichthe deprivations could be satisfied.  People who are poor are not simply deprived; theyare unable to meet their needs.  This implies that they lack the resources - the goods,benefits and services which a person might have or have access to - necessary toovercome their deprivation.  The kinds of problem I began by describing in terms of'poverty' were principally the problems of people who lacked adequate resources.  Baratz and Grigsby refer to poverty as 'a severe lack of physical and mental well-being, closely associated with inadequate economic resources and consumption' (10). This suggests, I think rightly, that poverty is not actually defined in terms of inadequateresources and consumption, but with the lack of welfare which results from them.  Thereare two problems with their formulation.  One is that the term 'closely associated' is tooloose to be helpful: a person whose resources and consumption are adequate would not
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normally be thought of as poor, even if that person suffers some kind of deprivation. Second, people may have resources which are adequate for some purposes andinadequate for others.  An owner-occupier whose mortgage is foreclosed, someone whofaces huge damages from a legal action, or a businessman who goes bankrupt, haveinadequate resources, and suffer deprivation as a result; but the inadequacy theyexperience, and the deprivation which results, affects only part of their lives, and(although all become vulnerable to poverty) they may well continue to draw onresources and avoid deprivation in other respects.  If poverty consists in a relationship between resources and the experience ofdeprivation, the kinds and patterns of deprivation which a person is likely to experienceare necessarily indeterminate.  It becomes virtually impossible to establish anauthoritative  list of factors which define people as being poor.  It may be possible toestablish some agreement about which forms or patterns of deprivation are particularlysevere - though there is clearly much scope for disagreement - and to define the kinds ofresources which are needed to provide against them.  But in any monetary economy,people are able to choose to some extent what they will spend their money on.  Whenresources are inadequate, people are unable to pay for some items or some combinationof items.  The most common pattern of poverty in developed societies is not that a poorperson lacks every kind of good in every sense - a test of 'destitution' rather than ofpoverty  - but that people lack some things, in various combinations, for much of the time. If people are short of food, they may skimp on the electricity bill.  When the electricity billhas to be paid, they might not pay the rent.  When the rent has to be paid, they go shortof food.  The process consists of a constant juggling with inadequate resources; there arealways options, though the options consist of a number of unpalatable choices betweendifferent kinds of deprivation which at different times are more or less pressing, moreor less serious.  Poverty might, then, be linked with inadequate food, fuel, clothing orshelter, in any combination, but equally it might not include any of these; no single factor,and no consistent set of factors, can be held to be 'essential' to poverty.  Deprivations areconsidered as 'poverty' when they are recognised as particularly serious, which is whydeprivations of food, clothing or shelter are so often seen as paradigms of poverty.  Butnone defines or exhausts the list of factors which might be included under the term.When resources are considered in more detail, the position becomes still lessdeterminate.  Resources are important because they represent the ability to gain the kindof things which people lack.  This ability might be understood in terms of money orcapital goods, which can be converted into the things one needs; equally, it may refer toother resources a person is able to draw on.  Although I have referred to poverty asreflecting 'a lack of resources', it might be more accurate to refer to Titmuss's concept ofa 'command over resources'.  'Command' over resources is another way of saying thatpeople use resources, or are able to use them.  This is often judged in terms of income orwealth, but what someone possesses is not always as important as the kinds of resourcethat person is able to draw on.  Ownership does not guarantee use.  Many people ownrights in pension funds, but cannot draw on them.  Conversely, many people use housingwhich they do not own; a person who rents a house has the use of it, without owning it. 'Command over resources' also includes the potential to use resources.  Some people areable to borrow resources - like the use of credit cards, mortgages or their spouse's car. Some people are able to provide for unexpected contingencies by insuring against risks;they are in a more favourable position than others who cannot.  One implication of relating poverty to 'command' over resources is that the idea isagain referred to its social context.  The command over resources of individuals maydiffer - which means that, in circumstances where a person is deprived in other ways,that person's ability to use resources to limit the problems arising from deprivation willalso be limited, and so social disadvantage may add to the problems of poverty.  Peoplein the kinds of circumstances I introduced in chapter 1 - people who are unemployed,single parents, disabled people, or ex-mental patients - are liable to be socially rejected. Someone from an ethnic minority may not be able to buy adequate housing.  A personliving on a poor estate may not be able to get a taxi to call, to obtain hire purchase, or to
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have milk delivered.  Status, power and stigma play a part in determining the commandover resources which people have.  In the allocation of council housing, which nominallydoes not depend on an economic market, housing officers have graded people accordingto their 'type' and 'standards', and offered them housing accordingly (11).  In access tohealth care, middle class people not only use their doctors more - an issue which mightbe taken to reflect amongst other things cultural differences, better transport orcommunications, or better knowledge - but are more likely to receive the care for whichdoctors are the main gatekeepers (12).  If status leads to people acting differentlytowards others, it is changing the ability of people of different statuses to affect criticaloutcomes.  This reinforces the view that the nature of poverty is socially defined.
The social definition of povertyThe concept of deprivation conceals a nest of value judgments.  Implicit in the idea of a'lack' of something is  the existence of a condition in which these things are not lacking. The concept of deprivation implies that there is a standard of sufficiency - an amount offood, clothing or shelter which is at least 'enough'.  To say that someone is 'poor' is to saythat that person does not have enough.  But the question 'how much is enough?' canscarcely be addressed, let alone answered without reference to some values, because theidea of sufficiency depends on the standard that is being applied - enough perhaps tosurvive, to avoid suffering, to maintain physical efficiency, to be comfortable, to livedecently, or whatever.  Much of the debate about the concept of welfare in the UK has focused on the idea of'subsistence need' - a standard of sufficiency based on the minimum necessary forphysical efficiency.  The idea of 'subsistence' is evidently more narrowly defined than theneeds which support a more general sense of well-being; transport, amenities orpersonal disposable income may not be requisite to maintain physical efficiency even iflife is worse without them.  The selection of subsistence as being of particular importanceclearly depends on a value judgment.  Historically, the selection of a standard ofsubsistence was based not least on the desire to put certain core issues beyond dispute -which was the approach taken by Rowntree.  The nature of subsistence, however, is socially constructed.  This proposition isgenerally associated with a 'relative' view of poverty; absolute definitions are widelythought to be incapable of accommodating the idea that needs might be sociallydetermined, and this is taken to be fatal to any attempt to establish a fixed standard ofsubsistence.  This is a basic misconception.  It may in theory be possible to argue for anabsolute concept that is independent of social criteria - for example, that the elementsof the nutritional value of food are required for subsistence as a fact of human existence,irrespective of social conditions - but there are very few people to whom this positioncould be attributed (and certainly not Booth or Rowntree, who are most often used asexamples).  The nearest I know of is George, who writes that, while much of poverty isrelative, 'in all times and in all countries ... there is a core of basic necessities which isirreducible and which must be satisfied if people are not to be in poverty.  Thuspoverty consists of a core of basic necessities as well as a list of other necessities thatchange over time and place.'  (13)   There are few if any 'basic necessities' which are not subject in some sense to socialdefinition.  In relation to food, it has to be established which foodstuffs will supply basicrequirements, and where they can be obtained.  For example, there is some nutritionalvalue in eating dogs, horses and insects, but the option of doing so is not universallyavailable.  (Conversely, milk, which is a staple part of the diet in the UK, cannot bedigested by many adults in the Third World; when after the second world war the USshipped dried milk to countries to help prevent starvation, it caused sickness.)  Clothinghas to be assessed, not only by the warmth or protection it offers, but also in terms ofdecency and convenience.  The fuel that is necessary depends on the conditions in whichthe fuel is used, and the equipment available for burning it.  And the definition of what
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is a 'shelter' equally is different in different societies - a function not only of climate andmaterials, but also land tenure and the social organisation of housing.  In the ThirdWorld, squatting is a widespread, and arguably a 'normal', form of tenure.  But a personin Britain who is without a home does not have the option of erecting a squatter shack -not so much because of the lack of materials, as the limitations of land use and therestrictions of the law.  A person with no accommodation is liable, not just to be movedon, but to be arrested.  There is, then, a clearly defined minimum level, which people arenot supposed to fall below.  But it is a socially defined condition, because the way it isunderstood, and the circumstances in which it is applied, are social.  This argument owes something to Marx.  Marx argued that needs are necessarilydefined in social terms; there may be biological needs, but the way in which needs areinterpreted, and the forms in which demands are made, are social (14).  This is the basisof the concept of poverty in the Soviet Union (15) - which defines an absolute level ofpoverty in social terms; the idea of a socially defined 'poverty line' is in consequenceaccepted institutionally.  It is also, I think, what Sen means to say when he seeks todistinguish 'capabilities' from 'commodities or characteristics' (16).  'Capabilities' are thebasic needs which everyone has; 'commodities' and 'characteristics' are the meansthrough which these basic needs are interpreted or operationalised.  Sen does hisargument a disservice by describing this as an 'absolute' core within a 'relative' context,because the terms 'absolute' and 'relative' refer to models of poverty rather than theconstituent concepts; what he is saying is that even if needs are basic and universal, theprocesses through which they are recognised and met are necessarily social ones.'The necessities of life', Townsend writes, 'are not fixed.  They are continuously beingadapted and augmented as changes take place in a society and in its products' (17).  Theproposition that the meaning of poverty changes over time follows from the fact thatpoverty is defined and identified in terms specific to particular societies.  But it is not, inthe way that Townsend suggests, primarily a change in expectations and wants.  Associeties change, so do the nature and type of goods and resources available.  If theincome of a society increases, 'poverty goods' - that is, goods which are primarily boughtby people with limited resources - are less likely to be available, because it is not worththe while of suppliers to provide them.  It can be difficult, even illegal, to obtain cheapcuts of meat, peat for burning, or cheap distilled liquor like poteen; poor people have topay more for higher quality goods along with the rest of us.  (This should not be taken asan argument to lower standards; there are very good reasons why social minima shouldbe raised.  But when social standards are higher, poor people evidently need more tomeet them.)It is also true that things which are not essential in some societies become essentialin others.  Some societies, for example, have few facilities for transport.  This means thatother basic resources, like food, have to be obtainable without recourse to transport (andwhere they are not, we would reasonably describe them as 'poor societies').  In a modernindustrial society, many basic facilities are not available on these terms, or are availableonly at a cost which exceeds the cost of the transport itself.  This means, for all intentsand purposes, that access to transport becomes a necessity.  As Marx says, the structureof society creates needs.  But these are not necessarily 'false' needs, in the sense ofdelusions fostered by a materialist ethic; they are part of the facts of life of specific formsof social organisation.This prompts some refections on the applicability of the 'absolute' and 'relative'models to the kinds of points which I have considered.  The idea of poverty necessarilyincludes important social elements, both in the understanding of basic needs and in thenature of the resources with which those needs might be met; this is commonly taken asa criticism of the 'absolute' model.  If there is a principal deficiency in the idea of an'absolute minimum', it is the failure of the concept to take into account positional goods. Positional goods are in their very nature determined by a pattern of social relationships,and not by an interpretation of the need for certain types of core commodities.  Thisimplies that an adequate definition of a social minimum cannot be solely 'absolute', butmust include some criteria which are relative to the society in which it is applied.  That
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is not to say that there are no 'absolute' criteria, in the sense of criteria which relate toa set standard, but only that absolute criteria cannot be enough in themselves.This does not mean that a simple 'relative' model is any more satisfactory, if by arelative model one means that people are identified as poor strictly by their relationshipto others who are not poor.  The 'relative' concept is sometimes taken as a form ofinequality, and there are clear indications in the argument that some aspects ofinequality - particularly positional goods - have also to be considered as aspects ofpoverty.  But there is no standard to judge how the distinction should be made betweenthose who are poor and those who are not; and it is not clear what there is in a 'relative'model that can make it possible to identify certain needs as particularly important oressential.  In other words, the weakness of the 'absolute' model is that it fails to take intoaccount issues which can be seen as 'relative'; whereas the 'relative' model fails toidentify the kinds of issues addressed by the 'absolute' approach.   
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Chapter 3
Operationalisation of the conceptAn adequate conceptualisation of poverty goes only part of the way towards theidentification of the problem.  The  concept has to be translated into usable terms, or'operationalised'.  Measures have to be selected which will faithfully reflect the conceptof poverty which has been outlined.It is here that philosophical integrity begins to crumble.  The task of  findingappropriate measures is so difficult, and so frustrating, that academics, researchers,campaigners and politicians have been driven, again and again, to use measures ofpoverty which they know to be inadequate, misleading and sometimes evencontradictory to the positions which they which to adopt.  One of the best knownexamples in the UK is the use of the basic means-tested benefit (currently named IncomeSupport) as a standard of poverty.  It has been referred to, particularly by Townsend, asthe 'state's standard of poverty'; and, because of Townsend's authority, this use has beenwidely imitated.  This has many disadvantages, not least that if one uses the level ofbenefit to define people as poor, any increase in that benefit increases the number ofpeople defined as poor - and conversely, that a cut in benefit leaves more people definedas better off.  Why, then, is the benefit used in this way?  One reason is that it isconvenient.  If it is possible to define all people on or below the level of incomeprescribed for benefits as 'poor', then it is possible to identify large numbers of peopleas poor without having to undertake fundamental research (which has its own flaws). A second reason is that it is conventional, and as such gives a fairly constant referencepoint - it makes it possible to discuss other issues about poverty, like why people arepoor or what sort of people become poor, without having first to go through theagonising process of defining the problem and identifying the people concerned.  Thefamilies of disabled people are likely to fall into a band of income close to the level atwhich people claim benefit.  This does not tell us exactly how many disabled people arepoor, or what the extent of their deprivation is likely to be, but it is quite sufficient toidentify disabled people as a particularly vulnerable group.  Third, it offers a basis toanalyse other issues.  If one learns, for example, that housing tenure is stronglydifferentiated in terms of income, and that people in receipt of the basic means-testedbenefit are more than twice as likely to rent property as to own it, one has establishedan important fact about housing tenure - whatever the defects of the reference pointwhich is being used.   The same kinds of argument relate to the method used by the Luxembourg IncomeStudy (1).  This study relies on a series of statistics drawn from sources in differentcountries, which it attempts to process into a standard format; often, the figures are notformed on a directly equivalent basis, and there are problems in potential bias in relationto those groups which are left out of the data.  There are discrepancies in the way peoplewho share incomes, like households or families, are recorded.  Poverty is defined, withinthe study, on a strictly comparative basis, in terms of 'economic distance'; a povertystandard is calculated as 50% of median income calculated on an equivalent basis foreach individual.  Despite the evident limitations of the material, about which the authorsare explicit, and despite the theoretical problems in presenting this as a definition ofpoverty, which I shall return to, the use of this standard provides information of strikinganalytical power.  It is possible, for example, to identify the relative position of differentkinds of household in different countries, and the extent to which social security benefitsreduce their relative disadvantage.  The authors of the LIS wave aside the problems ofdefinition.  'Although the concept of poverty is controversial, most social scientists agreethat the group with the lowest income can be defined as poor even in affluent societies.' (2)  There are dangers in this position, but there is some reason in it, too.  Irrespective
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of whether the issues being addressed might really be said to be the problems of poverty,for those who are interested in poverty by any definition attention needs to be focussedon the problems and characteristic of people on the lowest incomes - and this is the typeof information the LIS is dedicated to producing.  The level of Income Support, or the relationship to median income, are being used asindicators - not a precise measurement of a problem, but a signpost towards a range ofassociated problems.  The principle of using indicators is widely accepted in socialresearch, out of necessity rather than conviction.  If it is not possible precisely to measurea particular problem, it may still be possible at least to get some idea about the shape orsize of a problem by using proxies.  But this process is fraught with difficulties.
Validity.  A valid indicator is one which actually reflects the problem or condition itis supposed to reflect.  There are many difficulties with this, because most indicators areonly approximations of a problem at best.  Income statistics, for example, are widely usedas an indicator of poverty - that is, as a guide as to where poverty is likely to occur -because income stands as a useful proxy for consumption.  However, too close anidentification of poverty with low income would not be very satisfactory.  There arepeople with very low incomes who are not poor.  The income of business entrepreneursmay be negligible, or even negative, but their consumption may be high; a very highnegative income is a sign of affluence rather than of poverty.  
Reliability  Indicators are reliable if they consistently report the same thing in thesame way.  This means that, even if the indicator is not a very accurate reflection of theproblem being studied, one can at least get some feeling for whether a problem is serious,and how it is changing.  Unfortunately, many of the figures which are widely used areunreliable.  One of the problems with monetary values is that they change, usuallythrough inflation.  It is possible to control for inflation to some degree, but the methodswhich are used to do it - in the UK, the Retail Price Index - are concerned with the valueof money overall.  The RPI reflects, as faithfully as it can, the 'basket of goods' bought bythe average consumer.  This will include, for example, the cost of housing, or petrol forthe car.  But most people in the UK buy housing; many poor people cannot afford to buy,and so are not directly affected by the mortgage rate.  Poor people cannot afford cars, sothey probably will not buy any petrol.  On the other hand, food and fuel  constitute a largepart of the budget of poor people - because the needs for food and heat do not diminishin proportion with someone's income.  The inflation rate calculated from the RPI doesnot, then, necessarily reflect the increase in costs faced by people who are poor; it is inthe nature of poverty that the 'basket of goods' which is bought is likely to be different. (This problem is not, by the way, insuperable; Bradshaw's research on 'budget standards'(3) identifies the items which poor people actually buy at the cost which they pay, whichaccounts for inflation very neatly.  The point of this example is not to say that inflationalways makes figures unreliable, but rather that a very widely used figure, which isreliable for many purposes, is not reliable for the purpose of examining poverty.)  
Availability  Those indicators which are readily available have usually been designedfor a particular purpose, which may or may not be adequate for an assessment ofpoverty.  Wealth statistics rely on the Inland Revenue's definitions of goods - anassessment complicated both by the extent of liability for tax, and by the concern ofpotential taxpayers to evade or avoid liability.  Effectively, any analysis relies on some heroic approximations using available figuresas proxies for other facts one would really wish to have.  But even remote proxies maybe hard to find.  To take one minor example, in attempting to establish the spatialdistribution of poverty for some locally based research, I hoped to draw on informationabout the distribution of the ownership of goods in different areas; but I found noadequate source of local data.  Information on telephone ownership is not made availableas it is now considered to be 'commercially sensitive'.  Information on TV licenses, as avery crude approximation of TV ownership, is not held in a form which allows analysis. Information on car ownership is confused by the level of registration in the names offirms.  Probably the best indicator is the level of owner-occupation - but that is notparticularly accurate, because it depends largely on estimates initially based on the
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census, which rusts over time, and there is no reliable way to take account of subsequentvacancies or transfers from and to private rented housing.  Examinations of poverty ata local level tend, as a result, to rely on data drawn from much larger administrativeunits, which limits their application to small areas.
Plausibility  It is not essential for their use, but it is at least desirable than anyindicators used should make sense.  Much work that has been done on the measurementof poverty has produced some fairly implausible results.  Townsend's 1979 work onpoverty, for example, which will be considered in more detail shortly, is based on adescription on the lifestyles of poor people.  He shows that poor people are likely not toget three meals a day, and poor children cannot have a birthday party.  This may be true,but it is difficult to see factors like these as constituting poverty in themselves.  Theresults appeared because Townsend used a statistical analysis to select the items whichbest indicated poverty, rather than relying on an explanatory model.  The effect may bescientifically valid, but it may be repugnant to 'common sense', and as such it is debatablewhether it can subsequently provide a sound and secure basis for policy.
Usefulness and application  Last, but not least, any indicators have to be useful - thatis, they have to be applied to the problem they are being used to analyse.  Research intopoverty does not take place in a political or administrative vacuum, and it is oftenundertaken for specific purposes.  For example, a discussion of the distributiveimplications of policies can comfortably settle for figures based on income distribution,on the basis that the lower end of the income distribution, even if it is not equivalent topoverty,  will pick up most cases of poverty on the way.  Research into the spatialdistribution of resources, which has been important for resources allocation, tends torely on different sorts of indicators, such as the types of problem associated with poverty,because these are locally available.  And research intended to reflect on the benefitssystem requires some identification of the recipient unit - usually the household, thoughin some cases (for example the attempt to identify the poverty of women withinhouseholds) individuals.  The point here is not to claim that some kinds of figure arebetter than others for these purposes, which may or may not be true, but rather that thetypes of indicators which are used may be quite different according to the purpose of theresearch.
Identifying povertyPoverty can primarily be identified through two main aspects: the presence ofdeprivation, and the lack of command over  resources.  It follows from what has been saidthat, although these factors are both important within the definition of poverty, neitheris requisite in order to identify the problem: deprivation can be taken as an indicator oflack of resources, and the lack of resources is likely to generate deprivation.The identification of deprivation might be undertaken directly or indirectly.  Directidentification can be undertaken by classifying certain types of problem as being seriousimpairments of welfare of the type associated with poverty and measuring those directly. Indirect identification relies on the association of poverty with a range of factors, causesand consequences - like unemployment, ill health, or low educational attainment.  Thisapproach has mainly been undertaken in studies of area deprivation (4), but in principleit could also be extended to studies of individuals or households.  (It is also the basis fora distinct strategy in response to poverty, 'indicator targetting', which is outlined inchapter 7.)It is difficult to say with confidence that direct identification is superior to indirect. Both rely of necessity on the use of indicators rather than precise measures; both pointto factors which are important in their own right.  The primary justification for using oneapproach rather than another is that it better serves the purpose for which the researchis intended.  Command over resources is perhaps more difficult to identify directly; in its nature,it refers to a potential set of circumstances as well as the actual situation.  In practice,actual resources have to stand as an indicator for potential ones.  Resources include
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income, which is a flow of resources, and wealth, which is a stock.  Income is widely usedas an indicator of poverty - that is, as a guide as to where poverty is likely to occur - buttoo close an identification of poverty with low income would not be very satisfactory. The French team contributing to the European Poverty Programme made a number ofobjections.  One was that it was a 'one-dimensional' approach.  Poverty is multi-dimensional and cannot be described through low income alone.  A second is that theamount of income is less important as an indicator than its regularity and stability. Third, it invites inclusion of many people within the definition who would not bedescribed as poor.  Fourth, it is difficult to measure in any accurate, trustworthy way.  (5). Wealth, equally, proves to be not very convincing as a measure of poverty.  Wealthis usually measured in money terms, but money is important for what it will buy; theclothes a person wears may be almost worthless in money terms, because their onlymarketable value is second-hand, but the lack of a stock of clothing is very important forpoor people.  Despite their defects, income statistics are often a better guide to povertythan wealth statistics.  Income is important because it marks, for most people, the levelof their consumption - what they are able to use.  Income statistics may not reflect theconsumption of any individual or family, but when people are taken in the aggregate,many of the differences between individuals cancel out.An alternative to the use of either income or wealth is the use of consumption, as atruer measure of command over resources.  Unfortunately, consumption figures are noteasily available, because for individuals or families they require that a record is kept; thishas been the focus of much empirical research.  However, they are still vulnerable tomany of the objections made to the use of income as a measure.The apparent impossibility of measuring poverty practically in any objective, reliable,indisputable way might be seen as reason to despair.  The French report to the EuropeanCommunity suggested that'while it is impossible to quantify poverty in France, it also appears an unnecessarystep.  The fact that one does not have a total (fictitious) number of the poor does notprevent one from devising policies in favour of the most deprived, from determiningmeasures to be taken or from working them out carefully.'  (6)I have some sympathy with this position.  While I was writing this section, a  presenteron the radio happened to ask: how would you feel if you had a six-foot alligator in yourgarden? and the question struck a chord.   I think I would have difficulty describing it tothe appropriate authorities, especially if they did not want to believe me.  I doubt I couldtell it apart from a crocodile.  It hardly seems important to know whether it is three feet,six feet or nine feet long.  But I do know I would want someone to take it away.  Unfortunately, it will not do as an approach to poverty.  The first obstacle is that manypeople do not believe poverty exists, at least not in their country; one of the most basicreasons for social research has been to provide hard evidence about it in order topersuade governments to action.  Second, the problems of poverty are varied, anddiffused throughout society; policies which focus only on the most obvious problems(like poor areas) are likely to miss large numbers of people.  Third, governments (andothers involved in the subject) want to know what is involved in the effort, how much itwill cost, and what they can expect to achieve.  None of this can be measured precisely,but it can be measured; the use of indicators is, at least, a way forward.  
Operational definitionsResearch into poverty has come to rely on a range of assumptions and on definitions ofissues which are intended  to translate the concept of poverty into practice - and to makeit manageable.  It is difficult to make sense of a discussion of the issues without firstintroducing some of the substantive work which has been done in this area.  Writers andresearchers on poverty have not confined themselves to discrete observations about thetopic; they have produced packages of material, primarily in order to operationalise theconcept of poverty, but often, it has to be said, with the intention of arguing for aparticular political outcome.   
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Booth: the qualitative description of povertyFor most purposes, the modern study of poverty begins with Booth.  Booth's mammothwork Life and labour of the people in  London, begun in 1886 and finished in 1903,represented at the time the most thorough analysis of poverty ever undertaken.  Booth'smethods were distinguished from his  predecessors' in three main respects.  First, heattempted to establish 'the facts'; as a positivist, he attempted to discover as much as hecould of the problems of poverty without prejudging.  Second, he attempted to useempirical evidence to quantify the extent of the problem.  Third, he used a variety ofmethods by which to identify the problems, believing that this would reinforce thedescription of poverty (7).Despite widespread misconceptions to the contrary, Booth did not attempt to definepoverty according to any prescriptive standard.  He sought rather to describe thecondition of poor people; such attempts as there are to define poverty emerge from thedescription.  Booth based his analysis of poverty on an division between eight classes:'A.  The lowest class of occasional labourers, loafers and semi-criminals. B.  Casual earnings - 'very poor' } together C.  Intermittent earnings } 'the poor' D.  Small regular earnings. E.  Regular standard earnings. F.  Higher class labour. G.  Lower middle class. H.  Upper middle class.'  (8)The basis of this classification is not immediately clear.  It looks, at first sight, as if peopleare grouped according to their incomes; this is certainly what distinguishes classes D andE.  But Booth includes at least four groups, classes A, F, G and H, which are identified bytheir status in society rather than by their income.  More importantly, classes B, C and Dare distinguished by the frequency of their income.  This suggests that Booth was tryingto distinguish people by their class, in the sense of groups defined by their economicrelationships, rather than by their income.  Williams suggests that the classes were identified on three criteria - relationships tothe labour market, the domestic economy of households, and their moral character (9). These elements certainly occur within the discussion of the classes, but it is going too farto conclude, as Williams does, that the classification is a moralistic one.  Booth did notattempt to apply either clear discriminating principles or an explicit explanatory model;this was not his purpose.  The primary basis for the distinction between classes isobservation rather than theory.  Life and Labour describes a range of social conditionsin which it seemed that people are likely to be poor or on the margins of poverty.  Theclasses represent groups which seemed to experience significant differences in theirlifestyle.  The aspect of Booth's description of poverty which was to attract most attention washis use of a 'poverty line', which distinguished poor people from others.  He set this at18s to 21s a week.  He did not directly justify the selection of this range of income interms of needs, a point which has been taken to indicate a degree of imprecision in hisresearch (10).  But the poverty line was nothing more than an estimate of the levels ofincome at which people were likely to become poor.  He explained the way in which heidentified this range of income in the final volume of the second series.  'I take 21s as the bottom level for male adult labour in London.  The employments inwhich less than 21s a week (or 3s 6d a day) is paid are exceptional in character. When the rate is 18s or 20s the work is not only characterised by great regularity andconstancy with no slack seasons or lost days, but is generally such as a quite youngor old man could perform - men who preferably have only themselves to keep."  (11)In other words, the poverty line was identified as the lowest part of the range of regularearnings.  The Simeys argue that 'Booth's poverty line must be regarded as being drawn so as to coincide with popularopinion. ... it was not his fault if his endeavour to translate this into shillings and
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pence for illustrative purposes was regarded by others as the main factor in hisevaluation.' (12)Booth made no attempt to explain how people should spend their money, and he wascriticised at the time for not doing so.  He responded by constructing a number ofindicative household budgets, to give some idea of the lifestyle of people on very lowincomes.  The poverty line was an indication of the sort of incomes over which people arelikely to become poor; the household budgets represented the behaviour of people in thecondition of poverty.  The idea of the poverty line, reinforced by Rowntree's attempts to identify minimumlevels of income, were to take the debate in a different direction.  But the attempt todiscover poverty by describing conditions, rather than defining them, has recently beenrevived; a paper by Bradshaw and Holmes (13) considers the experience of unemployedfamilies by identifying their pattern of expenditure budgets, diets and financialcircumstances.  This returns, in effect, to the kind of work pioneered by Booth'shousehold budgets.  The emphasis is firmly on the qualitative appraisal of the experienceof poverty.  If Bradshaw and Holmes' work deserves particular mention, it is not so muchfor its originality as for its fusion of a range of different types of qualitative method.  Itcombines studies of household budgets and expenditure with interview reports,observation and analysis.  The results are intended, not to present the characteristics ofevery poor person in miniature, but to reflect a particular kind of experience in depth. As such, it provides an insight into poverty which cannot be achieved throughquantitative appraisals.  In describing the 'circumstances and conditions of life' ofunemployed people, Bradshaw and Holmes identify a series of issues.  These included arestricted diet; an inadequate stock of clothing; limited stock of consumer durables, withthose which were possessed being in poor condition; limited access to transport; and ahigh proportion of time spent at home watching television.  The problems did not,perhaps surprisingly, include bad housing - which may indicate that the families were notas 'poor' as some others, or may reflect the relatively high standard of housing in the UK. The main gap in the research is that there is little account of people's positional status -for example the impact of stigma, or of living in undesirable areas.
Rowntree and the 'biological approach'Rowntree's definition of a poverty line was certainly strongly influenced by the debatesabout Booth's work.  One  of the objections raised against Booth was that he had failedto distinguish the circumstances of people according to their behaviour.  C.S. Lochobjected to Booth's work 'that poverty is so entirely relative to use and habit and potential ability of all kinds,that it can never serve as a satisfactory basis of social investigations or socialreconstruction.  It is not the greater or lesser of command of means that makes thematerial difference in the contentment and efficiency of social life, but the use ofmeans relative to station in life and its possibilities.'  (14)Bosanquet, similarly, was prepared to assert that 'there are comparatively few families in London through whose hands there had notpassed in the course of the year sufficient money and money's worth to have madea life free at any rate from hunger and cold, and with much in it of good.'  (15)Rowntree's distinction of 'primary' and 'secondary' poverty (16) was a direct refutationof this kind of criticism.  People were described as being in primary poverty when theyhad inadequate income to meet minimum subsistence requirements; secondary povertyarose when, even though the incomes of people were nominally adequate to meet theseminimum requirements, their patterns of behaviour or expenditure brought theiravailable resources below the level at which the minimum standards could be met. The distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' poverty has been controversial,because of the implication that people in secondary poverty might be condemned fortheir poverty. But this would be to misinterpret the thrust of Rowntree's argument.  Thestandards he devised for 'primary poverty' were deliberately set at a level so strict as to
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be beyond controversy; the minimum requirements were calculated on the mostrestrictive standard Rowntree could devise.  Allowance was made for food, assessed onthe basis of providing a minimally adequate diet with the greatest possible economy;house rent and rates; and household sundries, including clothing, light and fuel. Rowntree made the point quite explicitly that not only was there no room forimprovidence or inefficiency, but there was also no allowance for the slightest deviationfrom the standard.  '... let us clearly understand what "merely physical efficiency" means.  A family livingon the scale allowed for in this estimate must never spend a penny on railway fare oromnibus.  They must never go into the country unless they walk.  They must neverpurchase a halfpenny newspaper or spend a penny to buy a ticket for a popularconcert.  They must write no letters to absent children, for they cannot afford to paythe postage.  They must never contribute anything to their church or chapel, or giveany help to a neighbour which costs them money.  They cannot save, nor can they joinsick club or Trade Union, because they cannot pay the necessary subscriptions.  Thechildren must have no pocket money for dolls, marbles or sweets.  The father mustsmoke no tobacco, and must drink no beer.  The mother must never buy any prettyclothes for herself or for her children ... Should a child fall ill, it must be attended bythe parish doctor; should it die, it must be buried by the parish.  Finally, the wage-earner must never be absent from his work for a single day.  If any of these conditionsare broken, the extra expenditure involved is met, and can only be met, by limiting thediet ...' (17)On this basis, his initial research found that nearly 10% of everyone he surveyed was inprimary poverty; a further 3% were within two shillings of the line, and 8½% morewithin six shillings of it.  Rowntree established, by this process, not only that asubstantial number of people were on incomes so low that they must inevitably be poor,but that a high proportion of others were so close to the line that they must be expectedto be affected by similar restrictions.  These people were described as being in'secondary poverty'.  There is not one 'poverty line' in Rowntree: like Booth, he wasconcerned with a range of income in which people might be considered vulnerable topoverty.  Rowntree might be considered, in the idea of 'secondary poverty', to have offeredhostages to fortune.  He discussed the influence of drink and gambling on expenditure,for example, concluding that much secondary poverty might be attributed to these vices;and part of Poverty is directly concerned with drink and its effects, though Rowntree doessuggest that people's lives were so miserable that it is hardly surprising if they soughtsome social life and entertainments.  Equally, though, there are other sections whichreflect on the problems of secondary poverty.  Rowntree points out that poor people arelikely to pay more for their food, that people who spent their money inefficientlyinvariably went without food to pay for it, and that before condemning their inefficiencyit may be appropriate to compare their diets with those of the well-to-do.  There is muchin Rowntree's work which reflects the dominant attitudes of the epoch when he waswriting - but if he had failed to take account of those attitudes, he could not have hopedfor his work to have a major impact.  Rowntree's use of the idea of 'primary' poverty meets several of important tests forindicators; it has widely been interpreted to refer to a biological minimum necessary forsubsistence (18).  Rowntree himself invited the comment by referring to the standard aswhat was required for 'merely physical efficiency'.  He wrote: 'my primary poverty linerepresented the minimum sum on which physical efficiency could be maintained.  It wasa bare standard of subsistence ...' (19)  Veit-Wilson has convincingly argued against theview that Rowntree's work excludes social conditions, but the idea of the 'biologicalapproach' has persisted, both in critiques of absolute measures and more recently in anacademic reconsideration of the value of defining an absolute minimum.  Sen, forexample, writes:
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'The much maligned biological approach, which deserves substantial reformulationbut not rejection, relates to this irreducible core of absolute deprivation, keepingissues of starvation and hunger at the centre of the concept of poverty' (20).What a biological minimum identifies is a point which people cannot live below, nomatter what they do - a level of 'primary poverty'.  The basket of goods approach usedby Rowntree actually goes somewhat beyond the 'biological' needs represented by aparticular calorific intake (as do the determinations of social assistance rates in Germanyor the Soviet Union, which use fairly restrictive normative budgets) (21), because thereis generally more in such a basket than is required for biological subsistence alone; butthere are measures which use food intake as the central guide, like the United StatesDepartment of Agriculture which assumes that food intake constitutes one-third of totalexpenditure (22) or the Indian government, which defines the poverty line in terms ofthe income of those who have a basic minimum calorie intake each day (23).  There are two main objections to this kind of approach.  One is that a measure whichis based primarily on people's food intake (and perhaps not even on all aspects of theirnutritional requirements) could in certain circumstances fall far short of meeting theirother needs, and it would be fairly extraordinary to suggest that a family is not poor ifthey have enough to eat but cannot afford adequate fuel, clothing or shelter.  The secondis that a measure of biological subsistence does not reflect the way that people actuallylive, and a standard of 'primary poverty' can be used as a basis to judge the poor formisusing their resources.  The purpose of defining the diets necessary for biologicalsubsistence should not be to suggest that poor people must eat according to a particularregime, but at times (e.g. in the menus published by the US Department of Agriculture)it can seem that way.  Poor people do not necessarily buy 'healthy' food when they areshort of money; they have good reasons for not doing so.  Recent research in Britainsuggests both that healthy food costs more, and that where there is not enough foodpeople need to supplement their energy intake with high-calorie foods, such as sweetsand biscuits.  This is particularly true where there are children (24).  Although these are strong objections, they should not be taken to invalidate the useof biological measures as an indicator.  On this most restrictive basis, one-seventh of thepopulation of the USA, which is one of the richest countries in the world, still emerges aspoor (25).  
Abel-Smith and Townsend: using benefit levelsAlthough the description of poverty in The poor and the poorest is not of the same kindas that undertaken by Booth  or Rowntree, it ranks as a major work which has had asignificant impact on the conceptualisation and analysis of poverty.  The argument isbased on a secondary analysis of statistics obtained from the Family Expenditure Survey,a government survey describing in detail the income and consumption patterns of a widerange of families.  'Poverty' was taken to be equivalent to the level of benefit offered byNational Assistance: the authors defend this by saying that'Whatever may be said about the adequacy of the National Assistance Board level ofliving as a just or publicly approved measure of "poverty", it has at least theadvantage of being in a sense the "official" operational definition of the minimumlevel of living at any particular time.'  (26)The authors sought to identify not only the numbers of people on the basic rates, but alsothose with 20% or 40% more.  The reasons for doing this were partly to take into accountextra needs not allowed for in the basic rates, and partly to bring in those on the marginsof poverty, whose life style would not necessarily be very different from those with asmall amount less.  The justification for the title of the paper is that their approachdistinguishes different levels at which people might be considered poor.This work was to prove enormously influential: it is largely credited with the'rediscovery of poverty' in academic literature in the UK (though it is perhaps importantto note that at the same period 'poverty' was being identified, in the United States, withina very different conceptual framework) (27).  The measure of poverty as equivalent to
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National Assistance rates, or 140% of those rates, became widely accepted: it is the basis,for example, of the measurement of poverty in the papers of the Royal Commission onthe Distribution of Income and Wealth (28).  The rates of National Assistance, even at the time of this pamphlet, had little to dowith the definition of poverty.  The National Assistance rates introduced in 1948 werenominally based on Rowntree's surveys, but Beveridge used lower figures thanRowntree; the figures were based on 1938, and no allowance was made for inflation; andthe government made adjustments, because of free school meals, which cut the rates forchildren.  Abel Smith and Townsend calculated that, at 1953 rates, the benefit levelswould fall below Rowntree's poverty line (29).Subsequent amendments of the benefit levels have had a still greater impact on therelationship between the benefits and Rowntree's estimates.  Through the 1970's,benefits for long-term claimants increased by prices or wages, whichever was greater -leading to a ratchet upwards of pensions, though tending to leave unemployed peoplebehind.  Inflation was measured by the general increase in the retail price index, not theitems used by Rowntree.  No account has been taken of the continued availability or non-availability of 'poverty goods' - second hand items, cheap foodstuffs, etc.  The allowancesfor dependants were altered in 1980, and the rates were substantially restructured againin 1988.  The effect of this is to confound any links which might be made between benefit ratesand poverty.  Benefit rates are not based in any measure of basic needs.  If anything,Income Support is below subsistence levels for large numbers of people.  Piachaud hasused a technique similar to Rowntree's to show that benefit rates were inadequate tomeet the subsistence of a child (30).  Mack and Lansley argue that serious deprivationsbegan, for most people, when incomes fell below 150% of the Supplementary Benefitlevel (31).  And research by the Policy Studies Institute shows that more than half all thefamilies with children on SB were in debt, had had serious anxieties about money whileon benefit, and ran out of money most weeks (32).  The Income Support rates areeffectively lower than SB was for many households.
Townsend: poverty as 'relative deprivation'Peter Townsend's Poverty in the United Kingdom (33) is certainly the most importantstudy of poverty after Rowntree.   Townsend explains his research in terms of adeveloped conceptual analysis of poverty, which I have already addressed in part, andshall consider further in the following chapter; poverty is described in terms of thenormal activities and amenities which are avilable to others in society.  In order toestablish who was poor, Townsend consequently contrasted those who underwent aseries of deprivations from those who did not, a condition he refers to as 'relativedeprivation'.Townsend's approach relies on the analysis of observed circumstances andbehaviour.  The importance of this approach is that unlike studies which concentrate onincome or a 'poverty line', Townsend's work has been able to describe in great detail theexperience of poverty among a wide range of people, and to offer a quantitative basis forcomparison.  In many ways, his theoretical analysis, and the detailed consideration ofpeople in various types of circumstances, is of greater interest than the process heultimately uses to summarise the primary circumstances of people who are poor, but inso far as this chapter is concerned with the ways in which poverty has been described,it is important to outline it here.  Townsend begins with sixty factors which may beassociated with poverty, and then uses a statistical analysis in order to select twelvewhich seem most strongly associated with low income.  The selected items are as follows:1.  Has not had week's holiday away from home in last 12 months2.  Adults only  Has not had a relative or friend to the home for a meal or a snack inthe last 4 weeks3.  Adults only  Has not been out in the last 4 weeks to a relative or friend for a mealor a snack.
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4.  Children only.  Has not had a friend to play or to tea in the last 4 weeks.5.  Children only.  Did not have party on last birthday.6.  Has not had an afternoon or evening out for entertainment in the last two weeks.7.  Does not have fresh meat (including meals out) as many as four days a week.8.  Has gone through one or more days in the past fortnight without a cooked meal.9.  Has not had a cooked breakfast most days of the week.10.  Household does not have a refrigerator.11.  Household does not usually have a Sunday joint (3 in 4 times).12.  Household does not have a sole use of four amenities indoors (flush w.c.; sink orwashbasin and cold water tap; fixed bath or shower; and gas or electric cooker.) The index looks odd, because the statistical analysis has some important effects on theform which the index takes.  In the first place, the factors which are selected are notnecessarily those which are most strongly associated with poverty, but those which besthelp to identify the issue.  The reason for this is that some factors which are stronglyassociated with poverty are frequently found together with others which are alsostrongly associated, and the inclusion of both does not do any extra work in identifyingwho is poor and who is not.  Each item in the index, then, stands for a number of otherassociated factors.  Second, the factors which are selected are not necessarily appealingto 'common sense'; items which seem plausibly to be associated with poverty, likeovercrowding or shortages of fuel, were eliminated in favour of others which are lessapparently important, like whether children had a birthday party.  Third, and perhapsmost important, associations which are established in this way may be conditional on thecircumstances in which the survey was undertaken; it would be dangerous to generalisetoo far from the index, as Townsend himself would undoubtedly stress.  The basicresearch was done in the late 1960s, when the consumption of meat (which has sincesubstantially fallen) probably meant something different in social terms.  The techniquesthat Townsend used may be generalisable; the precise results are not.  More recently, Townsend has extended the basic principle to consider other factors. In particular, he has sought to distinguish 'subjective' factors, reated to public viewsabout essential items, and 'objective' factor, which are indicators of deprivation. Whatever the test, the results indicate that benefit levels are substantially too low.  (34) 
Bradshaw: budget standardsJonathan Bradshaw's work has been eclectic, being generally more concerned to identifythe problems of poverty than to  offer an authoritative definition (35).  The idea of'budget standards' has been based on insights from a number of writers - includingRowntree, Piachaud and Townsend, and sources from the US  - with the aim being toestablish the minimum levels of income on which people can reasonably subsist.  The definition of 'budget standards' is not directly equivalent to the definition of asubsistence standard.   Rowntree's definitions of subsistence made some fairly sweepingnormative assumptions about the kinds of thing which people needed to live on a aminimum.  But there are major problems in trying to specify such budgets withoutimposing standards inappropriately, because people's pattern of expenditure changesas their income increases.  Where people are short or resources, they have to spendproportionately more on certain items - like food; they have to balance competing claimson their spending; and they buy different kinds of goods.  The use of a normative budgetoverrides this kind of consideration; it may be useful as an indicator, but it does not givemuch indication of the way in which poor people live, nor of what kind of income wouldgenuinely be adequate.  The Watts committee (36) suggested that it should be possible to work out thepatterns of expenditure which people actually made, avoiding many of the normativejudgments associated with the method.  Bradshaw and his colleagues take this suggestionfurther, by examining the proportions people on low incomes actually spend on differentheads of expenditure.  This is judged by comparing budgets for items like food, clothingor fuel, and then working out the cost of a family budget from that.  
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The authors are modest about the potential of budget standards research, for twomain reasons.  In the first place, what people spend money on is not everything whichgoes to make up their material welfare, let alone their quality of life.  Second, there is stilla normative element in the selection of the commodities which are accounted for.  Butthe approach differs from Rowntree, and from the general tradition of normativebudgets, in its careful avoidance of any prescription about what people ought to spendon particular items.  The amount people actually spend represents both what it isreasonable to spend and what people might expect to spend; the measure takes account,then, of people's behaviour, the costs of meeting basic needs, and probably of dominantsocial norms.  It differs from Townsend in considering, not what people actually do, butwhat they can afford to do - defining, therefore, a 'poverty line' based on commonpatterns of behaviour at different levels of income.  If there is a way to identify patternsof deprivation as a matter of fact with levels of income, this seems to be it.
Mack and Lansley: consensual standardsThe next major development to consider in the progress of empirical research is the'consensual' standard of poverty -  a piece of research undertaken, remarkably, for atelevision programme, 'Breadline Britain'.  The central problem of most methods whichrely on the social definition of poverty is the difficulty in establishing what norms arebeing applied.  The way people live does not necessarily establish what they believeabout lifestyle.  Mack and Lansley attempted to establish norms, not by examiningbehaviour, but by asking people what they consider 'essential'.  The replies are outlinedin table 3.1; they include all the items considered necessary by more than two-thirds ofthose asked.
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Table 3.1: An index of deprivation % describing as necessary % lacking1983 1990 1983 1990
HousingHeating   97  97   5   3Indoor toilet   96  97   2   0Damp free home   96  98   7   2Bath   94  95   2   0Decent state of homedecoration    -  92   -  15Enough bedrooms forchildren   77  82   3   7Self-containedaccommodation   79   -   3   -
FoodTwo meals a day for adults   64  90   3   13 meals a day for children   82  90   2   0Fresh fruit and veg. daily    -  88   -   6Meat, fish or equivalent veg.every other day   63  77   8   4
ClothingWarm waterproof coat   87  91   7   42 pairs of all-weather shoes   78  74   9   5
Household goodsBeds for everyone   94  95   1   1Refrigerator   77  92   2   1Carpets   70  78   2   2Washing machine   67  73   6   4
Financial securityInsurance    -  88   -  10Savings of £10 per month    -  68   -  30
Quality of life  Public transport   88   -   3   -Toys for children   71  84   2   2
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Table 3.1: An index of deprivation Celebrations on special   occasions like Xmas   69  74   4   4Presents once a year   63  69   5   5Out of school activities    -  69   -  10Hobby or leisure activity   64  67   7   7Source:  from J Mack, S Lansley, Poor Britain, London: Allen and Unwin, 1985; and HFrayman, Breadline Britain  1990s, London: Domino Films/London Weekend Television.  This work attempts to address the controversy over which standards which shouldbe applied by appealing to public opinion; this has the advantage both of identifyingdominant social norms and of establishing an external standard which can then beapplied to the examination of the circumstances of poor people.  The list of factorsemphasises the social nature of the definition of poverty.  Some preferences are clearlycultural, like the descriptions of carpets and hobbies as 'necessary'.  Others reflectchanging standards: it is intriguing, for example, to see indoor toilets described as'essential' when they were not even particularly commonplace sixty years before; I haveheard anecdotes from housing officers suggesting that people were initially reluctant toaccept houses with inside w.c.'s because they feared they would be unhygienic, whichdoes not seem unreasonable.  The differences in results in the course of seven years areremarkable, too; some part of this change is probably explicable in terms of aliberalisation of attitudes to the poor, because what one considers 'necessary' for othersdepends in part on the circumstances which they are believed to be in.  The importance of Mack and Lansley's work rests in its attempt to frame a standardof poverty which reflects the process of social definition.  It is uncertain whether publicopinion, as expressed in a social survey, is equivalent to an expression of social norms. What it does express, however, is the way in which people are likely to use words -which, in the terms of the kind of philosophical analysis I have tried to apply to theconcept of poverty, is as good as a description of the word's meaning.  Bradshaw andMorgan's method helps to establish what the relationship is between a lack of resourcesand deprivation; Mack and Lansley's approach helps to identify whether people in suchcircumstances can or should be identified as 'poor'.
ConclusionOn the face of the matter, the operationalisation of a concept develops as a reflection ofa theoretical position.   However, the examples which I have considered suggest that thisis not a very good description of the process which is involved.  The differences in theoryare important, and they will be examined further in the following chapter.  But evenwhere there are theoretical differences, the approaches implied by different methodsmay be complementary; Booth, Townsend and Bradshaw have used not one method, butseveral.  It is possible to 'triangulate', to use several different methods as a means ofidentifying the cluster of problems at the centre.  The effect of the overlap between methods means that some important similaritiescan be identified between the approaches.  Some aspects of the concept of poverty seemto be fairly universally incorporated.  All of them recognise, to some degree, that povertyis socially defined - not least because all of them have to translate the definition ofpoverty into terms which are current in the society to which they are applied.  Theprocess is not simply, then, one in which conceptualisation defines the possible field of
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operational applications; it is a two-way process, in which the process ofoperationalisation shapes the kind of concept which is adopted.  
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Chapter 4
Concepts of povertyThe dichotomy between 'absolute' and 'relative' poverty is built on a false, or at least aninadequate, interpretation  of the kinds of position which people have adopted.  Theabsolute model is supposed to be fixed over time, and conceived without reference tosocial circumstances.  I have yet to encounter a work which considers 'absolute' povertyin these terms: even the classic texts by Booth and Rowntree, which are most commonlycited as examples of the 'absolute' model, show a clear awareness of the social nature ofpoverty.  Booth is particularly misrepresented; what he actually wrote about poverty wasthat'The 'poor' are those whose means may be sufficient, but are barely sufficient, fordecent independent life; the 'very poor' those whose means are insufficient for thisaccording to the usual standard of life in this country.'  (1)The reference to the 'usual standard of life in this country' is virtually equivalent toTownsend's phrase 'common or customary in society'.  Rowntree's model comes nearerto an absolute standard, a standard adopted to prove a case - that poor people did nothave enough to live on, even if the most stringent standards are used.  However,Rowntree did clearly accept, even within this, that standards altered over time (2). Ringen suggests:  'There never was such a thing as an absolute concept of poverty andno one has argued that there should be.  The absolute concept ... is a straw man ...' (3)The 'relative' concept of poverty is equally liable to be misinterpreted.  It issometimes taken as a form of inequality - which, if the Roaches' definition is used, it is. But Townsend writes:'Inequality ... is not poverty.  Even if inequalities in the distribution of resources aresuccessfully identified and measured, those in the lowest 20 per cent or 10 per cent,say, are not necessarily poor.  ... Some criterion of deprivation is required by whicha poverty line may be drawn ...'  (4)There is something wrong here; there seems to be a basic inconsistency between the waythe models are initially presented and what the supposed advocates actually say aboutthem.  There are real differences in the positions that people hold, but they cannot simplybe identified as 'absolute' or 'relative'.  For the most part, when authors have addressedpoverty in conceptual terms, they have sought of necessity to modify or qualify the termsin which the problems are addressed.  In effect, there is not one 'absolute' or 'relative'model, but a diversity of different approaches, often with a different theoretical basis.
Comparative standardsThe idea that poverty is relative is rooted in the view that poverty can be identified bycomparison with the conditions that other people are living in, either with members ofthe same society or with others in other societies.  This confounds two important, butseparable, issues.  One is the social definition of poverty; the other is the process bywhich people are compared to establish who is poor and who is not.  The distinction mayseem at first difficult to sustain, but it is an important one, and it is worth examining ingreater depth.The reason why the two ideas are so often confused is that they both depend on aform of comparison.  However, the comparisons which are made are of different kinds. In one sense, almost all words are defined to some extent by comparison: for example,I know that I am sitting on a chair because I compare it to other objects of a similar typeand function which I also call 'chairs'.  Poverty is identifiable because it represents a setor cluster of conditions similar to other circumstances which we also refer to as 'poverty'- and that is a crucial point, because it means that new circumstances, or circumstances
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which come newly to our attention, can be identified as 'poverty' when the effects theyproduce are like those we associate with poverty.  It may not have been obvious in theearly 1900s that the impediments to development suffered by many children should bespecifically considered as a form of impoverishment, because the main impediments atthat time were often the same problems - bad housing, poor standards of hygiene, limitednutrition - which were identifiable as aspects of poverty on other grounds. Improvements in many of these circumstances, however, reveal that there are otheroutstanding impediments - like the lack of toys, play space, or room to study, whenparents are unable to afford them - which still present problems for a child'sdevelopment.  That is not necessarily a sign that the meaning of poverty has changed, butit does indicate that the application of the concept is likely to alter as social conditionschange.  Social definitions of poverty depend on a comparison of poverty with the thingsit is like.  By contrast, when poverty is identified by contrasting the circumstances of poorpeople with others who are not poor, it is being compared to things which it is not like. When Bradshaw refers to 'comparative need', for example, the comparison which ismade is based on a strict inequality between the people being compared.  'Deprivation'is certainly a term which implies a contrast between those who have and those who havenot; if poverty is rightly described in terms of deprivation, then poverty is definedprimarily in terms of the things which one does not have.  This can in turn be taken to mean that poverty can be identified by a contrast with thecondition of others who are not poor, but that is not obvious.  Deprivation may involvecomparison with those who are not deprived, but equally it may involve comparison withsome kind of standard or norm.  To justify a comparison with other people who are notdeprived, one has to establish on what criteria they might be considered to be different -which would imply that there is some pre-existing condition being applied, or a norm ofsome kind.  If deprivation or poverty is to be identified by a process of comparingpeople's relative positions, it seems to be based in one of two propositions: either thistype of comparison helps to reveal the norms which underlie the distinction, or povertyis to be defined in terms of the differences which are identified by the process.These are very different kinds of argument, and it might be helpful to give themdifferent names.  The definition of poverty in terms of differences in circumstances is a'comparative standard of poverty'.  The process of comparing people is a 'comparativemethod', which can be used to support either an attempt to discover social norms or tocontrast differences in circumstances.  Comparative standards are being used with increasing frequency, not least becauseof their convenience and analytical power.  The Roaches, for example, define poverty asthe condition of a certain proportion of the population, a use also adopted by theNational Children's Bureau (5).  This is particularly crude - it has the effect of alwaysdefining a proportion of people as poor, irrespective of any changes made in theircircumstances - and little used, except as a convenience (because it is evident that if thereare poor people, they are likely to be found in the lowest income groups).  Much morecommon is the relationship of low incomes to the average income in a country - ameasure which also treats poverty as a form of inequality, but by which increases or fallsin relative income can have a clear effect on someone's status.  The Leyden study, for theEuropean Commission, experimented with various definitions of poverty as arelationship to median income and family size (6).  Other work for the EuropeanCommunity has experimented with levels at 40%, 50% or 60% of average income (7). Walker and Lawson refer to a standard of poverty set at 60% of average disposableincomes (8).  UK statistics now refer to 'households below average income', again acrossa range of levels  (9).  The Luxembourg Income Study, which promises because of thequality of its data to provide the standard measure, refers to people as poor when theyhave incomes of less than 50% of the median equivalent income (10).  Each of theseapproaches treats poverty in terms of relative disadvantage; there are no supplementarycriteria in terms of possession of goods, availability of essential items or socialcapabilities.
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In the review of research outlined in the previous chapter, there were three examplesof the use of comparative methods - that is, cases in which poverty was identified interms of a contrast between the circumstances of those who were poor and those whowere not.  These are Booth's identification of classes, which seems to me to rely on someimplicit normative judgments; Townsend's construction of an index of deprivation; andBradshaw's attempt to classify 'budget' standards, which seeks to identify dominantnorms through concentration on observed behaviour.  This approach has someattractions.  Because the comparison takes place within a social context, the difficulty ofcoping with shifting social definitions of poverty is largely removed.  The comparativemethod can be adapted to many different kinds of circumstance and condition, withoutnecessarily understanding the dominant social norms.  At the same time, social normsare often defined in the light of prevailing conditions, and a comparative measureprovides an indicator of normal behaviour; Townsend's measure comes close to doingso, and Bradshaw's closer still.  The process of comparison is a useful one; whatever the conceptual difficulties oftreating a comparison as the basis for a description of poverty, it is still likely to be truethat poor people are likely to be found among those who are relatively disadvantaged ina society.  But the comparative methods are still subject to certain difficulties.  As Senpoints out, it may happen through social changes that a person may suffer greaterhardship and be considered less poor - a point which undermines the rationale forprovision which might relieve poverty.  Equally, it suggests that people may becomepoorer even though their material circumstances are improving in real terms, whichmakes it an easy target.  Second, a comparative method limits the kinds of cases in which people might bethought to be poor to cases where they are also in a particular relative position.  Theimplication of a measure based on the lowest 10% or 20% of the population is that theremaining 90 or 80% are not poor.  The use of the median as a point of reference in arange of studies means that poverty is necessarily confined in all circumstances to thelowest 50% of the population; by definition, it becomes impossible for the majority of thepopulation to be poor.  There is evidently something seriously wrong with thisproposition, particularly when one moves to consideration of the least developed thirdworld countries; it is suspect even when applied to a country like Portugal (11).  Thepoint does not undermine the usefulness of this kind of measure as an indicator, but itis a salutory reminder that the issue under discussion is not that of 'poverty'.Third, the process of comparison does not necessarily reflect the way in which manypeople use the word 'poverty'.  This is the substance of Joseph and Sumption's obviousobjection:  'A family is poor if it cannot afford to eat.  It is not poor if it cannot affordendless smokes and it does not become poor by the mere fact that other people canafford them.' (12)  The central problem with a simple comparison of poor people withothers is that it cannot identify the kinds of value which determine at what point itemsare considered to be 'essential'.   There is then no evident criterion on which to judge thatpeople are poor.  This relationship depends on some other kinds of consideration aboutthe relationship between poverty and social norms.  The central justification for the useof a comparative standard - as opposed to a comparative method - is that there issomething within the process of comparison which reflects the social processes throughwhe become poor.Townsend argues for an assessment based on 'relative deprivation', which heattempts to assess by examining the objective conditions of poor people.  He identifiespoverty in relation to 'ordinary living patterns, customs and activities' - a term whichincludes both norms and patterns of behaviour - but his process of measurementdepends on observation of behaviour, or a comparative standard, rather thanestablishment of dominant norms.  There is nothing within the method to identify whatis a norm and what is not, and both Townsend's definition of poverty and his selectionof the criteria by which people might be thought poor are based wholly on the differencesbetween the circumstances of the poor and those of others.  This is not simply a
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comparative method; it conceals the use of a comparative standard, albeit a standardwhich is more complex than others.A comparison of this sort is related to social norms, but it is not equivalent.  Not allcomparisons reflect expectations.  The use of the kind of definition which identifiespoverty in terms of inequality (13) implies that poverty changes directly andimmediately in response to changes in social conditions.  Social expectations mayultimately reflect such differences over time, but they are unlikely to do so in the shortterm - and perhaps not even in the medium term.  Table 4.1 shows the possession ofdurable goods by income.  If people are judged by what other people have, they mightreasonably be identified as poor if they lack a telephone or a deep freeze.  Perhaps moresurprisingly, the same might be said of a tumble drier - owned by only 37% ofhouseholds, but by nearly two thirds of all families with children.  This is scarcelysomething that one 'expects' to find - on the contrary, it is initially a surprising figure ina society where poverty is all too apparent.  Similarly, not all comparisons which do meetexpectations are enforced as social rules; the widespread ownership of deep freezes,telephones  and colour televisions is not (as far as I know) accompanied by any obviousexpectations or rule of behaviour.  It might, I think, be true that these items will becomenecessary as time goes on - food preservation, communications and leisure are allextremely important in modern life - and it may legitimately be argued that social normsare likely ultimately to come into line with social circumstances - but the way that peoplelive is not necessarily immediately reflected in what they believe.  
Table 4.1: Possession of durable goods by weekly income, 1988 £0-100 £100-180 £180-250 £250-350 Over£350 AllDeep freeze 52 74 84 88 93 77Washing machine 63 83 89 93 96 84Tumble drier 22 38 46 50 60 42Telephone 68 82 88 91 98 85Colour TV 81 90 93 95 98 91Video 19 43 60 74 80 53Source:  adapted from Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1990, General
Household Survey 1988, London: HMSO. Comparisons do not, then, yield information directly about social norms (though acomparative method might still be used as an indicator of norms).  A comparativestandard assumes, rather, that poverty is a form of inequality.  This identification is madeexplicitly by O'Higgins and Jenkins:'Virtually all definitions of the poverty threshold used in developed economies in thelast half-century or so have been concerned with establishing the level of incomenecssary to allow access to the minimum standards of living considered acceptablein that society at that time.  In consequence, there is an inescapable connectionbetween poverty and inequality: certain degrees or dimensions of inequality ... willlead to people being below the minimum standards acceptable in that society.  It isthis "economic distance" aspect of inequality that is poverty.  This does not mean thatthere will always be poverty when there is inequality: only if the inequality impliesan economic distance beyond the critical level.'  (14)
37
Poverty and inequality are clearly closely linked.  The term 'inequality' does not referto 'differences' between people; people are 'unequal' if one of them has a relativeadvantage over the other.  The idea of 'inequality' generally refers to disadvantage in asocial context.  Command over resources is one of the main ways in which advantage ordisadvantage in society may be assessed; if a person is poor, that person is disadvantagedin comparison with someone who is not poor.  But a comparative standard goes muchfurther than this, by defining poverty in terms of inequality.  This follows from thepropositions that poverty is socially defined, and that it is based in a comparativeconcept.  The reference to the social definition of poverty supplies the context; theelement of comparison identifies the nature of the disadvantage.  The conclusion thatpoverty is of the same nature as inequality is true by definition.  
If poverty is defined as a form of disadvantage in a social context, andInequality is the name given to disadvantage in a social context, thenPoverty is defined as a form of inequality.If the initial propositions are accepted, I do not see how the conclusion can be resisted -though Townsend attempts to do so.  If there is some confusion between Townsend'sview of poverty and the concept of inequality, it is because he is inconsistent inrecognising the importance of social norms while attempting to identify poverty throughthe use of a comparative standard.  
Normative standardsDeprivation may involve comparison with those who are not deprived, but equally it mayinvolve comparison with some  kind of standard or norm.  The concept of deprivationnecessarily implies a concept of sufficiency; and if poverty is a form of deprivation, thenequally it demands some consideration of sufficiency.  (It does not, I should note, requireany concept or definition of riches, though from a concept of sufficiency one may be ableto move towards a concept of luxury (or superfluity), which may fall short of riches.)  Tomove from this position to the view that the term can be arrived from a comparison withother people, a supplementary argument is required: that the others with whom thecomparison is being made are not deprived.  This might seem like a very minor condition,but it is nevertheless important.  They may not be deprived, but how can you tell?  Itimplies that there is some pre-existing condition being applied - a norm of some kind.  Deprivation is a comparative term, but there is no intrinsic reason why a standard ofdeprivation, or its associated concept of sufficiency, should have to be derived from acomparison with the conditions of other people.  If I discover that a person in Britain isshort of food, I may need to know more in order to explain why this happens in anapparently affluent society; but the norm that I am using for the comparison may be anutritional norm, rather than a comparison with the dominant social standard.  Equally,if I discover a society in which everyone is short of food - by whatever social definition -I can see no difficulty in describing them as members of a poor society.  The 'absolutecore' of need which Sen refers to is not necessarily an objective measure of poverty, butit is a normative one - that is, a standard which applies a norm.  Normative standards are of two main kinds.  There are, first, norms identified byexperts, which relate to the capacity of people to function in society.  These might bedescribed as prescriptive standards of poverty.   Rowntree's or Piachaud's measurementof minimum standards are attempts, not to impose arbitrary personal definitions, but todescribe a minimum necessary to social functioning.  Their position is complicated bytheir political purpose.  Rowntree's standards were deliberately selected to be morerestrictive than dominant social norms, because by doing so the authors were able todemonstrate that people were poor beyond question.  The purpose of Rowntree'sdistinction between primary and secondary poverty was not to impose judgments on thepoor, but to demonstrate to those who did impose such judgments that even if oneapplied the strictest imaginable standard, people would still be poor.  As such, Rowntreeprovided a powerful political argument.  Piachaud used a similar approach as a direct,and most effective, criticism of the adequacy of benefit rates. (15)
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Second, there are socially established norms, a commonly held set of expectations andvalues.  The derivation of 'consensual' standards is based in such norms.  This currentlyfalls within the remit of the 'relative' model, but it is 'relative' in a very different sensefrom comparative standards.  Runciman (16) argues for a concept of 'relativedeprivation', not to be confused with Townsend's later use of the term.  People determinethe standards which are appropriate by a comparison of their circumstances with thecircumstances of other people.  When they do not have things which they can reasonablyexpect to have, they may consider themselves deprived.  Runciman's arguments seem,at first sight, to be based in subjective impressions, but that is a misleading impression;the views which are formed are inter-subjective, formed through an interactive processrather than by individuals in isolation (17).   In consequence, it produces social normsof what constitutes poverty and what does not.  Norms are a form of expectation whichacquire, through familiarity and usage, the force of a rule.  (This implies that a socialdefinition of poverty can also have the force of a rule.)  The attempt to define poverty inaccordance with public opinion - like Mack and Lansley's work - can be seen in part asan attempt to identify the norms which are effective at a particular time.  Appeals to'common sense' - like Joseph and Sumption's rejection of Townsend - are not, simply, thereaction of individuals; they appeal to what the authors believe is the dominant socialexpectation.In talking about poverty, people do seem to be applying a variety of normativestandards - which leads people to talk about hunger, destitution and so on as if thesewere 'absolute' concepts.  The concept of normative standards is more difficult tooperationalise, but probably a more accurate description of the way in which poverty isconceived.
Establishing a minimum: the poverty lineOn the face of it, a 'poverty line' is a crude concept.  Poverty lines define thresholds, interms of income or  wealth, below which people may be considered as 'poor'.  Theweakness of all the approaches which define one or more 'poverty lines' is that they restin a view of poverty as a simple function of the relationship between resources andconsumption.  There are, in practice, many other norms which are also used - normsreflected not only in words like want, need, or destitution, but in other concepts likehomelessness or hunger.  Poverty is associated with income and wealth, but it is not thesame thing.  The idea was used first by Charles Booth - the Simeys describe it as 'perhaps his moststriking single contribution to the social sciences'  (18).  Booth was not, as I haveexplained, attempting to define a subsistence income, even if it looks that waysuperficially; he was, rather, stating the range of income over which people seemed tobecome poor; the figure was based on a lengthy series of observations rather than anyprescriptive standard.  The concept of the poverty line was later substantially changedby Rowntree, to become more a definition of poverty than a descriptive indicator -though it is far from clear that this is what Rowntree intended; his descriptions of'secondary poverty' are based on a 'feel' for the circumstances in which people are poor,and not on any precise system of measurement (19).  Bowley, writing in 1915, was tocomment:'I have ... still to be convinced that the scale of diet made familiar by Mr Rowntree hasthat definiteness which is so often assumed by people who quote his reults.  I ratherregard it as a useful arbitrary measurement of a low scale of living, by the help ofwhich we can compare populations in respect of the adequacy of their wages; itmakes a useful and intelligible line, even if it is not possible to accept it as the PovertyLine, which divides the poor from those who have a competence.  There is not, andcannot be, any such division except an arbitrary one, for every quantity involvedvaries continuously from grade to grade.' (20)It is important, then, not to take the original idea of the 'poverty line' as indicating tooliteral or mechanistic a relationship between needs and income.
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The first point of controversy, one which is pointed to by Bowley, is whether therecan be said to be a 'line' at all.  All poverty lines require a distinction to be madesomewhere.  Veit Wilson classifies poverty lines on the basis that whereas some useprescriptive criteria, others try to establish where the line falls empirically.  Among thefirst, he gives examples which include Booth, Rowntree, and the statistical measurementof inequality; among the second, he includes Townsend and Mack and Lansley (21).  Whether the concept of poverty is normative or comparative, there are conceptualproblems in accepting the idea that poverty affects people according to whether they fallabove or below a 'line'.  If poverty is normative, and defined in terms of a line, then on theface of it a person either is or is not poor.  But this is not the way we use the term.  Peopleare not simply said to be 'poor' or 'not poor'; they may be 'hard up', deprived, poor,destitute.  Within these categories, there are further gradations - like 'very poor', 'poor','fairly' poor.  Booth distinguished 'poverty' from terms like 'want' and 'distress' (22) -want and distress being, in his view, aggravated forms of poverty.  These are not preciseterms with a universally agreed meaning, and they may overlap with the othercategories; there is no clear distinction, for example, between the circumstances in whichone would use 'fairly poor' and those in which one would use 'deprived'.   Within an normative standard of poverty, there are two ways in which gradations ofpoverty can be accommodated.  One could be based on a calculus, in which a person'spoverty is graded according to the extent to which it falls below a line or an establishednorm.  This approach has an appealing simplicity, but there is a major conceptualproblem arising from it.  The very idea of a calculus implies that there is some basis forcomparison, on a strictly relative basis.  The attempt to grade poverty below thenormative level becomes, therefore, a comparative exercise.  It is possible, of course, toargue that poverty is a mixture of normative and comparative elements; but it is difficultto see why, if a comparative standard of poverty should be accepted below a normativeline, the principle should be rejected in its entirety above the normative line.  There is noevident reason to accept that 'poverty' must be seen in normative terms but that'destitution' or 'want' have to be seen as comparative.  The second way in which the idea could be incorporated, and one which I think betterreflects the use of the terms, is not through one, but through several, different norms -the approach favoured by Booth.  People in general need food to live, and to be healthy;they may have enough food to preserve life but not health.  A person without any foodat all is more 'in need' than someone who does not have food which is adequatelynutritious, but it makes perfectly good sense to talk about both people as being 'poor'. What is happening here is that at least two standards are being applied; 'poverty' is ageneral term used to indicate serious deprivation on either basis.  The use of a comparative standard of poverty poses a different set of problems.  Thereis little difficulty in coming to terms with gradations in the concept of poverty.  A conceptof poverty based on relative principles is necessarily transitive, which means that if A isjudged to be poor compared to B, and B is poor when compared to C on the same criteria,then A has the greatest degree of poverty and C the least.  (This may seem so obvious thatit is not worth mentioning, but it contrasts with a normative approach; A, B and C mightall fall into the category of 'people in poverty', with the result that the distinctionsbetween them become irrelevant.)  The main difficulty is in using the idea of a line orthreshold below which people can be said to be 'poor'.  The justification for a 'line' restsin large part on the existence of some discontinuity in the distribution of resources. Booth, who based his description of a poverty line on a division between classes,suggested that the line came at the level of the band of income which distinguishedpeople in regular work from those who were casually or intermittently employed (23). Desai suggests, on the basis of Mack and Lansley's figures, that there is a thresholdbeyond which people are likely to become poor in the terms of the consensual measureof poverty (24); but it is uncertain whether this can be justified in these terms.  Piachaudargues that the apparent 'threshold' in these figures is a statistical artefact (25).The central problems with poverty lines are not so much that they are liable to bearbitrary - that is virtually inherent in the use of indicators of this sort - as that they are
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subject to systematic biases in application and interpretation.   An illustrative problemis that of equivalence.  The concept of poverty depends on a relationship between needsand resources, and if a poverty line is to reflect the relationship in any meaningful way,it seems impossible to avoid some kind of adjustment for needs.  The needs of a singleperson are very different from those of a family with six children, and in turn those of afamily with six children are not the same as those of eight single adults each maintainingan independent household.  This kind of adjustment is usually referred to in terms of'equivalence scales' - translating the circumstances of different members of a householdinto equivalent terms (26).  It is still necessary to generalise to some degree.  The usualjustification for generalisation is that differences between individuals tend to cancel out;for everyone whose needs are greater than average, there is someone else whose needsare less.  But 'poverty' is a diffuse and diverse concept, which covers a wide range ofcontingencies; the main objection to such generalisations is that they can conceal issuesin which systematic disadvantages arise.  One example is the position of women withinhouseholds, who because they may not have a proportionate share of resources may bebelow the standards of others, particularly when those others are at the margins ofpoverty (27).  This is not an insuperable obstacle - it implies that descriptions of povertywhich ignore the disadvantaged position of women have been liable to set the povertyline too low, and that can be countered with an appropriate equivalence scale.  Anotherexample is that of disabled people, who have higher costs than others to face, and so arelikely to suffer the deprivations associated with poverty at higher levels of income; thismeans that the application of a general poverty line will fail to identify their needsadequately (28), which in turn implies that an adjustment is necessary.  The problemwhich emerges is not that such adjustments are impossible, but that as differentcircumstances are progressively taken into account - like the needs of single parents, ofold people, of positions in the life cycle, and so forth - the whole process ultimatelybecomes so complex as to be almost unworkable.  The objections to the use of a 'poverty line' are considerable.  But - as in much of thisfield - it is necessary to make compromises in order to achieve practical results.  Themain value of the idea of the 'poverty line' is in its use in relation to policy.  If it ispossible to show that certain levels of income are clearly related to the conditions ofpoverty, an increase in income can substantially alleviate many of the problems.  Thepoverty line is a means of operationalising this concept.Booth set his poverty line well above the level of benefits he recommended.  Theprinciple behind this was, first, to allow for people on benefits to use other resources tosupplement their lifestyle; and second, to develop benefits at a level which might beacceptable politically.  If benefits are specifically set at a point much lower than thethreshold of poverty, it is difficult for those opposed to benefits to argue that the benefitsare too generous, offer disincentives to work or are wasteful in their expenditure.   Conversely, there may be a case for setting a poverty line below the level of benefits. If benefits are intended to offer social protection, or a minimum level of income whichallows for relative ease rather than basic sufficiency, then it seems unduly limiting toconfine the level of benefits to the level of poverty.  This seems to be the currentargument of the UK Conservative government, which denies that people who are inreceipt of benefit are in 'poverty'.  Without being very clear as to what this implies, orwhere the line of poverty falls, it must mean that if there is a level or range of incomeassociated with poverty, it comes somewhere below the level allowed for in benefit.  The critiques developed of subsistence measures of poverty in the 1960s and 1970swere based in the view that such measures justified a minimal response to the problemsof the poor.  In the 1980s, when it became clear that benefit rates in the UK wereinadequate to meet people's needs, a number of authors began to argue again for thedefinition of a 'basket of goods' of the type used in Germany (29).  Others (like Mack andLansley, Bradshaw, and Townsend) developed different techniques for establishing aminimum income.  The advantage of such approaches is that it becomes possible tomeasure the success or failure of benefit transfers in redistributing income against anindependent criterion.  All of them recognise a risk of some arbitrariness, but the political
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importance of defining some kind of standard by which poverty can be judged is evident. There is little immediate risk that the definition of minimum standards will lead toa restrictive allowance on benefit.  The indications from all of these methods is thatbenefit rates in the UK are too low for people to live without experiencing seriousdeprivations.  In the long term, however, it is possible to envisage circumstances in whicha standard which has been applied for a number of years might fail to meet developingneeds, or to allow for fuller participation in society.  The Leyden study or the Luxembourg Income Study (30) avoid the problem by using a measure - derived fromaverage incomes - which defines poverty fairly directly in terms of inequality.  
Poverty and inequalityIf poverty is seen as normative rather than comparative, this would imply that onecannot validly infer that poverty is  defined in terms of inequality.  This is not, I shouldemphasise, the same as saying that poverty is not caused by inequality or does not resultfrom it.  There are many things which could be seen as resulting from social inequality,and others which reinforce inequality,  which are not defined in terms of it (in a Marxiananalysis, almost all social relationships are treated as arising from inequality).  Senargues, for example, that a person with less money will have less command overresources than someone with more - and command over resources is crucial to theconcept of poverty.  It is true that if poverty is socially defined, and poverty is identified by comparisonwith those who are not poor, then poverty is defined in terms of inequality.  It does notfollow that if poverty is socially defined and poverty is the result of inequality thatpoverty has to be defined by comparison with others.  If I did sufficient violence to thewords, I could probably demonstrate this in terms of purely formal mathematical logic -[(A & B) ? C] does not imply that [(A & C) ? B], because B may be contingent on otherfactors entirely - but the point should be obvious enough as a matter of common sense. The way in which poverty is defined does not have to depend on inequality at all.  This discussion may all seem rather abstract.  But the arguments are not simplyconcerned with philosophical niceties; these definitions have clear implications forpolicy.  If poverty is defined in terms of comparative rather than normative standards,it is the attack on inequality, rather than poor conditions, which becomes the centralfocus of policy to alleviate the problems; and the approach to inequality does not demandthe same kind of measures that an approach to poverty does.  In his discussion of Equalities, Rae outlines a number of strategies for redistribution:raising the minimum someone might have, reducing the ceiling of incomes, reducing therange of inequality or changing the ratio between rich and poor (31).  Each amounts tothe same when taken to an extreme; but there are crucial practical differences from thepoint of view of the poor.  Raising the minimum has the most direct effect, because itdirectly increases the resources of those who are poorest.  Imposing a ceiling has theleast, because the resources which are redistributed are not necessarily made availableto those who are poorest.  Changing the ratio, or reducing the range of inequality, shouldin most cases improve the basic resources available to the poor and have the addedadvantage that they address not only the problem of resources, but also the relativepurchasing power of those resources; as such, they also begin to address the problem ofpositional goods, which constitutes the main link between poverty and inequality.  Poverty can be dealt with, then, at the same time that inequality can be dealt with; butthere are strategies for dealing with inequality, particularly levelling down, that areineffective for dealing with poverty.  This is why replacing the idea of 'poverty' with thatof 'inequality' will not do.The identification of poverty with aspects of inequality means that significantimprovements might be made in housing, health, education, and personal resourceswhich are held to have no effect on poverty if the relative position of poor people is notimproved in the process; conversely, a society in which resources were desperately short
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but the range of inequality was limited (like Sri Lanka) is not to be considered as havinga serious problem of poverty.  I suggested in the first chapter that any concept of povertywas liable to be judged by its political consequences.  By that test, there are much greaterproblems with comparative standards than there are with normative ones.  Theidentification of poverty and inequality serves to undermine much of the rationale for theredistribution of resources to the poor.  Whether or not inequality remains, it is betterto be disadvantaged in a warm dry house than a cold damp one.  In attempting to avoidan 'absolutist' concept of poverty, many 'relativists' have lost sight of the kinds ofproblem which make the persistence of poverty an offence against the values of acivilised society. The approach I am advocating will not, of course, deal with the root causes of poverty. Hospitals cannot deal with the root causes of car accidents, and there is no question thatpreventative action should be taken to stop the accidents happening in the first place, butthat is no argument for doing nothing when people are injured.  A stance based mainlyon comparison lacks a sufficient sense of outrage against poverty - at the conditions thatpeople live in.  The kinds of problems I began by describing are problems which oughtto be tackled.  People should have enough to eat.  They should not have to sleep rough. The conditions can be improved, and they should be.  That is a moral position, and it canonly be sustained on a normative basis.  
International comparisonsIf poverty is socially defined, there is an evident problem in trying to make comparisonsbetween societies.  By  definition, different societies will refer to different concepts ofpoverty.  This can make it difficult to draw any meaningful comparison between societies- which is an important limitation in view of the growing number of interventionsdeveloped on an international basis.  The problem is not insoluble, but any of thepotential solutions demands some kind of compromise.  One option is to judge each country by the internal standards accepted within thatcountry.  This is usually done between countries of a broadly similar rank and industrialframework - for example, the countries of the European Community  - though even there,there may be large disparities in the criteria applied between the richer and poorercountries.  When this method is extended further - for example, between industrialisedcountries and those of the Third World, or even between the US and the USSR - it impliesmassive disparities in the criteria which are being applied.  Despite these reservations,the method is not without its advantages and its applications, provided it is used withcaution.  The first main advantage is that the insights gained into the particulardistribution of resources, powers and opportunities within a country are often mostclearly seen by close observers within that country.  In other words, many of the moresubtle, intangible elements associated with poverty can more clearly be identified; itmakes it possible for those conditions to be researched where they occur, retaining aqualitative element.  Second, it enables issues to be adapted to the conditions whichobtain within different countries.  Third, if the aim of such comparisons is to provide abasis for policies which are decided at a national level, then a comparison of this kindmay be more relevant to the particular countries than one which uses internationalcriteria.  There are measures which apply a formula to different countries.  The welfarefunction identified by Leyden group or the standard used by the Luxembourg IncomeStudy apply definitions which are relative to those countries - which means that adifferent standard is being applied to each country.  This does not have the advantagesof close qualitative research, but the results which it yields are still potentially useful;poorer countries tend to have greater numbers of people falling below this level.  Thedefinition of poverty does not consist solely of a lack of material goods.  It includespositional goods, which can be identified by reference to indicators of class, status andpower within the different societies.  
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The main objection to this method is that it substitutes consideration of inequalityfor consideration of poverty.  Even within the industrialised countries, there areimportant differences not only in inequality, but in absolute income, in the amount whichthose countries spend on social services - which helps to provide the residents ofcountries with a basic level of resources - and in the minimum levels of benefits whichare provided.  Irrespective of the distribution of income, one would expect on this basisto find more severe problems of poverty in Italy or Ireland than in Denmark or WestGermany, and this seems to be the case (32).  If the principle of comparison is extendedoutside the OECD, then the startling inequalities of most of the South American countrieswould yield greater proportions in poverty than many deeply impoverished Third Worldcountries.  (The observation is still important as an indication of poverty, because suchinequalities are also experienced as a lack of positional goods.)If, however, the aim is to make it possible to draw comparisons across societies, forexample in order to inform the redistribution of resources between nations, a methodbased in the standards of each country may lead to inequities; Teekens and Zaidi objectthat if this approach was to be applied within the European Community it would favourpeople in richer countries who would not be classified as poor on a common standard,to the disadvantage of others who would be so classified (33).  To avoid this, it isnecessary to find some common standard which can be used across different societies.   The first option is to use a normative approach to apply to every country.  For example,a minimum level of income, a minimum amount of food (or even foods with basicnutritional values), standards of health, housing and education, can provide basic criteriaagainst which countries, or parts of countries, can be measured.  The World Bank, whilerecognising the arbitrariness of the definition, treats people as extremely poor if theyhave a  purchasing power of less that $275 a year, and poor if they have less than $370a year (34).  This is useful as a rule of thumb; they supplement the material with otherinformation about public services, health, education and so forth, because the availabilityof such services affects the basic standard of living for people who are poorest.  Teekinsand Zaidi attempt a more ambitious normative comparison across EC countries, bydetermining the prices of an equivalent basket of food and taking this, on the sameprinciple as the US poverty line, to constitute a proportion of the poverty line (35).  Arelated but different approach might be justified in terms of 'Engel coefficients' (36). Engel posited that people generally spend less on food proportionately as their incomeincreases; in that case, the numbers of poor can be determined as the numbers withineach country who spend more than a set percentage of their incomes on food, or perhapsother necessities (37).  Clearly, the more sophisticated the measure, the more likely it isto be sensitive to differences in behaviour, differences in circumstances (like the effectof the provision of basic resources in kind), and the problems of recording informationconsistently in different countries.  It may be possible to compare each country by reference to standards established ina group of countries (like the EC or the OECD).  Atkinson notes a peculiarity of theimplications of this approach within the EC; as the composition of the EC changes, theaccession of a poorer country brings the poverty line for the bloc down (38).  This isprobably best avoided by applying the standards of one country or the other.  This meansthat one can identify the problems of poverty within a rich society, like the US or Britain,and then extend the same criteria to poorer countries, like Nepal or Sierra Leone. Conversely, one can apply the standards of Sierra Leone or Nepal to the US or UK; theproblem with this is that the problems of poverty in the US and UK seem very limited bycomparison.  This is not outrageously inappropriate - the appalling prevalence of majorproblems in the poorer countries tends to dwarf the issues in the richer countries, butequally those problems tend to dominate consideration of other latent problems withinthe poorer countries themselves.  The use of the norms obtaining within the richercountry tends to imply a more detailed consideration of various kinds of issue which maybe overlooked from the perspective of the poorer country.  Equally, a concentration onthe standards of richer countries may mislead.  If issues relating to water supply,malnutrition or deaths during childbirth rarely feature in consideration of poverty in the
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richest countries, it is because these problems have largely (though not completely) beenovercome.  It is only from applying the standards of the poorer country that theimportance of these issues may be highlighted.  This argues, in many ways, for acombination of several standards - the norms of both richer and poorer countries.  
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Chapter 5
Understanding poverty: describing the circumstances
of poor peoplePoverty is not one kind of experience, but a whole range of  experiences.  It is expresseddifferently, not only between societies, but within societies; the term is used for peoplein very different kinds of situation.  In the United Kingdom, the term might be used todescribe a pensioner wrapped in blankets who stays in bed because she is unable toafford any heat in the house; a youth sleeping in a cardboard box on the street; anunemployed family with no disposable income, in debt to the landlord and the electricitycompany; a single parent isolated in a flat on a peripheral estate.  It is not only theexperience and nature of poverty which vary, but the circumstances and characteristicsof the people who experience it.  It is difficult to convey much of a sense of what 'poverty'is 'really' like, because these are not circumstances in which people necessarily haveanything directly in common other than the lack of resources to meet their needs.  Because poverty is complex, it is not really possible to give a comprehensive accountof the circumstances in which people become poor; but certain categories and groups ofpeople are clearly much more vulnerable to poverty than others, in so far as they lackmaterial resources, and - no less important for an understanding of policy - they are commonly identified in these terms.  Low income is experienced more by people inparticular types of household, but for many  - particularly those who are in two parentfamilies and others in households without dependent children - it  may be a temporaryexperience, because the type of household reflects a stage of the life cycle.  This tends topresent problems in describing people with low income as 'poor'.  If poverty is concernednot only with resources but also with issues like opportunities, powers and life style,there is little reason to suppose that many of the people at the lowest end of the incomedistribution necessarily suffer from poverty.  At the same time, people within thesecategories are likely to be vulnerable to poverty (because a protracted period on lowincome implies a limited command over resources) and it is within these groups thatpoverty is most likely to be identified.Although it does not show that people are poor, the proportion of each group who arelikely to find themselves in the lowest part of the income distribution helps to illustratethe vulnerability of different categories to poverty.  Table 5.1, drawn from theLuxembourg Income Study (1), shows how many people in each group are likely to be inthe bottom quintile of the income distribution, and how many of those are in 'poverty',or at least on low incomes (understood as 50% of median income).  Whatever thereservations one may have about identifying these circumstances too closely withpoverty, there are clearly some interesting implications to be drawn from these figures. It is evident, for example, that the level of income which pensioners enjoy in Sweden isrelatively far greater than in other countries, whereas single parents in the US have anotably lower relative income; these figures draw attention to features of the benefitsystems in those countries.  Elderly people in the UK are much more likely than in theother countries to find themselves in the lowest fifth of the population, despite asubstantial improvement in the situation of this group in the previous ten years.  
46
 
Table 5.1: Post tax and transfer position of persons relative to
average incomes Percentage of persons in:Elderlyfamilies Single parentfamilies Two-parentfamilies Other families
SwedenBottom 5th 24 31 22 14   'Poverty'  -  9  5  7
UK   Bottom 5th 48 45 15  8   'Poverty' 18 29  7  4
Israel   Bottom 5th 29 22 15  8   'Poverty' 24 12 15  6
United States   Bottom 5th 25 56 16 11   'Poverty' 21 52 13 10
West Germany   Bottom 5th 28 33 22 11   'Poverty'  9 18  4  5
 Source:  from T Smeeding, M O'Higgins, L Rainwater (eds), 1990, Poverty, inequality and
income distribution in comparative perspective  , New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p.65.
The LIS is still in its infancy, and at this stage the broad figures disguise certainelements of poverty, too.  The UK figures for 'households below average incomes', whichare calculated on a different basis, point to some other important factors.  The greatestrisk of low income is for single parents and unemployed people; and those who are sickand disabled are at greater risk than pensioners (2).  The figures fail, too, to takeappropriate account of a number of important groups, including women, ethnicminorities and people in part-time work, people living in institutions, and homelesspeople (3).   The latter categories point to further problems, because there are manygroups which are too small or difficult to define for them to be taken into account in suchan approach - groups like discharged psychiatric patients, travellers, people who arementally handicapped, young people discharged from care, or women who have sufferedfrom domestic violence.  In this chapter, I discuss only the largest categories, which areenough to draw some general conclusions; it is important to remember, though, that thediversity of problems associated with poverty defies any simple, convenientclassification.  
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Elderly people.  It would be misleading to pretend that all old people are poor, or arelikely to be.  The central reason why old people tend to have a limited income is theirwithdrawal from the labour market.  Not all old people do retire, though the tendency hasincreasingly been for people over 65 to do so.  The poorest old people are those whose pensions are insufficient to provide a basicminimum income.  This might be because the basic level of the pension is inadequate,which is the case in the UK or Israel, or because the numbers of people covered arelimited, which applies to more in West Germany.  The number of pensioners who receiveIncome Support as a supplement to their pensions has fallen in recent years, to about 1.3million (4); this is not however enough to bring them up to 50% of median income.  Itmight be estimated, too, that nearly half as many again are eligible for Income Supportbut not claiming.  Those who do receive National Insurance tend to have incomes whichare marginally above the Income Support rates; however, it is a level of income at whichrelatively small increases can make a large difference in command over resources. Because women tend to live longer than men, most pensioners are women; there may beproblems where women are not entitled to full pensions, because they have not workedin the labour market throughout their lifetimes, or where they have to rely on earnings-related pensions, because their earnings have been lower than men's.  Clayton suggests,I think with some reason, that 'elderly women are in receipt of a lower level of welfareassistance, commensurate with their needs, than elderly men' (5).Many pensioners are deprived.  They often live in older housing, because they arelikely to have lived in one place for some time; those in private rented housing areparticularly likely to live in bad conditions.  Savings have been eroded by inflation.  Theyare less likely to possess certain items, like fridges and washing machines, which havebecome part of the modern household.  At the same time, they are probably not as badlyoff as younger people who are not able to participate in the labour market.  Their benefitsare more generous - in most countries, because they are receiving benefits which reflectprevious earnings, but also because of a clear preference given to pensioners relative toother groups of beneficiaries like the unemployed. 
Chronically sick and disabled people.  The problems of disabled people are very diverse;they include conditions like blindness, inability to walk, deafness, inability to sustain aphysical effort, epilepsy, and chronic illness, and the definition of disability can beextended to include mental illness and handicap or alcoholism.  The kinds of conditionleading to disability can be presented clinically, to include for example neurologicaldisorders (like multiple sclerosis), blood disorders (like haemophilia), metabolicdisorders (like cystic fibrosis) or sensory handicaps.  Problems of this kind are referredto as impairments.  Disability is the functional restriction which results.  A person whosedisability causes disadvantage in a particular role or set of social roles is referred to as
handicapped (6).The OPCS surveys of disability present, with an unusual degree of authority, a set ofproblems likely to affect people who are disabled.  The problems they took account ofwere not clinical categories, but rather categories of functional incapacity.  Theseincluded locomotion; reaching and stretching; dexterity; continence; hearing; seeing;communication; personal care; behaviour; intellectual functioning; loss of consciousness;problems of eating, drinking and digestion; and disfigurement.  These categories overlapwith handicap - notably in the cases of locomotion, personal care, behaviour andintellectual functioning.  The majority of those who are disabled - and the vast majority of those who areseverely disabled - are old people, who are poor because they are not employed.  Amongyounger disabled people, the issue of participation in the labour market is crucial indetermining income.  Those who are employed, however, are also likely to earn less. Disabled non-pensioners had incomes which were on average 72% of non-pensionersin general (7).  The problem is not only that disabled people lack resources, but also thatthey may have special needs for expenditure.  Most disabled adults (60%) incur regularextra expenditure because of their disability; this may include items from the chemist,visits to hospitals and home services (8).  Overall, the survey concludes, 'disabled adults
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are likely to experience some financial problems and to have lower standard of livingthan the population as a whole as a result of having lower average incomes.'  (9)
Unemployed people.  Unemployment is not a simple phenomenon.  Beveridge attributedunemployment to two main factors: cyclical changes in the demand for labour, and whathe referred to as the 'disorganisation' of the employment market (10).  Cyclicalfluctuations arise because industry relies on demand from consumers to keep going; ina slump, this demand is not there.  Primary producing industries - like heavy engineeringor energy - are affected first; consumer industries follow.  In Full employment and a free
society, he extended his understanding of this category to cover structural unemployment- major changes brought about either for technical reasons or because demand isdeficient in the economy as a whole (11).The specific problems of the labour market are classified by Beveridge as  'frictional'(12).  Frictional unemployment included unemployment as a result of technical change(people become unemployed because their skills are made redundant, or because workis replaced by machines); local variations like those caused by the demand for casuallabour (which is less important now than in Beveridge's day; it referred to people wholooked for work day by day (like dockers) or week by week; and 'seasonal' (certaintrades, like building and hotels, take on people at some times of year and drop them atothers).  This is not an exhaustive categorisation.  Other categories of unemployment whichBeveridge referred to elsewhere include voluntary unemployment - when a person isunwilling to work at the market wage - and job-changing, which is  also a form offrictional employment.  Beveridge's description of unemployment is not as clear orprecise as it might be; but it is important, not least because his recognition of a widerange of different problems was ultimately reflected in the benefit system.  For practicalpurposes, the main importance of his analysis was the implied distinction of short-term(frictional) and long-term (structural) unemployment, which created different kinds ofproblem, and called for different responses.Where unemployment is temporary or short-term, the effects of low income areunlikely in themselves to be indicative of poverty.  But unemployment is a reverse queue:the longer the time a person has waited, the less likely that person is to be re-employed. In the UK, the average period of unemployment for those who are then re-employed isunder three months; the average period for those who are still unemployed is about ninemonths.  The effect of female unemployment deserves special mention.  Although women'swages are notably less than men's, they play a crucial role in lifting the collective incomesof households, and are of particular significance for household poverty when the man'swages are low.  In cases where both husband and wife are not working, the income of thehousehold is likely to fall critically - unsurprisingly, near to the basic benefit level.  
Single parents.  Single parents include unmarried mothers, divorcees (male and female),and widows and widowers (who are usually covered by social insurance).  They areidentified by their responsibility for child care.  A person who has responsibility for childcare is often unable to work, which creates major financial problems.  In addition, single-parent families are most often headed by a female, and female wages tend to be muchlower than male wages.  There are significant differences, however, between different categories of singleparent.  Unmarried mothers are (by definition) female.  Many are young, which meansboth that their earning capacity is limited, that benefit entitlements may be restricted,and that they are unlikely to have a core stock of capital goods.  They are also likely to beon benefit for a longer period than other single parents, and less likely to marry.  Widowsand widowers are likely to be older.  They are more likely to have accumulated capitalresources; if working benefit from age-related increases in income.  They may have someinsurance, or receive more generous benefits.  Divorced people have the greatest degreeof variation.  Some have a work record and working experience.  Some have capitalresources (or at least a proportion of joint resources), where others do not.  Some haveregular maintenance payments for children, and some do not.  Poverty, on this account,
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is most likely to affect unmarried mothers and certain divorcees, though the problemsof child care coupled with the restricted status of women in the labour market mean thatfew single parents are proof against poverty (13). 
People working on low earnings.  Low earnings are most prevalent within certainindustries - in the UK, particularly agriculture, textiles and (depressingly) the publicservice.  The incidence of low earnings varies, in consequence, according to the locationof these industries.  The effect of sex discrimination appears strongly in those industrieswhich traditionally employ women.  Because women's wages are lower than men's, they are much more likely to receivelow income in the long term than men are; the position particularly affects single parentsand single women.  A two-parent family with both a man and a woman earning is likelyto have a much higher income than one with only one earner, but where there is onemale earner he will usually bring in more than one female earner.
Women and poverty.  The position of women is of particular importance for anunderstanding of poverty.  The problem is not that people are poor simply by virtue ofbeing women - women are more likely than men to be poor, but most women are  notpoor.  It is, rather, that the disadvantages stemming from the structure of gender arecumulative.  Glendinning and Millar point to three main routes through which peoplegain resources: paid employment, social security systems, and the household or family(14).  The labour market is the most significant factor determining the poverty of womenrelative to men.  Social security systems are often discriminatory, but they do not preventwomen from obtaining resources altogether.  In relation to household income, it issometimes argued that women within  households which have apparently adequateresources may still be poor, because resources are unequally distributed within thehousehold (15).  There are reasons to question the proposition.  At the margins ofpoverty, the kinds of argument which Land makes are strong ones, because the womanwithin the household who is denied resources lacks essential items as a result.  However,as the income of the household increases, the lack of certain items - like a personaldisposable income or replacement clothing - is experienced within a context in whichthat person also has access to other items, such as furnishings, consumer durables,transport or holidays.   The kinds of problem which are experienced are degrading andimportant, but they are not equivalent to the problems of 'poverty'; if people in thissituation are 'poor', then so are middle-class families who overspend their budget orhouseholds whose commitments leave them with no disposable income.  It is much moreimportant that these issues contribute to the general disadvantage of women, and so thatin cases where household resources cease to be available - such as in a divorce - aprecarious position becomes one of poverty.Because it is only a limited minority of women who are poor, women cannot betreated as a category of people at special risk in the same sense as pensioners, disabledpeople or single parents.  But among those who are poor, women predominate.  Thelower earnings of women imply an inadequate command over resources when awoman's income is the sole income in a household - that is, particularly for single womenor female single parents.  (It is single parents who seem to attract most attention indiscussions of poverty in the US. (16))  The 'working poor' are often female.  Women areequally vulnerable as pensioners, with their liability to interrupted work records andlower earnings-related benefits.  With some justification, poverty has been described asbecoming 'feminised'; the main reservation to make about the term is the questionwhether it has not always been the case (17).
Race and poverty.  The identification of race with poverty is now frequently found in theliterature, though more often in an ideological context than in relation to any specificempirical analysis.  'Race' is not a simple characteristic.   The term is itself sociallyconstructed, and there is a disturbing tendency to lump together people in very differentcircumstances as 'non-white' or 'black' - disturbing both because it denies people theirdistinguishing characteristics and because it encourages primary identification by colour. The strong identification of racial issues and social policies in the US inclines one to
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the view that racial distinctions are an important element in the experience of poverty:nearly one third of the Afro-American population is considered poor on the officialstandard, compared to 10% of caucasians (18).  It is argued, in fact, that 'the two bestpredictors of official poverty status in the United States are sex and race' (19) - thoughit is important to recognise that most poor people in the US are not Afro-American, andthe over-identification of race and poverty can be destructive.  In the UK, the situationis much less clear.  There are certainly problems within European nations which relateto the status of immigrants (not always the same thing as race).  However, the specificinformation which is available is fairly scanty, and many of the generalisations which aremade are questionable.  As one major text on poverty in the UK comments, 'The mostnotable point ... is the paucity of information that is available' (20).      Figures from the Policy Studies Institute show average earnings of racial groups, andrelative levels of dependency on benefits in the UK: see table 5.2. The figures indicatesome degree of disadvantage; the higher earnings of women from the Caribbeanprobably reflect different patterns of work, and perhaps location.  There is evidence that'people of Asian and West Indian origin ... are more likely than white people to beunemployed, and those who are in work tend to have jobs with lower pay and lowerstatus than those of white workers'. (21)     
Table 5.2a:  Earnings of different ethnic groups
‘White' West Indian 'Asian’
Median weekly earnings (1982):Male £129.00 £109.20 £110.70 Female £ 77.50 £ 81.20 £ 73.00
Table 5.2b:  Support from state benefits by ethnic group 
Households receiving:UnemploymentBenefit   7% 17% 16%Family Income    Supplement    (for low pay)   1%  5%  2%SupplementaryBenefit  14% 20% 11%Retirement/widows pension  35%  6%  6%Source: C Brown, Black and white Britain, London: Heinemann, pp 208, 242.The figures conceal as much as they show.  In the first place, they refer to a widerange of occupations and age groups.  Second, they imply a uniformity of experiencewithin groups which is probably inappropriate.  It may be valuable to contrast the figuresgiven in table 5.3, which refer to housing tenure.  The figures show something of thediversity of different ethnic groups.  The pattern of tenure for the whole of the UK at thistime was that 56% of households were owner-occupiers, 31% in local authority housing,and 12% were renting privately; by contrast, Indians, Pakistanis and East African Asianswere much more likely to own, while those from Bangladesh or the West Indies weremuch less likely to.  This has to be interpreted with some caution, because althoughusually there is a strong association between owner-occupation and higher levels of
51
income, housing conditions are far worse for minority groups.  This indicates in part astrategy by many ethnic minority families to attempt to use low-income owner-occupation as the most accessible form of tenure; it also reflects, though, the relativeyouth and low incomes of many of the families, ignorance about grants and services, anddiscrimination in access to other forms of tenure and to better property.  'From the pointof view of amenities', Smith writes, 'it is better to be a white labourer than an Asianchartered accountant.' (22)
Table 5.3: Tenure of racial minorities (UK, 1981: %) 
Ethnic group Owner-occupied Council Private rentedWest Indian 41 46  6Bangladeshi 30 53 11Indian 77 16  5Pakistani 80 13  5African Asian 73 19  5Source:  C Brown, op cit, p 96.The life-styles of different minority groups are not equivalent.  Birthplace isimportant as an indicator, not so much because of cultural influences as because itrepresents a process of immigration, which affects the kinds of circumstance in whichpeople are likely to have come to Britain.  Bangladesh, for example, is a poorer countrythan Pakistan, and Bangladeshis in Britain are poorer as immigrants.  Indian immigrantstend to be better off than people from the Caribbean.  (These broad categories, of course,conceal further distinctions within and between groups).  The main process ofimmigration occurred at different periods for the principal groups, and the terms ofentry; the greater number of people from the Caribbean in council housing is explainedpartly by the terms of entry (later immigrants were prevented from dependency on'public funds', which led to a general fear of using public services), and partly by longerestablishment in particular areas; Bangladeshis, by contrast, are more concentrated inspecific local authorities.  The information which is available does indicate that people in ethnic minorities arerelatively disadvantaged, which also means that they are likely to be vulnerable topoverty, and over-represented among the people who are poor; the problems of racialdisadvantage are also significant because of the positional elements in poverty.  Povertymay, then, be an important issue in the understanding of racial problems.  However, thefigures do not show either that substantial numbers of people in racial minorities arepoor, or that race is a major category among people who are poor.  
The social construction of povertyThe issues of poverty among women and racial minorities point to a further dimensionin the understanding of poverty.  If  they were intended to be descriptive categories, theirinclusion in this context would have to be questioned; it is clear that, even if people inthese categories are more likely to be poor, most of them are not actually poor.  They arebetter considered as analytical rather than descriptive; they are intended not simply toconvey a sense of who is affected by poverty, but also to put the experience of povertyin the context of social disadvantage.  The process of categorisation is not simplydescriptive.  The assumption that old people, unemployed people, disabled people orsingle parents are likely to be poor may be justifiable in many cases, but there are clear
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exceptions, and there are many for whom the generalisations do not hold good.  Thekinds of contingency which I have been describing are themselves understood andresponded to within a social context; the process through which such groups are definedis not neutral, factual and value-free, but rather depends on a process of interpretationand political negotiation.Another way of saying this is that the problems of poverty are 'socially constructed'. This is not the same as saying that the nature of poverty is socially defined, though thereis a relationship between the two kinds of statement; it means, rather, that the processthrough which poverty is recognised as a social issue, and the way it is understood,depends on the society (and, one might say, the political process) of which it is a part. This might affect the definition of poverty, but equally it affects the way the problems areperceived, interpreted and responded to.  On the face of the matter, the kinds of categorywhich I have been outlining are descriptive; they seem to rely on a balanced,dispassionate assessment of the facts.  But there are other categories which mightequally have been used, and which are used in some analyses, but which, for one reasonor another, are not commonly referred to in the analysis of poverty.  These might include,for example, mental handicap, people living in poor areas, and social class.  The fact thesecategories are not referred to in the same way as they have been illustrates the point thatthe understanding of poverty is based in convention.
Mental handicapMental handicap describes the condition of people who have slow intellectualdevelopment.  This is associated with a  range of other problems, because slowintellectual development might reflect organic problems, because it affects a number ofother skills (such as when children learn to walk), and it can create problems incommunication.  Mentally handicapped people tend more often to come from families inlower social classes (23), and are likely to be on low incomes in later life, if only becauseof their limited earning power.  On the face of the matter, then, mental handicap mightseem to be a legitimate inclusion in the list of categories within which people becomevulnerable to poverty.  However, there is also a political history to the treatment of mentally handicappedpeople which may make it undesirable to classify them independently in this way.  At theturn of the century, mentally handicapped people were classified as 'degenerates'. Degeneracy was seen as a problem at the root of pauperism, mental illness, and crime . Concern was expressed (notably by the Eugenics Society) to prevent them from breedingbecause of the supposed social implications.  The philosophy is enshrined in the 1913Mental Deficiency Act, which identified people as being idiots, imbeciles, feeble mindedor 'moral defectives'.   After the Second World War, much of this philosophy wasdiscredited - not least because of the association of eugenics with fascism - although theidea of degeneracy did survive in the concept of the 'problem family' (24).  It is difficult to say that the way in which the issues of poverty and mental handicapbecame dissociated reflected a conscious break.  There was certainly, in the post warperiod, a desire to avoid stigmatising language, and 'social security' was separated from'welfare'; there was some complacency induced by the idea of the 'welfare state', to theeffect that groups like mentally handicapped people were now being catered for; but ifthere was any desire to protect the status of mentally handicapped people, it did notfilter through to policy, and services for mentally handicapped people were ignoreddisgracefully until at least the late 1960s.  Whatever the process, there has been noreturn to the kind of identification of mental handicap with poverty that was taken forgranted eighty or ninety years ago.  
People in poor areasPoor people tend to live in poor areas.  To live in a poor area is, properly speaking, partof the nature of poverty  itself, rather than a circumstance in which people are likely tobecome poor.  But the category has been an important one, not least because a close
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identification of poverty with certain areas has been used to justify a concentration onthe problems of the urban environment as a response to the problems of poor people.The process by which poor people come to live in poor areas is a fairlystraightforward one.  In the private sector, poor people are brought together through themagic of the market; those least able to exercise choice end up in the places least to bechosen.  The same has been shown to be true, to some extent, of the public sector. Research in Glasgow  shows that where applicants for council housing are allowed achoice, the people most able to exercise that choice are those who have the highestincomes and the best housing previously (25).  They are the ones who can wait for abetter offer.  Social segregation by housing officers has contributed to this process in thepast, but it equally happens in the private sector where there is no grading.Some areas are likely, as a result, to have greater concentrations of problems thanothers.  A study in Liverpool, for example, found extremely high correlations between arange of problems in different wards of the city, including theft, possession orders,warrants for disconnection of electricity, children being deloused, unemployment,assault, welfare conference cases, burglary, debtors, miscellaneous crimes, mentally illadults, malicious damage (vandalism), children graded as ESN ('educationally sub-normal'), and job instability (26).  These relationships do not reflect 'multiple problems'in individuals or families, but in clusters of problems in parts of a city.  Most of theproblems are directly attributable to poverty.  Unemployment, job instability, and adultsmentally ill are causes of poverty.  Theft and burglary, possession orders, disconnections,and debt are consequences of it.  Most of the other factors can be explained indirectly insimilar terms; children who perform badly at school may reflect parents in similarcircumstances, who live in these areas because their incomes are low; there is morevandalism because there are inadequate facilities to play at home; there is more attentionfrom the police and welfare agencies.  Although area-based analysis is a powerful tool for discovering some of the problemsassociated with poverty, there are dangers in identifying poverty too closely with poorareas.  Most poor people do not live in poor areas, and most of the people in poor areasare not poor.  Holtermann, in a study of the 1971 census, found that concentration on thepoorest areas was not likely to reach many of the poorest people (27).  In Tayside, whereI undertook some work on the distribution of poverty for the Regional Council, thefigures from the 1981 census showed that the worst 13 areas, covering approximately10% of Tayside's population, contained only 20% of overcrowding, 11% of householdslacking amenities, 25% of unemployment, 15% of households without a car, and 6% ofpensioner households.  The vast majority of poor people in the region did not then livein the most deprived areas.  Carley argues that 'however one uses indicators to definesocially deprived areas, unless half of Britain is so designated, more poor will be outsidethe areas than in them and any special treatment may be inequitable' (28).  No analysisof the poorest areas, no matter how refined it is, is going to identify adequately thedistribution of poverty.  
Social classThe third category is 'social class', or occupational status.  This became, in many ways,the dominant means of identifying  people who were disadvantaged in the 1950s and1960s, particularly in the literature on education.  Research in the 1950s by Floud, Halseyand Martin showed that the selective process favoured children from the middle classes,who consistently performed better in IQ tests as well as other tests of educationalattainment.  They did not find that the difference was due to discrimination: 'If by"ability" we mean "measured intelligence" and by "opportunity" access to grammarschools, then opportunity may be said to stand in close relationship with ability ...'  (29). The basis for concern this prompted was that differential attainment was reinforcingclass inequality, and much of the criticism of the educational system in the 1950s andearly 1960s was a response to the perceived bias in the selection system against workingclass children.  The 'secondary modern' schools were clearly second-class schools;selective schooling was gradually replaced from 1965 on by comprehenive education. There was concern, too, about early leaving.  A number of reports pointed to the
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disadvantage to working class children who were required to leave early in order to startearning:  the reports included Early Leaving and 15 to 18 (30), and they argued for theraising of the school leaving age to 16, as provided for in the 1944 Act.  Most pupils leftwith no qualifications at all.  The introduction of CSE followed the 1960 Beloe report andthe Newsom report, which concentrated on those of below average ability (31).  Therewas concern, too,  about higher education: the expansion of higher education in the late1950s and early 1960s, with the declaration of new universities and the creation ofPolytechnics, was intended partly to improve the output of people in scientific andtechnical education, and partly to improve the opportunities for working class children. (In practice, the main benefit of this expansion has been reaped by the middle classes;the prospects of higher education in a university or polytechnic for a girl from social classV are virtually negligible.) (32) If social class became less important after the 1960s in policy terms, it was partly thatmany of the policies which had been argued for had been implemented; it was also thatdisadvantage was increasingly being related to family circumstances or to the structureof society.  Disadvantage, it was argued, arises before school, in social settings, and theschool tends to reflect this (33).  Later developments took the emphasis of policy awayfrom schooling and more towards the problems of inequality.There are still many who see in social class a major analytical tool for the predictionof the incidence of deprivation, patterns of behaviour and social outcomes.  In theanalysis of health care, for example, social class proves to be a powerful indicator ofdisadvantage in health (34).  People in lower social classes, including children, are morelikely to suffer from infective and parasitic diseases, pneumonia, poisonings and violence. Adults in lower social classes are more likely, in addition, to suffer from cancer, heartdisease and respiratory disease.  There are also gender related problems.  Men in lowersocial classes suffer more from malignant neoplasms, accidents, and diseases of thenervous system.  Women in lower social classes suffer more from circulatory diseases,and endocrine or metabolic disorders. There are various explanations as to why this kind of disadvantage persists.  TheBlack Report considers the possibility that there is some degree of natural or socialselection; that there are cultural and behavioural factors influencing health outcomes;and that the apparent asociations are an artefact, the result of the way in whichoccupational categories and health are defined.  Poverty remains an important elementin the explanation; poor nutrition, bad housing and unsatisfactory environments may allcontribute to ill health.   There are however reasons to doubt whether social class itself is the principal factorwhich explains health outcomes; it is at best an indicator.  Despite its evident importanceas an analytical category, it has not been since the 1960s been treated in Britain as acentral focus for responses to the problems of poverty; that probably reflects as much onpolitical fashions as it does on the strength of the argument.  The central problem withan emphasis on social class is that it depends on a reference to occupational status, whenmany of the people who are poorest have none.  The kinds of issue which occupationalstatus identifies are the issues of structured inequality at different levels of society; thekinds of responses which it demands run across several strata, rather than focussingspecifically on the poorest.  
Interpreting povertyIf there is a contrast between categories like mental handicap, poor areas and social classwith the kinds of  category which were considered previously, it is not a strong one.  Itis possible, perhaps, to describe the first set of categories as 'descriptive', and the secondset as 'analytical'.  But descriptive and analytical categories are not easy to separate,because the selection of particular classes of description as especially important - like theproblems of ethnic minorities or women - is often based in their importance in terms ofa causal analysis, while the use of certain explanatory categories - like 'social class' or'low income', which are defined in terms of inequality - can be justified in terms of theirdescriptive power.  Ultimately, the selection of certain categories as appropriate ones,
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and the rejection of others, depends to a large extent on the kinds of analysis on whichan understanding of poverty is based.  The ways in which poverty is described are important, not only because they affectthe way in which the problems of poverty are conceived, but because they shape thekinds of response which are made.  In the United States, for example, there is a verystrong link made between poverty and racial issues, to such an extent that discussion ofpoverty sometimes stands for racial issues; in the United Kingdom, poverty is morecommonly associated with unemployment and family policy; in France, poverty is beingtaken increasingly to mean social exclusion.  The kinds of response which are made topoverty reflect these understandings; so, in the US, the 'War on Poverty' was primarilyconcerned with the circumstances of the urban Afro-American population, the UK'sresponses to poverty are often described in terms of benefits for people out of work andChild Benefit, and in France there has been the introduction of the Revenu minimum
d'insertion directed at the integration or 'insertion' of poor people into society.It would be wrong, though, to attribute the pattern of response primarily to the wayin which poverty is described.  The process of interpretation is at least as important,probably more so; political responses to poverty depend to a large extent on the kindsof explanations which are given for poverty, and the beliefs which people hold aboutthose who are poor.  In the next chapter, I consider this relationship in greater detail.
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Chapter 6
Causes and responsesOne does not have to understand poverty in order to respond to it.  For one thing, theway into a problem is not  necessarily the way out of it.  For another, social problemshave to be addressed whether one understands them or not.  I think it would be a brave(or foolish) person who claimed to have an adequate understanding of the causes ofracism, for example, but ignorance or imperfect knowledge is not a good reason forinaction.  At the same time, the kinds of responses which are made to poverty are clearlyaffected by the kinds of understanding which people have of poverty - the way in whichthe problems are constructed, the kinds of issues which are identified as being important,and the way in which the issue relates to others.  Understanding these issues is importantfor understanding the kinds of response which might be made.In some cases, the explanations which are given for poverty prompt a particular kindof response, in a fairly simple and direct relationship.  If poverty is held, for example, tobe the result of genetic inheritance, then the main way in which it is likely to beaddressed is by altering the process - which implies some kind of eugenic policy.  If, onthe other hand, poverty is the result of exploitation of the poorest by a ruling class, thenit will remain for as long as such exploitation persists and some restructuring of powerrelationships is required.  There are grounds for suspicion about any simple explanation -if only because poverty is not one kind of problem, but many - but irrespective of thetruth or falsity of the reasons which are given, the impact on policy can be considerable.
Pathological explanationsPathological explanations are those which attribute poverty in one way or another to thecharacteristics of people who  are poor.  These include  individualistic, familial and sub-cultural explanations of poverty (1).
Individualistic viewsIndividualistic views of poverty attribute poverty to the characteristics of the people whosuffer from it.  In a  competitive society, those who fail might be those who are in somesense inadequate or incompetent; those who have made the wrong decisions, throughill-luck or mistaken judgment; and those who have not tried.  These ideas are oftenlumped together, but they are very different. The first proposition is unfortunatelyexpressed, because words like 'inadequacy' and 'incompetence' have a distinctivelyjudgmental and insulting flavour; the terms imply a moral judgment about people'sposition in society, when it is very questionable whether the system of rewards reflectscompetence to any great degree.  If, however,  one takes the proposition to mean thatpeople have different capacities, and that this is likely to affect their opportunities andincomes, it is much less contentious.  People might become poor, for example, as aconsequence of mental illness, physical disability, or mental handicap.  The secondproposition is not especially contentious; people do make decisions which put them ata disadvantage, whether it is in their education, their choice of spouse, their children,their economic capacity, or how they use the money they have.  The third category - thosewho do not try - is the category most clearly associated with moralistic and right-wingviews; poverty is widely attributed to 'laziness', though less so in the UK than used to bethe case.  (In 1976, 43% of people in the UK thought that poverty was the result oflaziness - virtually twice the average of the rest of Europe.  By 1989, this figure had fallento 18%.) (2)This kind of explanation does not of itself determine the likely policy responses.  Inrespect of people with limited capabilities, the view of individualists on the right wingtends to be that they should be treated as 'deserving', while others are seen as
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'undeserving'; the left, by contrast, tend to dismiss the distinction as irrelevant to policyor undesirable (because of its effects in stigmatising all recipients).  When it comes topeople who have made the wrong decisions, the difference between left and right wingconsists not in the question of whether people ever make wrong decisions, but whatshould be done; the left tend to argue for mutual support and solidarity as a form ofprotection for the casualities of social processes, while the individualist right suggest thatpeople must face the consequences of their personal decisions if those decisions are tomean anything.  In respect of those who do not try, there are mixed feelings: on both rightand left, there is a feeling that people should have to contribute to society, but theindividualist right tend to magnify the numbers of potential cases, while the left considerthe problem to be insignificant or attribute it to structural factors.   On both sides, thereis some uncertainty as to whether there is room for moralistic judgments within policydecisions, although some on the right have argued for a re-assertion of a distinctionbetween the deserving and undeserving poor (3).
Familial explanationsSome views of poverty link it to the structure of the family.  This may be individualistic,in the sense of attributing  responsibility to individuals within the family, but it may alsorely on issues relating to genetic make-up or family background.  Genetic explanationsfor poverty take it that the structure of rewards in society in some way reflect either thecapacity or the inherited behaviour of the citizens; if the origins of poverty are genetic,it suggests that some intervention is required in the way people breed - the argumentwhich was central to the eugenics movement.  During the 1950s, the pattern in social work moved towards addressing the problemsof deprivation brought about through the pathology of the family.  The reinforcement oflinks between maternal deprivation and juvenile delinquency was a primary justificationfor the development of personal social services in their present form.  Bowlby's Maternal
Care and Mental Heath (3), though it did not invent the idea, became established as thereceived wisdom on the issue, and for over twenty five years policies for childrensuffering from neglect and abuse were formed simultaneously with policies for youngoffenders.  The development of Social Services Departments in England and Wales wasinitiated by the Seebohm committee; the government White Paper which had announcedthe setting up of the committee was entitled 'The Child, the Family and the YoungOffender' (5).  The summit of this approach was reached in the 1969 Children and YoungPersons' Act, which effectively removed the administrative and many of the practical distinctions between young offenders and abused children, supposedly in the hope thatit would remove the stigma of criminality from young offenders.  (Arguably, it transferredthat stigma to everyone else).  The 1989 Children Act has reversed the trend and re-asserted the distinction.  The attribution of poverty to family background is perhaps most strongly linked withthe idea of the 'cycle of deprivation' or 'transmitted deprivation'.  There is at least a goodargument to be made that poor parenting leads to disadvantage in development, but the'cycle of deprivation' goes further: poor parenting, it is held, generates a cycle ofinadequate development, and further poor parenting.  In the words of Keith Joseph,'parents who were themselves deprived in one or more ways in childhood become inturn the parents of another generation of deprived children.' (6)  The social services enjoyed a major expansion in the early 1970s, not least becauseJoseph, as Secretary for State, believed that early intervention in families was importantto break the 'cycle of deprivation'.  It was Joseph, too who to his credit set up the workingparty on transmitted deprivation to examine the problems.  After ten years, the workingparty was to report that transmitted deprivation did not work in the way that people hadthought (7).  There is little evidence to show that there are continuities particularlypreserved in certain families, partly because most poor children are not poor as adults,and partly because people marry spouses who are not from similar family backgrounds(8).  
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Subcultural explanations'Subcultural' explanations are those which imply that the values of poor people are insome sense different from  others.  The best known expressions of poverty as a'subculture' have been Oscar Lewis's anthropological studies of poor people in Mexico,Puerto Rico and New York (9).  Lewis summarises some of the major characteristics asfollows:'On the family level, the major traits of the culture of poverty are the absence ofchildhood as a specially prolonged and protected stage in the life cycle, earlyinitiation into sex, free unions or consensual marriages, a relatively high incidenceof the abandonment of wives and chidren, a trend toward female- or mother-centredfamilies ... a strong disposition to authoritarianism, lack of privacy, verbal emphasison family solidarity which is only rarely achieved because of sibling rivalry, andcompetition for limited goods and maternal affection.   On the level of the individual, the major characteristics are a strong feeling ofmarginality, of helplessness, of dependence and inferiority.  Other traits include ahigh incidence of maternal deprivation, or orality, or weak ego structure, confusionof sexual identification, a lack of impulse control, a strong present-time orientationwith relatively little ability to defer gratification and to plan for the future, a sense ofresignation and fatalim, a widesread belief in male superiority, and a high tolerancefor psychological pathology of all sorts.'  (10).Valentine attacks the characterisation on the basis that it is not really about a 'culture'at all (11) - it has far more to do with the supposed effect of poverty on personality.  Oneof Lewis's principal faults is that he mixes psychological characteristics with socialrelationships, and then compounds them with other factors (like unemployment, lack ofsavings and lack of privacy) which are aspects of poverty itself, rather than of any'culture' (12).  Ultimately, Lewis's description can be seen - like many others in the field -as 'a middle class rationale for blaming poverty on the poor' (13).The 'culture of poverty' seemed to be discredited, but it has recently resurfaced inarguments about an 'underclass' (14); Auletta associates them with 'violence, arson,hostility and welfare dependency' (15) (he has perhaps forgotten rapine and pillage), andMurray with 'drugs, crime, illegitimacy, homelessness, drop-out from the job market,drop-out from schoool and casual violence' (16).   This kind of argument is not new - itcan be traced back without much difficulty to feudal times, with the condemnation of'sturdy beggars'.  The credence which is given to work of this kind reflects not simply along-standing tradition (17) but a form of rejection which is a deep element of socialstructures (18).  Its importance rests mainly in the effect it has on the political will torelieve poverty.  I do not wish to attempt to deny that there are poor people who areunpleasant, antisocial or morally reprehensible - there are people who are not poor whoare like this, and it is difficult to see what there could be about poverty that might investpeople with a special kind of moral virtue.  But there is no reason to suppose that it isespecially relevant or convincing, either.  As for the belief that the moral turpitude of thepoor should deny them relief, one might with equal justice argue - as the Victorianreformers did - that financial support is a precondition for moral regeneration.The core of truth which lies behind sub-cultural analysis is that poor people do livedifferently - that is part of what 'poverty' means.  The problem rests in the idea that theychoose to live differently.  This might be a tenable position if one also believed thatpoverty is a consequence of the values one holds; but if not, there would be people whohad the values who were not poor, and people who were poor who did not have thosevalues.  Empirical evidence does not support the view that poor people think differently. Rokeach and Parker, surveying the values of the poor in the US, found that they tend toreflect - sometimes even to exaggerate - dominant values (19).  Rodman points to theproblems of reconciling these values with the circumstances they actually live in; hesuggests that poor people have to undertake a 'value stretch' to make it possible tomaintain a sense of decency despite the limitations of their life style (20).  Subcultural explanations suggest that it is necessary to establish a different set ofvalues.  In the US War on Poverty, concern about the culture of poor families becamecrossed with concern about the supposedly deviant subculture of Afro-American families,
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and much of what the War on Poverty was concerned with was the development ofopportunities for Afro-Americans.  The range of policies included, for example, the Officeof Economic Opportunity, designed to develop economic initiatives; Headstart, aneducational programme aimed primarily at pre-school children, in order to make earlyintervention possible; and, significantly in view of the 'cultural' objectives, the co- optionof Afro-American leaders into the political process (21).  
Structural explanationsStructural explanations are those which attribute poverty in one sense or another to thestructure of society.  There are  a range of different kinds of explanation.  What they havein common is the view that when there are structural inequalities, some people will fallto the bottom.  The responsibility rests, then, not with the individual but with the socialorganisation which produces the effect.  
Poverty as diswelfare.  One view of poverty is that it is the product of the way in which society is organised. Titmuss, for example, saw people in poverty and need as the casualties of a competitivesociety (22).  If society is unequal, then (of necessity) some people must fall to thebottom, for whatever reasons.  If there is not enough work, or work is available only onrestrictive terms, then some people will be unemployed.  If people have to be able-bodiedin order to be eligible for work, then disabled people will be disadvantaged.  Titmusssuggested that this could be seen as a form of 'diswelfare', the converse of a position inwhich others in society, and indeed society as a whole, produced material goods; thereare losers as well as gainers, and it is important if this position is to be justifiable thatsome mechanism exist through which the losers can be compensated for their diswelfare. The kinds of response to poverty which this implies is one which identifies thedifferent kinds of outcome and responds accordingly.  In some views, the failure ofwelfare agencies to respond can be taken to be a cause of poverty in itself (23), thoughas this assumes the existence of conditions of poverty it hardly constitutes an adequateexplanation.  Responses to different outcomes can be made in many ways - for example,through provision for particular kinds of deprivation, or provision for differentcontingencies, like old age, unemployment and sickness.  These options, and others, areconsidered further in the next chapter.    
Structured disadvantageThe main limitation of the view that poverty is the product of social organisation is thatit does not take into account  the extent to which patterns of disadvantage recur.  Thearguments centred on women and racial minorities are important, because they indicatenot only that some groups tend to be disadvantaged, but that the disadvantage theysuffer is structured and persistent.  The process through which disadvantage is structured is the subject of somecontroversy.  There are three main analytical concepts - class, status and power -commonly used to explain the pattern of disadvantage.  The terms are closely related;they are often are used interchangeably, and even after the distinction has been made,it is not necessary to consider that any one explanation excludes the others.  For thepurposes of analysis, though, it is useful to make the distinctions.  
Power  Structural explanations for poverty are sometimes also conceived in term ofrelationships of power relationships.  The argument is that poor people do not simplyfind themselves at the bottom, but that they are put there and kept there by a repressivesocial structure.  This is taken to support a view of society which is based on thedominance of an élite, or of a class in whose interests rule is made.  Explanations whichare based on interpreting gender relationships and the feminisation of poverty may basethe analysis in the understanding of patriarchy, or male dominance.  
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In order to understand the relationship between power and poverty, one has to referto the kinds of model through which power is supposed to be exercised.  Lukes refers tothree main kinds of power.  The first is overt power, used when those who have powerwish to force the compliance of those who have not.  Second, there are 'non-decisions';people who have power are able to control the agenda for discussion, so that certainissues fail even to reach the point at which they may be tackled.  Third, there is the'hegemony' exercised by or for a ruling class, in which the pattern of values andperceptions is shaped in such a way that decisions will ultimately be made in theirinterests, even though there may be no need for any direct intervention (24).It would be easy to suppose, from what I have said about the social construction ofpoverty and the structure of disadvantage, that this is evidence of the exercise of power. But it is important to recognise that effects are not proof of intentions.  Evidence ofinequality or the enforcement of social norms do nothing to demonstrate thatdisadvantage is the product of power relationships.  That argument can only beestablished by examining the processes through which power is exercised - in otherwords, showing how the exercise of power leads to disadvantage - which is where mostof the commentary on power in the context of social policy fails to deliver (25).  In thecase of poverty, the argument has more substance than in other areas of social policy,because poverty can be explained to a large degree in terms of the economic system, andthe economic system can be seen as reflecting the power and influence of a number ofprincipal actors.  Poverty is not necessarily produced directly or deliberately, but it maystill be seen as the product of a system in which the welfare of the poorest person isinsufficiently important to merit other kinds of economic policy.The main implications of an argument based on power for responses to poverty aretwofold.  The first is that, if poverty is produced as a result of deliberate action, or evenof knowing indifference, there is unlikely to be an acceptance of measures to alleviatepoverty, and the best which an be hoped for will be minor ameliorative measures whichdo not conflict too far with other objectives.  The second is that this situation canultimately be addressed only through seeking to redress the structure of power insociety, a point which takes us beyond the confines of this book.
Status.  People's social relationships are not formed randomly; they develop as areflection of a person's roles in society.  'Roles' describe both what a person does, andwhat others expect that person to do.  They affect, and are affected by, people'sbehaviours in different social settings, including family, workplace and community.  Astatus is a set of such roles.  Statuses are linked with honour and esteem - and, conversely, with patterns of socialrejection or stigma.  Poor people have been seen as the people of the lowest status.  Therelationship between poverty and low status is, however, unclear.  Poverty can be seenas a product of low status; if a person has a limited set of roles in society, that person'sopportunities to accumulate command over resources are limited.  Low status can beseen as a product of poverty; if people lack resources, they become unable to participatein society, so that they are marginalised in relation to many social processes.  Andpoverty is sometimes identified with low status; in the European Community, povertyhas been identified with 'exclusion' and marginality (26).  As a description of thecondition of many poor people, this is not wildly inappropriate; but it should not beconfused with the nature of poverty in itself.  Marginality and exclusion are issues whichrelate to social stratification, rather than needs and resources; as such, the problemsapply to many groups, including people with physical and mental differences, peoplefrom different cultures, and people who breach social norms, who are not necessarilypoor.  The experience of exclusion is itself a significant problem, and one which has beendescribed, in the term of 'stigma', as the central problem in social policy (27).  The socialprocesses which lead to stigmatisation are complex, and poverty plays a part withinthem; but there are also issues relating to prejudice, social norms and the nature ofdeviance which go well beyond the scope of this book.  (I have however examined theseissues elsewhere. (28))   
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Several different kinds of response to poverty which are prompted by a focus onexclusion and stigma.  One option is a policy of inclusion - through 'rehabilitation',employment, training or similar approaches.  A second option might be to grant statusand rights - Lister's prescription for the extension of 'citizenship' (29).  And it may bepossible to approach the situation of the poor collectively, through participation orpositive discrimination.  These approaches are flawed (30): they fail to address either thestructural context of disadvantage or the problems of social rejection, and inconsequence they are likely to expose people who are vulnerable to further rejection. There may be a distinct argument for improving the resources of people who areexcluded; financial resources will not overcome the problem, but they can help tofacilitate fuller participation in society, as well as alleviating some of the worst effects ofexclusion.
Class.  The poverty of different categories of people is linked by a crucial thread.  People'spoverty reflects their income; and in most cases, their income is determined by theirrelationship to the labour market.  The first, and most obvious, issue is the question ofwhether people participate or do not participate within the labour market.  Those whodo not - like unemployed people, disabled people, pensioners and single parents - arethose most at risk of poverty.  This statement needs, though, to be qualified.  The effect of non-participation in thelabour market is conditioned by both their employment history - which affectsentitlement to benefits and employment prospects - and the length of time during whichpeople do not participate.  The second major issue is that people do not participatewithin the labour market on equal terms.  There are two striking examples of the effectof labour market inequalities in the position of people who subsequently are identifiableas receving low incomes.  These are first the receipt of occupational pensions by somepensioners, but not others, and second the disadvantaged position of women.  This argues for an analysis of the causes of poverty in terms of class.  Classes, inWeber's definition, are 'groups of people who, from the standpoint of specific interests,have the same economic position' (31).  This is not the same as an analysis based on'social class'.  The conventional description of people's 'social class', which defines peoplein terms of their occupational status, misses the most important thing about people whoare vulnerable to poverty - they may not have an occupational status at all.  Thedescription of poor people as a class is based, rather, on their economic position - thatis, their position in relation to the economic market.  The policies which are most directlyderived from this are those which are concerned either to change economic resources -like redistribution - or those which are concerned to change people's economicrelationships, through employment or the development of legitimate pattern ofdependency.
The underclassPoor people constitute, in important ways, an 'underclass'.  The term 'underclass' hasbeen disapproved, for example by  Ruth Lister and Carey Oppenheim (32), because of thenegative use of the term; and certainly, I would not wish to be associated with such uses. Historically, references to the poorest section of society often have been negative, butone should seek to distinguish between terms which are intrinsically negative - like'degenerates', 'problem families' or 'lumpenproletariat' - from those which have beenconsidered negative because they refer to a socially rejected and despised group, like the'submerged tenth', 'hard to reach', 'the abyss'.  Matza makes the point that the reasonwhy terms for describing the poorest section of the people are changed so often is thateach, in turn, comes to carry the stigma associated with the reference group (33).  Thefirst uses of the idea of the 'underclass' were made from those on the left, not those onthe right (34).  The term 'underclass' is not intrinsically unreasonable.  A 'class' of people is defined,sociologically, as a group identified by virtue of their economic position in society.   The'underclass' is composed of people whose economic position is not simply poor, buteffectively excluded from the mainstream of economic production (35).  Simmel once
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argued that 'poor' people should be considered, sociologically, to be those who becamedependent as a result of poverty; their position was not, he felt, equivalent to those whowere poor as a result of low earnings (36).  I do not share this view, for reasons which Ishall detail shortly, but the argument should give pause for thought; effectively, it restson the premise that people are distinguished, as a group, by the nature and source oftheir income.  A marxist class analysis defines people's class in terms of their relationshipto the means of production; there must then be some distinction between the proletariatand those who have no direct relationship to the industrial system.  A Weberianapproach would reinforce this distinction, though it might also suggest a number ofunderclasses, rather than one homogenous group.  The registrar-general's classificationof occupations starts from the signficant premise that status groups are primarily definedin terms of occupational categories, and it follows that those with no occupationalcategory are likely to fall below the levels occupied by those who have.   The 'underclass'is an economic grouping which falls beneath the criteria by which other economic groupsare classified. The underclass are sometimes represented as excluded, in the sense of being unableto participate in the normal patterns of social life; but the 'exclusion' of the underclassis only partial.  It is possible to distinguish two main economic categories.  One group arethose who are genuinely excluded from the labour market altogether, and so arefinancially dependent.  This group includes pensioners, and many disabled people.  Thesecond group, which is perhaps more important in the study of poverty, consists ofpeople who are not simply excluded, but who have a marginal position in relation to thelabour market.  These include single parents, some disabled people, and many peoplewith low employment status or skills, who may find themselves employed only casually,intermittently or for limited periods of time.  Their work is of low status and earningpower; when work is scarce, they are likely to be unemployed.  In France, these kinds ofconditions are generally referred to in terms of 'précarité'; Matza and Miller describe thesituation in terms of 'sub-employment' (37).  This kind of group is not, in general,covered by Townsend's definitions of poverty, which are concerned primarily with theability to participate in society at a particular point in time; and there is a case to say thatthe underclass consists not of people who are poor, but of those who are most vulnerableto poverty through the process of exclusion.  The categories of 'poverty' and the'underclass' are therefore related but discrete.  The underclass needs to be distinguished, too, from Simmel's categorisation of thepoor as those who are dependent on benefits.  Clearly, sub-employment suggests thatpoor people are likely to have to depend on beneits at some point.  However, many ofthose who depend on benefits do so only for short periods - there are transitions throughunemployment, serious illness or single parenthood - and do not necessarily becomepoor.  Conversely, many of those who are poor may have intermittent periods duringwhich they are not dependent.  The response to poverty is affected by a class analysis of this kind.  If it is correct, thenthose people who fall within an underclass differ from others in two main ways.  One isthat their earning power, even when work is available, is limited, and their resources areirregular and insecure.  Benefits which are tied to the labour market - like nationalinsurance, which rely on an unbroken contribution record, or benefits for people on lowincomes - often disadvantage the claimant whose employment status is marginal. Benefits which presume a stable set of circumstances - like benefits for single parents,or pensioners - are claimed if, like the cases of pensioners or people with dependentchildren, the circumstances can be taken to be stable, but may not be claimed if, as incases of single parenthood, benefits tied to accommodation, recurrent sickness orunemployment, the situation is not stable.  Second, the low status of the underclass leads to a pronounced set of social problems. The underclass is not defined by its social status, but it is important to note thatclassifications of status tend to reflect economic position.  Status, Runciman suggests, isa lagged function of class (38); people who have no occupational role, who have norelation to the industrial or commercial system, or whose role is marginal and inferior,constitute the lowest status groups.  Poor people are stigmatised, suffering problems ofpowerlessness, prejudice, and rejection.  It sometimes happens that the elements of
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stigmatisation and low status become confused with the identification of the features ofpoor people as a class, but this should be seen as a consequence of their class position,rather than a defining characteristic.  Ultimately, the effects of this class position aretranslated into policies which are restrictive and degrading.
Implications for policyThe different kinds of explanations for poverty are not mutually exclusive.  At a schoolsports day, there will be a  number of prizes for a range of events.  People can choosewhich events to enter, and according to their abilities and performance they will receiveprizes.  The reasons why someone comes first may well be attributable to merit, skill orperseverance; the person who comes last may well be less skilful, less willing toparticipate.  The explanation of who is last would be, in such a case, individualistic.  Butthe explanation of why someone has to come last, why there are not prizes for everyone,or why children are asked to compete is structural - it is determined by the organisationof the event - and this explanation can co-exist with the individualistic one, without anycontradiction.  (It leaves open the question of whether society should be run like a schoolsports day.)If people can hold a number of explanatory positions simultaneously, it becomesdifficult to associate the kinds of policy which are advocated simply to the pattern ofcausation implied in particular explanations for poverty.   Attempts to link the relief ofpoverty to a causal analysis substantially reflect a set of moral positions which have beentaken about the condition of people who are poor.  Those who attribute poverty to thefault, laziness or immorality of the poor are likely to argue that they deserve their fateand that attempts to improve their situation without addressing the root problems aredoomed to failure.  Those who view poverty as the product of an unequal society inwhich people are disadvantaged in economic, political and social terms suggest that sinceno amount of individual effort can redress the balance, it is inappropriate to structure therelief of poverty through a system which requires them to lift themselves by their ownbootstraps.  But neither of these positions is set and immutable.  Even if poverty is seenas the result of individual fault, it is possible to argue that in a well-ordered societyindividuals, and their dependants, must be protected from the consequences ofindividual failure.  Equally, it can be argued that even if there are structural problemspeople can overcome the disadvantages imposed on them.Structural explanations for poverty imply that some change in social structure isdesirable.  The problem with this proposition is not that it is self-evidently wrong orunreasonable, but that it is difficult to translate into operational terms.  The CommunityDevelopment Projects, in the UK, were given a remarkable brief by the government: toexperiment in deprived areas in order to see what could be done (39).  The CDPspublished a series of reports linking deprivation in particualr paces with the economicstructure, and concluding that they were fairly powerless to do anything.  When centralgovernment abolished the CDPs, the organisations protested vociferously; but by theirown argument, if they could do nothing, they had no further functions to perform. Equally, the argument which I have made for considering poverty in relation to thelabour market is also a structural one.  It is clearly very difficult to seek a transformationof the labour market in order to avoid the main effects, if only because any alteration,even if it is successful, is likely to maintain a distinction between those who are able towork and those who are not.  If this kind of analysis is not to be a counsel of despair, it is important to recognisethat the responses to problems do not have to rely on successful analysis of their causes. I have mentioned a number of policies, like redistribution and income maintenance, andattempts to 'rehabilitate' people or include them in social networks; there are others,which focus on different client groups (like old people or disabled people), or thosewhich concentrate on the correlates of poverty (like poor areas, gender and race); in theexamination of social security policies which follows, other approaches will beconsidered.  None of these policies directly addresses the kinds of problem which theanalysis of the 'underclass' implies.  But all can help, in different contexts, to improve thewelfare and the relative position of some people who are included from participation in
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the labour market, improving their circumstances in the process.  If the worst effects ofstructural disadvantage are at least mitigated, social policy will have made a positivecontribution to welfare - as well as acting to some extent to change the structure ofsociety (40).
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Part 2:  Social security as a response to poverty
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Chapter 7
Strategies for the relief of povertyPoverty might be responded to in many ways, including some which would not be usuallybe thought of as 'poor relief'.   'Poor relief' is an old fashioned term; it has fallen intodisuse, partly because it is associated with some undesirably stigmatising practices, andpartly because it seems limited in its scope.  'Relieving' a problem does not necessarilysolve it; it merely lifts a burden.  But whether or not relieving poverty is enough, theburden needs to be lifted.  There is something of a tradition in social policy of findingreasons why people should not be helped directly, particularly when it comes to poverty. Imagine that someone is drowning in a lake.  On the right, there are some who feel thatit is a very nice lake which would look much nicer if people didn't make silly decisionsabout falling in.  On the left, there are some others who want the lake to be drained. Somewhere in the middle is a social worker, who will not physically intervene but canoffer swimming lessons over the megaphone.  Poor relief is about dragging people out. Perhaps there are better answers, but it needs no apology.If poverty consists of deprivations which resources are inadequate to meet, it can berelieved either by addressing the problem of deprivation, or by increasing a person'sresources.  These tend to overlap, if only because it is difficult to meet deprivationwithout increasing a person's resources in one sense or another, and increasingresources in response to deprivation is likely to reduce the level of deprivationexperienced.  The distinction is fairly arbitrary, then, but it is still useful in helping toidentify some of the elements of policy.
Responses to needOne option is to identify the nature of the deprivation in isolation from other issues - a'symptom-centred' approach - and to make provisions which can reduce that deprivationdirectly.  This, on the face of the matter, is the most direct form of poor relief.  If peopleare homeless, they can be provided with housing, or the means to obtain it; if they arewithout food, they can be given food.  Symptom-centred approaches are often dismissedin serious analyses, because they are almost invariably inadequate: some items will bemissed, leaving gaps in coverage; they fail to address causes, or to prevent a recurrenceof the problems.  In the particular context of poverty, the scope of symptom-centredapproaches is limited.  It is in the nature of poverty that people experience, not isolatedforms of deprivation, but a cluster of problems; and a person who lacks resources for onething may have to balance that need against others.  Housing benefits, as a result, are notspent only on housing; they act as a general form of income support (1).  Food stamps donot simply increase people's food intake; they also release resources for other items. Even if a measure is adequate to meet a particular problem, it is unlikely to be adequateto meet the other kinds of need which are associated with it.One should not underestimate the importance of symptom-centred responses,however; they may not be sufficient, but that does not mean they are not necessary ordesirable.  Homelessness, malnutrition, ill health or educational deprivation, are allserious problems in their own right; a direct response to such problems is even at itsworst better than nothing, and at best it can make a major contribution to the alleviationof deprivation.  The second approach is individualistic.  In order to respond to the needs of peoplewho are poor, it is necessary to identify who they are; this implies the introduction ofsome kind of means-test, either as a special procedure or a part of a general system ofincome assessment (like that undertaken for taxation).  The problems of means testing,which will be examined in more detail later, have made this an unpopular alternative. It is often presented as a more efficient way of relieving poverty - because resources goprecisely to those intended; but there are problems, not only because it is difficult
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successfully to identify individuals, but also because people's circumstances change -implying that benefits should be withdrawn.A third set of responses to deprivation can be made by responding to the generalcircumstances in which people have become deprived.  This may relate, for example, tointerruptions of earnings, through unemployment or sickness; to cases in which peoplehave withdrawn from the labour market, as in retirement, disability and singleparenthood; and to circumstances in which people's income is otherwise inadequate fortheir needs, as in the case of low earners.  In other words, a response is made to thecontingencies in which people become poor, as much as to the problems of poverty inthemselves.  This is very much the basis on which social security systems have beenorganised, and it will be returned to in that context later.   In some cases, the assessmentsare easier than financial assessments - it is not usually difficult to identify old people orlarge families - but this is not true of all, and the problems are not necessarily less thanthose of an individualistic approach..Interpreted more broadly, there is scope for directing responses not only to thosewho are identified as poor, but to problems associated with poverty.  This may includecharacteristics such as gender, race, age or locality.  This kind of approach, the fourth, iscontroversial, because people in such circumstances, even if they are more vulnerableto poverty, are not necessarily poor - and many, even most, may not be poor.  The WorldBank refers to this approach as 'indicator targeting' - directing resources to thecorrelates of poverty, rather than to the problem itself - and defends it on the pragmaticbasis that it is less costly administratively than directing resources to individuals (2). Indicator targeting is sometimes used in relation to problems related to poverty, likecommunity development, and in some cases for the purposes of income maintenance (forexample universal benefits for old people or children).  The central argument for such anapproach is that it allows a fairly effective response to be made to poverty with little ofthe administrative complications which accompany individualised approaches.  Thereis a case, too, to suggest that indicator targetting may be less stigmatising, because it isless individualistic - though it is still possible to stigmatise a school, an area, or a regionno less than a family or a street.  The main objections are, first, that it may not be efficient- many resources are used for people who are not necessarily poor - and second, that itmay fail to reach many poor people who are not reached by the special programmes. After some initial indicators have been identified, the marginal benefits of furtherprogrammes reduce, with some measures reaching many of the same people while at thesame time leaving others without effective aid.  This suggests that although an elementof indicator targeting may be helpful as part of a broad strategy against poverty, it isunlikely to be sufficiently effective in its own right.Lastly, one can seek to prevent deprivation from arising.  Much depends, here, on thetypes of causes to which the different forms of disadvantage are attributed.  Policiesaimed at preventing poverty are often directed either to the perceived causes of poverty -for example, through the development of educational opportunities - or to effects which,like bad housing or malnutrition, might be seen as perpetuating the problems of povertyin the future.  Poor relief has been accorded only a limited role in the prevention ofpoverty, not least because of the criticism (usually made on the right) that poor reliefcreates an incentive to people to accept low incomes (3).  The proposition is veryquestionable (it will be returned to in chapter 9) but it has certainly been influential. There is an argument to say that meeting present needs is also an important way ofprotecting against future needs.  Where there is a a system which protects people fromhardship through the provision of different kinds of benefits for particular contingencies,like sickness, old age or unemployment, there is less need to make provision for theunexpected, as well as protecting people against future needs.  The problems of povertyare likely, besides,  to lead to other problems.  The shortage of cash in the short term islikely to create other problems in the long term - including the inability to obtain certainitems, debt, the sacrificing of some items in order to obtain others (for example a failureto replace clothing in order to obtain food, or eating less to pay for heat).  Poor relief can,then, be seen as an important preventative measure in itself.  
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The lack of resourcesThere are three basic approaches to poverty which concentrate on the lack of resources(4).  One is to increase resources  overall, on the principle that a general increase in theliving conditions of the whole population will improve the conditions of all, including thepoorest.  Margaret Thatcher, a former Prime Minister of Britain, once suggested that theGood Samaritan would not have been able to have helped if he had not had the wealth todo so.  The position is consistent with the kind of poor relief exercised in Victorian times. Although inequalities may remain, there is some evidence that inequalities are effectivelyreduced in richer countries, because of the greater levels of involvement in the economicprocess, the shared benefits of a common infrastructure, and a greater dispersion ofresources (the main reservation that has to be made about this is the extremelydisadvantaged position of poor people in middle-income countries, like Brazil, in contrastwith the more equal distribution found in some poor countries, like Sri Lanka).  However,there are important limitations on such a strategy.  An increase in resources does notguarantee that the circumstances of poor people will be improved, or even maintained;there has to be ome mechanism through which the poorest can obtain a share of extraresources.  For one thing, there tends to be an implicit assumption that the mainmechanism through which this will be brought about is participation in the labourmarket; but it is in the nature of the poverty that many poor people are not participatingin the labour market.  For another, poverty consists not only of the lack of certainquantities of material goods, but also an element of positional goods, then the lack ofpositional goods cannot be redressed by an increase in national resources alone.  The second main strategy is to spend money on the social services, the 'strategy ofequality' favoured by the Fabians.  Public spending, by providing a range of goods andservices available to all, has the effect of establishing a floor of resources below which no-one needs to fall.  The effect is similar, as a result, to the strategy of establishing a floorof income (or 'maximin').  It has much the same advantages, coupled with the additionalmerit of achieving, through the judicious use of public funds, major economies of scaleand the achievement of particular social objectives.  Equally, though, it has an importantlimitation, which is that it does not directly address the problems of positional goodsrelated to inequality; and one of the main criticisms of this strategy has been that it failsadequately to redress social inequalities (5).The third main option is to redistribute resources from rich to poor, either byestablishing a minimum level of resources, or by changing the relative proportions of richand poor.  Social security consists of a direct redistribution of resources, in the sense thatthose who pay are not necessarily those who receive.  Redistribution is described as'vertical' when there is a transfer of income between people on higher and low incomes;it is 'progressive' when the direction of redistribution is from rich to poor, and'regressive' when the direction is from poor to rich.  Necessarily, redistribution must beprogressive to some degree if it is to relieve poverty, and on the face of the matter themost effective means of dealing with poverty through the mechanism of social securityshould be one in which resources are redistributed directly to those who are worse off. But this proposition is disputed, because there are those who believe that the process ofredistribution and the methods which are used to identify poor people (mainly means-testing) can have a negative effect on people who receive social security.  
Universality and selectivityThe objection to the identification of poor people as a specific target for directredistribution is best explained  by reference to the ideological divide between residualand institutional welfare.  Redistribution is generally interpreted in terms of twoopposing models of welfare, residual and institutional.  Redistribution which is directedexclusively at people who are poor is residual in form.  Residual welfare creates a socialdivision between donors and recipients, which many believe to be inherentlystigmatising.  Townsend believes that this results in inadequate benefits, because theidentification of a dependent population is likely to be seen as a pubic burden.  It isimportant to recognise that the test of effectiveness in the relief of poverty is not whether
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money is used solely for the poor, but rather what level of resources is achieved in theprocess.  Even if redistribution to those who are poorest is the primary intention ofassistance, it may be necessary to disguise the recipient group, and to approach theissues obliquely in order to offer redistribution without stigma.The model of institutional welfare, by contrast, presupposes a degree of acceptanceof the circumstances of people who are poor, because it is based on a view that needs area normal part of social life.  Redistribution which is consistent with institutional welfareis therefore directed towards the kinds of contingencies in which people experienceneeds - contingencies which would include childhood, sickness, unemployment and oldage.  In so far as poverty is largely accounted for within this kind of contingency,provision for poverty can be made effectively through provision to meet such needs.  I suggested, in the first chapter, that there was a degree of irrationality in theassociation of different principles and policies in terms of these models.  The attempt toavoid stigma indirectly reinforces its worst effects, by failing to make resources availablefor those in need.  Institutional benefits, and those which are based on social protection,are not necessarily progressive in form; some relate to contingencies in which people arealso very likely to be poor, like the circumstances of elderly people, but others(particularly benefits relating to child care) relate far less to poverty and (becauseparents of older chldren are likely to be involved in the labour market) may even havea regressive effect.  The institutional and residual models seem to relate to intention andpurpose as much as they do to specific methods; even if residual benefits are subject tosocial disapproval, it is far from clear that benefits based on contingencies likeunemployment or single parenthood would be more acceptable.  The avoidance of directredistribution because of its association with residual welfare also avoids the benefitsof direct redistribution.  The difference between types of benefits is sometimes referred to on the basis of'universality' and 'selectivity'.  I am reluctant to go too far into the topic, because thedebate is moribund, and has been for years; but the terms have had such an impact inshaping the way in which people judge poliies that it seems impossible to avoid thesubject.  'Universality' and 'selectivity' are often used ambiguously.  Selectivity is wherepeople receive benefits according to need.  Reddin (6) treats this as if it only meantmeans-testing, but this is not what selectivists argue; selectivity implies a test of meansor need.  Some writers, then, see benefits like Mobility Allowance, for which the test iswhether a person is able to walk, as selective; others do not.Universality implies benefits which are given to all as of right.  Jones, Brown andBradshaw write that 'a universal social service is ... one to which all citizens contributeequally, and from which all are entitled to draw equal benefits.' (7)  The first part of thisis wrong.  No-one expects everyone to contribute equally.  Beveridge thought that hiscontributory scheme was 'universal', but this was because he believed rights had to beearned, not given by the State.  If insurance is universal, it is because everyone gainsrights on the same basis.  The best example of a universal benefit is Child Benefit -everyone is a child at some time.The basic argument against universality is the cost; one of the reasons why benefitsare low, it has been argued, is that the jam is already spread too thinly (8), though thisis disputed by those who believe, like Townsend, that universality prepares people toaccept a higher commitment to welfare services.  The arguments against selectivity are,first, that it is complex, both because the identification of needs requires complexassessments and because the identification of different groups of need requires acomplex, differentiated system of support.  Second, any test of need has to exclude peopleat some point; there is invariably a problem of equity at the margins, between thosepeople who qualify and those who do not.  (There is also the problem known as the'poverty trap', because benefits have to be withdrawn if people's circumstancesimprove.)  Third, it is argued that people who receive selective benefits are likely to bestigmatised.  The importance of the issue is disputable, because often the people who areselected as being in need are stigmatised before they receive services; a refusal toallocate benefits or services on that basis can reinforce the problems they experience (9).The arguments about universality and selectivity have been given a great deal ofprominence, not because they are decisive in themselves, but because people associate
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them with institutional and residual models of welfare.  Universality is linked withinstitutional welfare because the idea that everyone is in need at some time is linked withthe idea that everyone should benefit.  Selectivity is linked with residual welfare becausethe idea of a 'safety net' implies a concentration on those in need.  The political association of left and right wing views with universal and selectivebenefits stems from the association of these methods with the models of instutional andresidual welfare.  But universality and selectivity are methods; institutional and residualmodels represent principles.  One might use the different methods for different purposes. It is possible to favour institutional welfare and selectivity - like Marx's 'to each accordingto his needs' - or residual welfare and universality, because one believes a universalapproach is a more effective way than means-testing to provide a safety net againstpoverty.  When it comes to practice, a host of considerations affect the choices made.  Theinfluences on different policies are complex, and it is rare to find that one simple,overarching explanation in terms of ideology can account for the adoption of one policyrather than another.
Social security as a response to povertySocial security is a term used for financial assistance, in whatever form it may take. Financial assistance compensates,  principally, for a lack of financial resources; and ifpoverty is a wider concept than lack of money alone, social security can relate to it onlyto a limited extent.  The nature of social security is that it provides, not goods, but moneywith which people can purchase goods.  This assumes that people will meet their needsby spending the money - and so, that the distribution of goods takes place through aneconomic market.  Economic liberals argue that the private market is the best method of arranging thedistribution of resources.  Arthur Seldon argues that price mechanism leads to choice forthe consumer; a service led by the consumer rather than by the professions; a moreefficient services at lower costs (because this increases profitability); responsiveness toneed (because their payment depends on it); and education of people as to theimplications of their choices.  He believes that collective provision is, conversely,inefficient and paternalistic.  Seldon extends his case well beyond issues like food andclothing, which are ordinarily dealt with through social security, to other spheres ofactivity like health and education.  The issue is not, he argues, that poor people might notbe able to afford services.  If this was the problem, then we could give them the moneyto decide for themselves - in other words, increase social security; there does not haveto be a publicly provided service. (10)The arguments against this position are both moral and economic.  Some areconcerned with the impact of decisions in the market on society as a whole.  This mightbe understood in terms of 'externalities'.  Education is worth something to society andto industry, not just to the person who receives it.  Ill health affects more than the personwho is ill, whether as part of an issue in public health or more generally in the fact thatsociety needs healthy workers.  This, in turn, implies that certain social needs have to berecognised.  Welfare services are not only provided for the benefit of the consumer: theyalso perform important social functions, for example, acting as a 'handmaiden' toindustry, or maintaining social morality - as they do in the case of probation or socialwork with child abuse.  It is not clear that the choices exercised by individuals arenecessarily the most appropriate form of distribution.Equally, the effect of aggregating independent decisions made by individuals may notbe socially desirable; the decisions which individuals make may not add up, collectively,into the best choices for a group of individuals.  It may be reasonable for individuals totake risks; but it is much less reasonable when a large number of individuals areinvolved.  It may be acceptable for individuals to take a serious risk of one in a thousand(people who ride motorcycles, smoke or even become pregnant accept risks which arefar higher); but a risk of one in a thousand could affect 56,000 people in the UK.Some call into question the effectiveness of the market as a means of distribution. First, the market tends to be selective, rather than comprehensive.  Insurance servicescommonly exclude 'bad risks' - e.g. people with multiple sclerosis, chronic
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schizophrenics, and elderly people - who will make their service uneconomic.  There isalso a problem in covering people for contigencies which they might be able to control -like pregnancy or unemployment.   Second, the market may be less efficient than publicprovision.  It may be cheaper to organise a large national service than it is to have smallercompeting services.  The NHS has been able substantially to reduce the costs of healthcare, by closing surplus resources, and using its monopoly power to buy materials morecheaply.  The private sector can be argued to duplicate facilities unnecessarily.  Equally,the market may lead to a less efficient distribution of services.  In the private market,services are distributed to reduce service costs gain the largest access to the market -often next to other similar services.  These often leads to a concentration of services inone place.  Areas with limited demand (because of many poor people, or limitedpopulations) may not be served at all.  Third, it is unclear that consumer choice is adesirable objective.  There are commodities - like health, and possibly education - whichpeople are not well placed to choose, because they have no criteria on which to base theirchoice.  Health care is not like Kentucky Fried Chicken (despite the assertion of a formermanaging director of that company selling health care in Britain).  It is in the nature ofthe commodity that it is difficult if not impossible for a consumer to judge the quality andvalue of what is being provided.  People actually have to buy insurance, not health careper se - which is, in effect, the purchase of private social security.  The relief of poverty does not, then, have to be seen in terms of the distribution ofcash benefits; it might equally be seen in terms of the distribution of goods or services. But in one important respect, social security provides a uniquely distinctive response topoverty - one which cannot be substituted by the supply of goods.   One of the problemswhich is identifiably part of poverty is the lack of a personal disposable income.  Socialsecurity can be used, as no other system can, to provide the options to obtain a numberof 'inessential' items at the discretion of the consumer - items which may well includealcohol, entertainments, or other items so often disapproved when people in receipt ofbenefits manage to obtain them.  (In Switzerland, it has been the case in certain cantonsthat people in receipt of public assistance are not allowed to enter bars. (11)) Paradoxically, the area in which the case for cash benefits rather than kind can be mademost strongly - the right to use one's money on luxuries - is the kind of ground which isleast likely to appeal to those who argue most strongly for the private market.The distinction between public and private provision plays a major role indistinguishing 'left' from 'right' in welfare terms.  This distinction is reinforced by theassociation of residual and institutional welfare with different parts of the politicalspectrum.  A person who believes in the institutional model, and takes the view thatneeds are developed and experienced socially, is likely to favour collective socialprovision to meet them; equally, someone who opposes the private market is likely tofind some justification for this opposition in the view that there are collective socialresponsibilities which the private market cannot meet.  Someone on the right is morelikely to favour provision by the state only when a person is unable to meet these needsin other ways, and the private market represents an important means of meeting needsat a minimal level, without recourse to public provision.Social security, however, cuts across this divide.  The very idea of financial assistanceimplicitly favours private market as a means of distribution.  One may reasonably arguefor a National Health Service rather than Medicare, or for public heating schemes ratherthan heating allowances on social security.  Social security benefits have been introducedto make up for the withdrawal of more general provision: examples in the UK are freeprescriptions (introduced because prescription charges were introduced) and HousingBenefits (which followed a major withdrawal of subsidy to council housing).  On the faceof it, then, social security should be favoured most by those who support the privatemarket, and opposed by those who prefer public provision; but in most cases, the exactreverse is true.  It is usually thought of as left wing to favour an increase in benefits, andright-wing to oppose it.  It is left wing to give people money to spend on food, and rightwing to insist that they should have vouchers or food stamps (usually because of the viewthat people might otherwise spend their money on other items).  The association of apparently contradictory ideas stems not from the issues of thepublic or private sector, but from the links of different kinds of benefits with residual or
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institutional welfare.  Provision on a general basis, whether in cash or in kind, isassociated with the institutional model; provision only as a safety net is residual in form. Food stamps, Medicare, Housing Benefits or free prescriptions are residual forms ofwelfare; a National Health Service, Child Benefit, or general subsidy for housing areinstitutional.  A person may believe in institutional welfare and believe that the privatemarket is still a better way than the state to distribute certain resources, like food, if onlypeople are given the money.  On the other hand, a person who believes that welfareshould only be given to those in need may favour giving people the goods rather thanmoney.  
Social security as poor reliefPoor relief can be achieved in other ways besides giving people money, and the closeassociation of social security  with poor relief requires some explanation.  The mainreason for the association is historical.  Although not all social security provision hasbeen developed in response to the problems of poverty - there is, in many countries, atradition of mutual aid for social protection which runs concurrently with provisionrelating to poverty - the response to poverty has been a significant element, which haspermeated not only the benefits specifically designed to address poverty and lowincomes (like Income Support, Aide Sociale, or Sozialhilfe)  but also many of thearrangements made for pensions, unemployment benefits and single parents.  Argumentsabout the nature of poverty have been fuelled by concern about the levels of socialsecurity and the coverage of benefits.  Arguments about social security, conversely, haveoften centred on poverty - even when the benefits themselves have not been principallyaimed at, or focussed on, poor people.  The association of benefits and the relief of poverty is long standing.  Thedevelopment of poor relief can be seen as an outgrowth of the mediaeval dispensationof charity.  This was not particularly associated with the distribution of alms in cash, atleast in Christian cultures - on the contrary, the traditional works of charity includedfeeding the hungry, giving water to the thirsty and clothing the naked.  (The Jewish andIslamic traditions, by contrast, emphasised the development of systematic provision anddistribution of charity through tithes or taxation).  A significant by-product of thereformation was that the monasteries, which had been a focal point for the distributionof charity, ceased to perform the function to the same extent - though it might equally beargued that the distribution of alms, which was seen to succour vagrants and enablepeople to move off the land, was one of the political reasons behind the desire to reformthe monasteries in the first place.  In Europe, the growth of vagrancy was linked with war and disease; vagrants werefeared, with some reason, because wandering, they spread illness, and dispossessed, theythreatened the possessions of others.  The reorganisation of charity in city-states, of atype commended by Luther (12), was intended to include those within the walls - thecitizens - while excluding those beyond it.  The systematic organisation of charity tooktwo main forms.  One was the model of the lazar-house, or hospital, which was later tobe developed into alternatively hospitals or the poorhouse (in Britain, the two usuallyexisted side by side (13)).  The other was the organisation of charitable donations,through a community chest and ultimately thrugh the levying of city rates.  Already bythe sixteenth century, Zwingli (one of the leading figures in the Reformation) wasreferring not only to the giving of alms but to the receipt of poor relief (14).The English Poor Law of 1601 made provision for a poor rate to be levied across thecountry, tied to a system of relief under 'overseers' of the poor, and for 'setting the pooron work'.  It is easy to overemphasise the importance of the old Poor Law, becausealthough it was national in its presentation it fell somewhat short of this in practice, withlittle indication that any national standards were applied.  Despite the move toworkhouses and poorhouses in the eighteenth century, out-relief - the principle of givingcash donations outside the poorhouse - was widespread; the Speenhamland system of1795 is famous for regularising a system to low-paid workers, but out-relief was alreadyimportant for other groups, including in particular old people and illegitimate children. When the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act changed the rules with the intention that there
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should be no relief outside the workhouse, this was effectively disregarded in manyplaces, where various groups (and in particular old people) continued to receive outrelief.  Charles Booth was to comment that old people had come, by the time of hisresearch, to view the provision of cash benefits as 'a matter of course' (15); and Booth'sresearch was distinguished by the strong case he made for the establishment of pensionsas a response to the poverty of old people.It is not possible to state with any confidence at what point cash benefits becamecentrally linked with the relief of poverty, but the indications are that the two developedhand in hand.  Cash provision has to be seen as only one model of the relief of poverty,one which developed in competition with two others - the model of the poorhouse, whichdepends on provision in kind rather than in cash, and the principal of requiring work forsupport, which although it can be compounded with punitive measures might also beseen as developing alternative routes towards independence.  But the reason why socialsecurity policies have been dominant in responses to poverty is clear enough: within avery restricted set of alternatives, social security developed as the principal means ofalleviating poverty in the community, and the reaction against the Poor Law, and similarpolicies, guaranteed it a significant place.  Cash benefits are a simple, direct response toone major part of the problem of poverty - the lack of resources.  They were largelyconsistent with the moral principles associated with charity and the custom of givingalms.  And the distribution of money has been a practical response - one whichgovernments were able to implement even when communications were poor and thestructure of civil government was restricted.  When the reaction against traditional poor relief led to a search for alternativemethods of distributing welfare, it was largely through cash benefits that this wasdeveloped - in Britain, through Old Age Pensions (1908) and National Insurance (1911),in France through family policy and les mutualités, in the US through Social Security(1935).  There are at least two different kinds of response represented here.  One was thedevelopment of benefits as a right of citizenship; the other is the establishment of co-operative subscription as a basis for cash support.  Social security policies developed, notonly from the traditions of poor relief, but from the co-operative practices of the guilds. The development of solidaristic arrangements fostered the model of social insurance,principally by the nineteenth century the province of trades unions and friendly societies(16).  Despite the importance of such benefits as a response to poverty, they were notexclusively addressed to the issues of poverty - insurance is as much concerned withsocial protection in the event of temporary interruption of income.  
Income maintenanceSocial security has not invariably been considered as the central response to poverty. Poverty was certainly an  important issue in the development of the social security in theUK, but the concern with poverty was reflected more widely in the foundation of the'welfare state': cash benefits had to be seen as part of a comprehensive range ofprovisions designed to deal with the main forms of need which arose in society.  TheBeveridge plan was based on 'assumptions' which included a health service and fullemployment; contemporary writers argued for a a broadly based welfare strategy whichemphasised, amongst other things, the role of housing and education in dealing withpoverty (17).  In other countries, by contrast, policies for poverty and social securitywere often developed quite distinctly.  In France, the social security system wasdeveloped more in terms of family policy and 'social solidarity' than as a response topoverty, and 'poverty' itself was not a serious political issue till the 1980s.  In the US, thebenefits system continued to rely primarily on social insurance; when 'poverty' came tothe fore, in the 1960s, the issue was presented and interpreted primarily in terms ofurban and racial issues.  Social security and the relief of poverty are not necessarilyequivalent.  The Laroque report argues that 'social security' should be seen as 'the response to an aspiration for security in its widest sense.  Its fundamentalpurpose is to give individuals and families the confidence that their level of living andquality off life will not, in so far as is possible, be greatly eroded by any social or
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economic eventuality.  This involves not just meeting needs as and when they arisebut also preventing risks from arising in the first place ... Thus social security requiresnot only cash but also a wide range of health and social services ...'  (18).The first part of this identifies the role of social security as 'income maintenance' - theprocess of guaranteeing incomes - rather than 'poor relief'.   The second part goesfurther, to identify social security with the wider aims of welfare states.  The role offinancial assistance wider has to be seen as part of a general strategy to improve people'slives.Barry suggests, with some reason, that 'in a well-ordered welfare state almost all thejob of relieving poverty will be done by policies whose objective and rationale are quitedifferent.'  (19)  Part of this is because welfare states seek to prevent poverty to forestallthe necessity of having to relieve it; part, too, is because the relief of poverty is likely tobe superceded by income maintenance.  If poverty is to be understood in terms of arelationship between needs and resources, and welfare states seek to produce acomprehensive, institutional response to needs, then the situation in which people do nothave the resources to meet their needs should not substantially arise.  The role of socialsecurity provision within the welfare state is not only to provide a minimum income, butto maintain income and protect people against the effects of a sudden decline inresources.  In many ways, however, the concept of universal income maintenance seems far toolimited.  The failure of British governments to address issues of poverty in the 1950s andearly 1960s has been attributed to complacency, eventually to be punctured by the'rediscovery of poverty'; but the point was not simply that people had been lulled intoa false sense of security.  The welfare state of the post-war period relied on a strategy fordealing with poverty which would not be focussed on poor relief - one which rested,instead, on a series of measures aimed at commonly occurring needs.  The problems withthis kind of strategy proved to be not simply that there were holes in the welfare net -holes which led to increasingly complex provisions as attempts were made to fill the gaps- but that it did not address the structured disadvantage arising from the labour marketand the relationship of poor people to the economic system.  Ultimately, the socialsecurity system has become more concerned with poor relief by default, because themore broadly based strategy of the 'welfare state' did not directly enough engage thekinds of problem presented by poverty.
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Chapter 8
The aims of social securityFinancial relief is given for a wide range of reasons: the relief of poverty constitutes onlya part of the functions of  social security, and not all the purposes which social securityis applied to can be treated as directly related to the provision of social security in itself. Social security is not only a form of income maintenance, but it also constitutes a majorelement of the provision of welfare within many countries, and, no less important, asignificant aspect of their economic structure.  All the social services can be viewed as fulfilling a range of objectives; Titmuss arguedthat social services are indeed defined by their common aims, rather than by the meanswhich they employ to achieve them (1).  The idea that services follow 'aims' suggests thatthe policies are intended by someone; but the kinds of intentions which can be attributedto the social services are varied and complex, as are the processes by which intentionscan be translated into action.  Another useful term, because it is neutral as to intentions,might be the 'functions' of social services - the uses which services seem to serve.  Somerelate to the welfare of individuals: they include altruistic or humanitarian concerns,curative, protective, and developmental functions.  Others relate to the welfare of societya a whole: collective concerns include redistribution, solidarity, social control andeconomic development.  It is difficult to represent these schematically, because thedistinctions between many of the concepts are blurred, but I have made the attempt intable 8.1.
Table 8.1:  Functions commonly attributed to social services
Individual CollectiveProvision for needs Humanitarian Social welfare;economic developmentRemedying disadvantage Compensation;cure Equality; social justiceMaintenance of socialcircumstances Protection ReproductionThe production ofdisadvantage Punishment Social divisi onChanging behaviour Rewards;incentivesTreatment Social controlDevelopment of potential Development ofindividualcapacities Solidarity; integration
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If the functions attributed to social services seem very widely applicable, it is not leastbecause social services are directed to social welfare.  Any attempt to improve welfarecan be seen as meeting needs or remedying disadvantage; any attempt to intervene insociety to do so can be represented as maintaining or changing social circumstances orbehaviour; and any measures which have a negative effect can be interpreted asproducing disadvantage.  The table is not exhaustive; these are not the only ways inwhich social services can be represented, or the methods through which the measuresmight be expressed.  That welfare serves many different kinds of purposes is fairly firmlyestablished in the study of social policy, and the functions I have referred to can beapplied to any of the social services (2).  Each can, equally, be related to social securityprovision.
Social security as part of the welfare stateThe first, and probably the most obvious, way in which welfare might be thought to helpindividuals is by meeting  their needs.  In the context of social security, this is mostclosely identified with the relief of poverty.  It is probably the most obvious function ofthe social security system, because historically it has been a guiding principle in thedevelopment of benefits, and because it tends to dominate current debates aboutbenefits.  Some benefits are specifically geared to people on low incomes; others, likepensions or unemployment insurance, are not only available to people who are poor, butcover circumstances in which people might otherwise be likely to be poor.At the same time, there are other kinds of needs which are met, which are notnecessarily confined to the problems of poverty, or even the problems of low income. The special needs of disabled people are responded to through a range of benefits;pensioners receive health benefits.  Benefits for survivors, like widows and orphans, havemore to do with the provision of social protection than with the avoidance of poverty. Some benefits are designed to provide temporary stopgap relief.  (This point will bereturned to in a later chapter, when provisions for various contingencies are discussed.)In collective terms, meeting needs has to be seen not so much in the sense of dealingwith the most common contingencies - like unemployment, disability or old age - as inthe effect which social security has on the welfare of the whole society.  Social securityfor unemployment is important not only for the effect it has on unemployed people, butbecause it acts as an economic regulator, increasing expenditure at times of reducedeconomic activity and so bolstering demand (an effect not universally agreed upon). Equally, the development of a range of benefits covering the principal circumstances inwhich people are likely to become poor fosters a pattern of economic relationships, andthere are other ways, of course, in which social security provision can be seen to supportthe economic system; Titmuss described these as the 'handmaiden' functions of welfare(3). 
Remedying disadvantage.  Disadvantaged people might receive some sort ofcompensation.  A disabled person may receive financial assistance, not because offinancial need, but because the process of becoming disabled itself is undesirable.  Thisis most clearly seen in systems of compensation for industrial disability (extended, inNew Zealand and Sweden, to other forms of disability).At the social level, remedying disadvantage is often represented in terms of equalityor social justice.  Social security is clearly an important element in the redistribution ofincome, both vertically and horizontally.  Social assistance, or benefit for the poor, goesto people who are not working and on inadequate incomes at the expense of people whoare working and paying tax, and is progressive.  Benefits for children, by contrast, aremainly a form of horizontal redistribution, going from people without children to peoplewith children, and from men and single women to mothers.  
Maintaining circumstances.  In order to maintain the circumstances of individuals, socialservices may seek to offer social protection.  The idea of 'social security' itself impliesthat people ought to be able to feel secure.  This involves, not only that people are
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protected against poverty, but also that they are protected against the hardships that arelikely to arise through a sudden change in circumstances.  If people become sick, orunemployed, they should not, the argument goes, have to lose their possessions ordeprive themselves as a result.  One sometimes hears the comment that 'people onbenefit have cars and television sets', as if this was somehow reprehensible.  Thequestion is whether they should be forced to sell their car or television before they canreceive benefit.  If the intention is to offer security, they should not.      The maintenance of social relationships takes us again back to the 'handmaiden'functions, but these have to be understood in this context in a sense which is wider thanthe relationship to the economic system alone.  Each society, in order for that society tosurvive, has to reproduce itself - which implies, not the maintenance of society as anunchanging network, but the birth and socialisation of new generations, the maintenanceof relationships and the integration of different social elements.  The clearest exampleof this in relation to social security is the way in which social security systems enforcesolidarity between generations: people who are working pay both for children, throughfamily benefits, and for old people, through pensions schemes.
The production of disadvantage.  Social services are often represented not only asremedying disadvantage, but as producing it, either through the maintenance ofrepressive social norms or through policies which are regressive in their distributiveeffects.  Clearly, if social services have the power to produce changes which are positive,they must also have the potential to produce changes which are negative.  The negativeaspects of social services are important; if they are not taken into account, an increasein benefits would be relevant to social services whereas a reduction in benefit would not(4).  Much of the production of disadvantage can be explained in terms of the applicationof other criteria, like the desire to maintain circumstances or to further the industrialprocess; if, for example, one believes (despite all evidence to the contrary) that industrialprogress depends on developing incentives to the better off, the policies which arepursued will probably increase inequality.  In relation to individuals, welfare provisionshave been linked with punitive sanctions designed to ensure that they conform todominant norms.  Social security is probably most vulnerable to this criticism in itsemphasis on work and participation in the labour market (5), and in its reinforcementof familial norms (6).  In collective terms, there are criticisms of welfare systems for thepreservation of social divisions on the basis of gender and race (7).Unfortunately, the literature on this topic is often muddled.  In the first place, thereis a widespread confusion of intention and effect; in an unequal society, one does notneed to look to deliberate policy to explain the reproduction of inequality (8).  Second,policies which are restrictive - like attempts to reinforce a particular view of the family -are often referred grandiosely to the industrial structure or the distribution of power insociety (9), when the issues may equally relate to the enforcement of social norms. Third, supposedly 'critical' accounts often fail to distinguish policies which do not engagedisadvantage and those which actually bring the disadvantage about.  Dominelli, to takean extreme example, claims that the Beveridge report is racist, presumably becauseimmigrants have less opportunity to contribute, (10), and that tax relief is sexist becausemen have higher wages and gain more from it (11).  One might as well argue thatpensions are racist because the ethnic minority population is relatively young, that childbenefit is sexist because it favours better off families over older women, and that publictransport is racist and sexist because it is mainly used by better off people inemployment.  This is codswallop, of the kind which gives anti-racist and anti-sexistliterature a bad name; and it trivialises a serious set of issues.  What the muddle conceals is that there are and have been welfare policies, andindeed welfare systems, designed to produce social division as an end in itself.  There aresome clear examples of repressive welfare régimes.   'The base of Nazi politics', Furnissand Tilton comment, 'was the politics of the welfare state' (12); Nazi Germany sought toencourage breeding amongst 'Aryans' by forbidding abortion, encouraging birth andsubsidising children; racial inter-marriage was forbidden, and mentally handicappedpeople were unable to marry at all.  South Africa has developed distinct welfare services,
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on different terms, for 'whites', 'Asians', 'coloured' and 'black' populations.  Theintentional production of disadvantage in most welfare systems is limited by comparison,but there are cases where policies are discriminatory, like the explicit exclusion ofmarried women in the UK from entitlement to certain benefits (now largely struck outby the European Community) or restrictions preventing immigrants from claiming (13). There are real grounds for complaint. 
Changing behaviour.  Benefits can be used to change people's circumstances and the waythey behave.  One example might be where benefits provide an incentive to rehabilitation- as in the allowance formerly given to disabled people to meet the expenses of travellingto work.  Another is where benefits are tied to a programme in which people's behaviouris supervised.  This aspect of the welfare state is less closely associated with theprovision of social security in the UK, where there was a very deliberate separation ofbenefits and welfare after the abolition of the Poor Law, than in other countries like theUS or France, where social work and welfare may still be part of the same administration. Despite the negative overtones of such a service, Piliavin and Gross, comparing in the UScircumstances in which social workers administer benefits with those who do not,suggest that the social workers who offered financial assistance were perceived morefavourably by their clients, and more likely to achieve positive results (14).Collectively, this kind of change is often referred to as 'social control'.  The term ishighly ambiguous, tending to be used not only for cases of moral interventions but alsothe use of power by elites, and not only for cases in which people are required to actdifferently, but to aspects of socialisation and reproduction.  If by social control is meantthe encouragement or enforcement of particular patterns of behaviour, there are clearexamples in the history of social security - not only in the Poor Laws, which sought todeter people from dependency, but in a range of policies designed to ensure that peopleare discouraged from indolence and vice (I use Victorian words to reflect the nineteenth-century tone).  These include the inclusion of penalties for people who have not takenadvantage of the opportunity to work, like the suspension of benefits or the prospect ofprosecution; the development of incentives to work, often by holding down the level ofbenefits; the linking of benefits to training opportunities; and, in 'workfare' in the US, theuse of work itself as a deterrent.  
Developing potential.  Social security may be used to foster individual development (anobjective referred to in France as 'l'épanouissement', literally 'blooming'.)  Social securityis often seen as a response to the rights of the individual, but this means more than theprotection of individuals from undesired consequences; it can include the expansion ofa range of opporunities, or at the very least some protection against reduction inopportunities.  There have been benefits concerned, for example, with creatingeducational opportunities: one, the Educational Maintenance Allowance, was intendedto assist people in low income families to stay on at school.  Another example might bethe rehabilitation of disabled people: disabled people received taxi fares to go to work. The past tense is indicative of a particular trend.  These benefits were limited in scope,and in the reforms of social security in the UK they have been largely removed.  That doesnot invalidate the objective.The development of collective units is usually referred to as 'solidarity'.  The term israrely used in Britain but frequently found in texts on social security in France andBelgium, and increasingly in the European Community.  Although there is considerableambiguity in the use of the term (15), solidarity can be represented as a form of mutualco-operation leading to group cohesion.  Alfarandi describes the concept in terms of aseries of social networks.  'Solidarity supposes the interdependence of individuals within a defined group.  Onecan imagine a system of concentric circles of solidarity, wider and wider, which gofrom the nuclear family up to the international community.'  (16)Social security is believed to foster solidarity partly through its development of systemsof mutual responsibility, like friendly societies or 'les mutualités', and partly through thebroader acceptance of responsibility which a commitment to income transfer and socialprotection entails. 
79
The placing of individuals within the framework of collective social networks isdescribed as 'integration' (or, in France, 'insertion').  Boulding describes integration asan attempt 'to build the identity of a person around some community with which he isassociated' (17), and the Commission of the European Community has argued forsolidarity for unemployed people in the following terms:'New kinds of social solidarity must be forged, comprising income transfer and alsohelp with professional and social integration, the establishment of trainingestablishments, support for employment creation.'  (18)Both 'solidarity' and 'integration' refer to a process of social cohesion; people areintegrated into society through a network of solidaristic relations.  
Social security in its own rightUp to this point, I have considered only general objectives relating to many forms ofwelfare provision.  Although there  are senses in which social security seems unusualamong other kinds of social services, it is not usually because similar functions cannotbe exercised through the medium of those services.  Social security is truly distinctive inonly one important respect: it gives people, not a service, but money with which they canmeet needs.  Although some benefits are tied to particular needs, like housing benefits,the evidence from the US is that these benefits act as a general income supplement (19) -as one might expect.  The issue which distinguishes social security from other forms ofsocial support is precisely that people have money to spend as they choose, rather thangoods and services.However, this does not mean that there is nothing distinctive which can be said aboutsocial security, because the service is not necessarily thought of in the same way as otherservices.  Social security payments are often made, for example, as a form ofcompensation for a change of state - as they are in the case of industrial disability or warpensions.  It would be wrong to say that no other service could perform a similarfunction, but in general health, housing, or social work do not, and 'compensatoryeducation' refers to something quite different.  In order to understand the specificpurposes to which social security is put, then, it is helpful to consider it not only as ameans to a general set of ends, but in terms of the kinds of justifications which are madefor specific types of payment.  Brian Barry (20) distinguishes five categories of payment of this type.  They are:1.  Payments made in anticipation or reimbursement of special expenses.  (Thisincludes benefits for disability, sickness and medical care.)2.  Payments made to compensate for some loss other than, or over and above,impairment of earning-capacity.  (This includes benefits for impairments as a resultof industrial accidents or diseases.)3.  Payments made to those whose status entails that they are not expected orpermitted to work full time.  (Examples are benefits for retired people, single parents, and disabled people.)4.  Payments made without regard to means or income to those whose earnings fallshort of some norm.  (This is intended to refer primarily to the replacement ofearnings, as opposed to the supplementing of general income.  Contributoryunemployment benefits are an example.)  5.  Payments made to those whose means or income are insufficient to get themabove some minimum income.  (This refers to basic social assistance benefits, but thecategory seems too restrictive.  There are benefits which relate to deficiencies inincome but which are not determined by reference to a minimum income: HousingBenefit is an example.)Other categories might include6.  Payments made to protect the position of people in contingencies where the totalhousehold income is likely to be interrupted (such as sickness benefits, maternityallowances and payments for widows)7.  Payments made in recognition of some service or contribution (such as warpensions)
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8.  Solidaristic payments made on the basis of generalised reciprocity (such asoccupational pensions, or those paid within professional societies).Doubtless the list can be further expanded.  It indicates, as Barry intends,  that the kindsof aims which might be associated with social security are very much more complex thanthose which might be identified with the relief of poverty alone.  'Social security' is ablunt instrument, which can be turned to many different purposes.  
Economic aspects of social securityThe importance of social security for economic policy stems not so much from the kindsof ends which it serves as in the  implications of paying for and delivering benefits.  Thelargest proportions of expenditure are accounted for, not by people in special or unusalneed (like unemployment or disability) but by contingencies which are entirely normaland predictable - old age, childhood and (in systems where it is dealt with through socialsecurity) for medical care.  When European states have expressed concern about the'crisis' of the welfare state, the problems refer principally to the pressure on expenditurefrom demographic trends, and especially from the growing numbers of pensionersrelative to the working population.  But the 'dependency ratio' - the number of peoplewho do not work, as opposed to those who do - has fewer direct implications for theeconomy than short-term fluctuations in benefits.  This is because the size of socialsecurity budgets is so great that even minor fluctuations can upset the balance of theeconomy, and in particular control over important elements of the economy like demandor public expenditure.The monetarist view, which has become progressively more familiar since the mid-1970s, is that public spending has a number of pernicious effects.  It reduces the totalamount of saving in the economy; this reduces investment, and so undermines the basisfor further growth.  It 'crowds out' private spending, reducing the capacity of theeconomy to function.  And it is parasitic on the economy, diverting resources fromproductive into non-productive activities.  This view is hotly disputed.  The InternationalLabour Office argue that social security is a scapegoat for the weakness of westerneconomies.  'In so far as there is a crisis in social security', they write, 'it is a crisis not of the structure of social security but of the erosion of the economicbase for its operation.  Social security is neither the cause of the crisis nor the causeof the recession.  To a considerable extent, social security has moderated both theeconomic and the social effects of the latter.'  (21)This squares with the Keynesian view, in which increased public expenditure can act asan economic regulator.  The worse the condition of the economy, the more money isinjected into the economy by the state.  This spending will reinforce the demand forgoods, reducing the extent to which they are affected by an industrial slump and in somecases even stimulating economic activity to turn the economy around.  Conversely, aseconomic activity increases, the need to spend money on social security for unemployedpeople falls, and the amount spent on social security reduces.  These arguments playeda large part in the foundation of social security in the United States during the 1930s.  It is difficult, however, to maintain a view of social security as a form of pureexpenditure.  It can happen that social security entails expenditure - for example, whereit is paid for by external borrowing which then has to be repaid.  However, in many cases,if not most, the money which is being spent on social security is paid for directly fromtaxation or contributions.  It is a transfer payment rather than an item of expenditure assuch; it represents a transfer of resources from one person to another.  The only'spending' is represented by the costs of administration, or the 'production' of socialsecurity, and even that is principally accounted for as a labour cost, which is anothertransfer.  Transfer payments are, at least at first sight, neutral in their consequences; theamount of money which is in the economy is the same before and after the transfer.  Theonly real difference is in the people spending it.  Changes in the distribution of income can affect the economy in two main ways.  First,the patterns of expenditure and saving of poor people may differ from those of richerpeople.  If richer people spend money on consumer goods, and poorer people more onfood, then the transfer payment has implications for the producers and distributors of
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consumer goods (and, in the UK, for exports) and for food production and agriculture. It can be argued that this might have large-scale macro-economic effects: if the amountof saving is greater among richer people, then saving will be reduced by extensivetransfer payments for the purposes of social security.  Second, and in economic terms themore important, the way in which the money is collected, and the way in which it isdistributed, make a difference to the way people collectively behave.  For example, socialsecurity is often represented as a form of compulsory saving, or redistribution over time. Barr describes one of its functions as 'income smoothing', reallocating a contributor'sconsumption over a lifetime (22).  Taxation, equally, can change people's behaviour ifsome kinds of activity are taxed more heavily than others; and one of the consequencesof insurance contributions by employers is that they make labour relatively moreexpensive, add to the costs of taking on extra staff, and lead to the product of morelabour-intensive industry being relatively more expensive to the consumer than capital-intensive produce.  Insurance-based pension arrangements have had a significant effectnot only on personal saving, but also, through the accumulation of large capital funds, onthe development of financial markets.    One of the most important effects of social security policy concerns its effect on thelabour market.  In broad terms, the structure of benefits clearly does affect participationin the labour market: 'imagine', Hill writes, 'how different our labour market would bein the absence of state pensions.  Bear in mind that British benefit policies for singleparent families reduce labour market participation by the heads of those families' (23). The point here is not to suggest that pensioners or single parents make their decisionssolely in terms of the availability of benefits.  Their participation in the labour marketdepends on other factors besides financial incentives; and the introduction of financialspurs to work (which could of course include positive incentives as well as negativeones) would still not mean that all pensioners and all single parents would, or could,subsequently move into employment.  But the institution of retirement, or expectationsabout child care (and, perhaps, even the possibility of divorce for many people), havebeen shaped in conditions which have included the development of systems of financialsupport.  Debates about the impact of social security on the labour market have centred, inpractice, on the circumstances of unemployed people.  The labour market is seen, inclassical theory, in relation to the simple terms of supply and demand.  When the priceof labour increases - that is, when wages go up - the supply increases (more people arewilling to work) and the demand for labour falls (fewer employers wish to take peopleon).  This causes unemployment.  Conversely, when the price of labour falls, the demandfor labour increases and the supply falls.  When there is unemployment, the argumentruns, the market can be brought back into balance by reducing wages, which willdiminish the supply of labour and increase the demand for it.  Social security affects thelabour market, the argument runs, by defining the wage at which people are willing towork.  If people can be paid more on the dole, they will not choose to work.  This is notdirectly equivalent to saying that everyone will choose not to work, though the case isoften put individualistically, in terms of 'incentives'.  This is a simple argument, and it seems a powerful one - though it is not really thekind of argument one finds made by professional economists; it is fairly representativeof what has been called 'do-it-yourself' economics, in which 'common sense' views aretempered with a smattering of economic theory gleaned from popular sources.  Itactually runs counter to much of the economic theory of the last sixty years.  One of thecentral insights of Keynesian economics was the recognition that unemployment is notbased on a simple relationship between wages, the demand for labour and its supply, butthat it reflected the level of activity in the economy as a whole.  Reductions in wages cutthe demand for items, and so reduce the amount of economic activity; reduced wagestend to lead, therefore, to higher unemployment, and conversely higher wages can leadto greater employment (Sweden and Germany are high-wage economies, with lowunemployment; Spain and Ireland have lower wages and much higher unemployment.) These two arguments are not directly incompatible.  The theory of a labour marketwhich can be described in terms of the supply and demand for labour depends on certain
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key assumptions.  The relationship between supply and demand is not fixed; it can beaffected by outside factors, like the level of economic activity, and the relative costs ofother methods of production, the availability of finance, and so forth.  According to theKeynesian analysis, these parameters are likely to change as a result of various factors -including the very changes in the supply and demand for labour on which the simplemodel depends.  The 'do-it-yourself' analysis may still be right - but that does not meanthat it is right in every case, or even in most.In practice, the effects of this argument are most keenly felt in the recurring debateabout whether people are 'better off on the dole', which has also been called the'unemployment trap'.  The problem is greatly exaggerated: people are hardly ever betteroff on the dole (24), and even in the rare cases where they are, many continue to workanyway.  There are, for example, women who carry on working for low wages whosehusbands receive benefits which are reduced in line with their wives' earnings - whichmeans that the women are working almost for  nothing (25).  The real issue here has very little to do with the 'incentive to work'.  The financialincentive for any individual to work depends on that individual's earning power, not onthe lowest wage paid anywhere - and there are, of course, other incentives besidesfinancial ones.  The comparison of benefits with the lowest possible wage any labourermight receive is an historical survival - it stems from the principle of 'less eligibility'under the poor law (26) - and has much to do with the economic theory of the nineteenthcentury (27).  But the reasons for its survival are best understood in moral terms.  Thereason why the dependency of pensioners is accepted, while younger people have towork, relates to social expectations; and attempts to limit the amounts whichunemployed people receive in benefit reflect both a popular sense of equity - that peoplewho are working should not feel that others who are not working are receiving morethan they are - and a desire to make the condition of unemployment still moreunpleasant than it already is.
The imposition of extraneous values - work, family, nationalitySocial values are often justified in economic terms - like  the incentive to work - but mosthave little or nothing to do with economics.  The essential reason why people arepenalised for not working is many people - and not only those on the political right -think that it is immoral not to work.  Work represents, to many, contribution to society:a person who is not working is considered not to be contributing.  In the Soviet Union,laws against 'parasites, tramps and beggars' are intended to penalise people who do notcontribute; Lenin was prone to quote St Paul's statement that 'he who does not workshall not eat' (29).  (Mrs Thatcher has incidentally referred to the same text, though Idoubt that this reflects an interest in Marxist-Leninism.)  The arguments for 'workfare'in the United States - arguments which have been echoed in Britain by politicians of theright - are based partly in a desire to punish those who are unemployed, and partly toensure that whatever their circumstances they do work.  The difference between left andright wing views is not in general that people should be free to be unemployed: it is thatthe right wing consider that unemployment will best be dealt with through individualefforts, which can be encouraged by a system of incentives and punishments, whereasthe left wing tend to the view that one cannot sensibly impose individual sanctionsunless there is employment within the economy for unemployed people to go to.Work is not the only way in which people might make a contribution to society.  Asecond major value is that of 'the family', which has been an important part of policy inFrance, as it has in other European nations with  strong parties of the christian right. Policy has reflected in part the desire to support childbearing; in part, it has assumed adependent role for women, and a marginal status in relation to the labour market.  Despite the desire to foster family relationships, there can be strange and perverseeffects arising out of the implementation of different rules (29).  Single parents aredistinguished from two-parent families by the absence of one partner, usually the male;if there is to be any difference between the position of a single parent and a couple inwhich one person is not working, there has to be a 'cohabitation rule', so that a coupleliving together as man and wife are not treated more favourably than a couple who are
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married.  Bizarrely, this means that people in stable relationships are penalised whenpeople who are promiscuous are not; that homosexual couples are treated morefavourably than heterosexual couples; and that people are deterred from developingrelationships which may lead to marriage.  If the intention is to reinforce the traditionalfamily, the rule could hardly be less appropriate.Third, there is the nation.  Nationality clauses are used to exclude people from a widerange of different benefits.  In the UK, the problem relates not to the rules under whichsocial security operates, but rather the terms on which foreign nationals are permittedto enter the UK.  Immigrants are required to state that they will not become dependenton 'public funds'.  This is taken to exclude insurance benefits - on the basis that peoplewho have paid insurance contributions should not be considered dependent - but notmeans-tested benefits, including Income Support and Housing Benefit, and not the non-contributory benefits.  The non-contributory benefits also have residence requirementsattached: for example, in order to claim Severe Disablement Allowance, a benefit forpeople who are 80% disabled and who are not entitled to the contributory InvalidityBenefit, people must have lived in Britain for ten out of the last twenty years and for mostof the last six months.  The benefit would be barred in any case to most immigrants fromoutside the European Community, and the prospect of thousands of disabled Germansand Italians flocking to Britain to claim about thirty pounds a week seems so improbablethat one has to ask what the basis of such an exclusion could possibly be.  One answer,I suppose, might be reciprocity - that the people to whom we feel as responsibility arethose who might have some responsibility towards us - but then, there will always besome who are dependent and unable to make a contribution, and they would not beexcluded on these grounds.  A second answer might be 'solidarity', the identification ofa group within which responsibilities are recognised; but the basic problem with thedefinition of solidarity is that the same process which implies the inclusion of certainpeople necessarily excludes others.  Disillusionment with the concept of solidarity inFrance has stemmed not least from the realisation that it can justify the exclusion ofthose who are most disadvantaged.  The third answer is racism, a motivation whichseems all too prevalent in the operation of the benefits system (30). Irrespective of the explicit justifications for benefits, or of the methods according towhich benefits are supposed to operate, social security - like other services within'welfare states' - is conditioned by its social and  political context.  The values of work,family and nation reflect the climate of social norms within which social security systemsoperate.  
Poor relief and the functions of social securityAlthough the relief of poverty can be seen as part of the functions undertaken by socialsecurity systems, this role  has to be understood within a much broader context.  Socialsecurity is not 'about' the relief of poverty, and it is difficult even to claim that the reliefof poverty is the primary objective; in some countries, the relief of poverty has had arelatively minor role (for example in France, where concern with the family has been thedominant element in policy (31), and in general, the claims of social protection,compensation and provision for special needs seem at least as strong.  If poverty remains a major concern for social security systems, it is not least thatmany of the kinds of objective associated with social security systems are obstructed byits persistence.  It is not really possible to foster personal development, to preserve thevalues of family life, to integrate people into society, or to achieve social justice whilepeople lack the means to lead a decent independent life.  Conversely, this means thatpoverty can be tackled indirectly; policies for social protection, inclusion, solidarity, orthe removal of disadvantage should subsume the aims of poor relief, and should inprinciple be able to do so without the risk of divisiveness or moral condemnation whichhas blighted poor relief in the past.  
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Chapter 9
Patterns of social security provisionA review of social security policies is not the same thing as a review of responses topoverty.  Strategies for dealing  with poverty are broader in concept than poor relief,which is the main focus of this book; on the other hand, for historical reasons the idea ofpoor relief is largely subsumed in the provision of social security.  The identification ofsocial security with poor relief may be defective, but the extent to which such systemsprovide for poor people, and their effectiveness in doing so, is still one of the mostimportant tests which can be applied.  The study of social security is a drier subject than the consideration of poverty alone;it has (or should have) less human interest.  Clearly, the way people are treated, and theway they feel, are a very important part of why social security policies matter, and whyI became interested in this area in the first place.  It is true, too, that much of theliterature on social security is concerned with these issues - the cases in which people failto receive benefits, or receive them only on terms of stress, the negotiation ofunnecessary obstacles, humiliation, or degrading treatment.  But the way people feelabout social security benefits, the experiences they have and their reactions to them, arenot what the discussion of the subject should mainly be about.  These issues concern thefailures of social security; where social security is working well, this kind of problemshould not arise.  Although it sounds odd to say it, a successful system will not be onewhich people feel good about.  People should not be expected to have 'positive' feelingsabout social security benefits - the idea reeks of an expectation of gratitude - any morethan they should have 'positive' feelings about roads, electricity supplies or drains.  Theideal situation of social security is one in which it is taken for granted.  To achieve this,social security systems have to be accessible, adequate, efficiently run, and as nearlyautomatic as possible.  It is debateable whether this can be achieved by concentratingsolely on the problems of poverty (though that point will be returned to later, inconsidering different patterns of benefit provision).  One of the central arguments foruniversality, or the 'institutional' model of welfare, has been that with an adequatesystem of income maintenance - the protection of people's income in a variety ofcircumstances - much poor relief becomes unnecessary.There is no simple way in to understanding how social security policies work,because the experience of claimants often depends on a number of benefits of differentkinds, payable in a range of circumstances.  As a first step, this chapter considers thebenefit systems in six different countries, giving some background for the later materialon benefits and contingencies.  The consideration is brief; the aim is to provide enoughto make comparisons possible, without covering so much ground that one loses sight ofthe general principles.  The following chapters review the types of benefits in operation,the range of contingencies, and the workings of social security systems overall.  
Social security in the United KingdomThe ideal of the 'welfare state' in Britain is, for many observers, the distinctivecharacteristic of the British  system.  The welfare state, founded in the 1940s, promiseda comprehensive set of measures, provided at the best level possible, as a right ofcitizenship.  The social security system in the UK is best understood as the product,directly or indirectly, of the kind of insurance system envisaged by the Beveridge report(1).  Beveridge's scheme itself depended on a pattern of insurance provision which haddeveloped through friendly societies and industrial organisations.  But he attempted todevelop insurance into a system which would be comprehensive, covering people in thepopular phrase 'from cradle to grave'.  For a number of reasons, Beveridge's scheme failed to perform as it was intended. Part of this relates to the deficiencies of any insurance scheme; insurance canot cover the
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full range of needs, because the beneficiaries have to have been able initially tocontribute.  The gaps included coverage for disability, unmarried mothers and long-termunemployment.  Other criticisms might be made of some of the particular assumptionswhich Beveridge made - for example, he assumed despite evidence that women wereincreasingly involved in the labour market that they were likely to be dependent on malebreadwinners, which meant that in cases of single parenthood or divorce (a contingencyhe considered 'uninsurable') the coverage of the insurance scheme was to prove grosslyinadequate.  In assessing the level of benefits, Beveridge adopted Rowntree's basicmeasures, without allowing adequately for inflation.  He excluded housing costs, whichhave remained a vexed issue in the provision of benefits in the UK ever since.  Thescheme was not set up to be adequate.  Further, when the scheme was introduced,economies were made.  The exchequer contribution was very limited - 18% of the costinstead of the 50% recommended by Beveridge.  The scheme introduced in 1948 also hadlower benefits for children than Beveridge recommended because, the government said,of free school meals.Insurance was firmly established as the basis for the social security system, but thefailures of the scheme made it necessary to devise other kinds of benefit to plug the gaps. The main benefits which fulfilled this function were means tested benefits, and non-contributory benefits.  The basic means tested benefit was clearly aimed at people on lowincomes, though the definition of a minimum income differed for pensioners anddisabled people from the allowance for unemployed people and their families.  The'rediscovery of poverty' in the 1960s prompted concern about the inadequacy of thisbenefit - at the time, called 'National Assistance' - and the problems associated withmeans-testing.  This, in turn, prompted a search for other kinds of benefit.  Non-contributory benefits for disabled people were developed not least in reaction to, on onehand, the failure of national insurance and, on the other, the perceived problems ofmeans-testing.  Much of the policy for social security which has ensued has been built around thetension between universality and selectivity.  In general, Labour has become associatedwith an institutional model of welfare and a resistance to means-testing; theConservatives have tended to favour a residual model with means tests that 'target'resources on those who are poorest (2).  Since 1970, Conservative governments havebeen responsible for Family Income Supplement and Family Credit (for people on lowearnings), Housing Benefit, and two major reforms of the basic means-tested benefit(Supplementary Benefit/Income Support); Labour has introduced non-contributorybenefits for disabled people, and Child Benefit.  However, the issue is not quite so simple:there are measures which do not fit the convenient political mould.  The ConservativeTax Credit Scheme of 1972 (3) seems to be based in an institutional model of welfare. The 1975 pensions scheme, in which Labour replaced a Conservative plan with its own,greatly increased subsidies to private occupational pensions schemes.  The reform ofSupplementary Benefit introduced under the Conservatives in 1980 began life under aLabour Government (4).  This reflects the kinds of constraints which the parties workunder, as well as a process of compromise and balancing of conflicting principles.  TheConservative Tax Credit Scheme was guided by the belief that more rationally orderedrules make financial control more effective; the scheme was dropped when practicaldifficulties were emphasised.  The primary justification for Labour's support of privatepension schemes, in 1975, was the government's determination to ensure adequatepensions in the future.  No single set of principles is dominant.
Social security in FranceWelfare provision in France is not based in the kind of comprehensive, all-embracingprinciple identified with the  British system.  The most important justification for welfarehas been the development of 'solidarity', an idea which developed from the turn of thecentury - at one point, it was the focus of a political movement, 'solidarism' (5).  The firstarticle of the Code of Social Security declares that 'the organisation of social security isfounded on the principle of national solidarity' (6).  This is understood partly in terms
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of the development of mutual aid and assistance, and partly in terms of social integration(7).  The social security system in France has developed from a range of diverse insurancearrangements developed by friendly societies and professional associations (lesmutualités).  The system of insurance which has developed has two principalconstituents: the régime générale, administered by the state, and the various régimesspeciales which are administered by or for different groups.  There are also several non-contributory additions, such as the allocation de solidarité spécifique for long-termunemployed people.  As in Britain, the insurance system can be seen as the core of thesocial security system overall, but the kinds of provision which are on offer are varied. Despite attempts to extend the concept of solidarity to the nation as a whole, it is inthe nature of a concept which depends on mutual aid that it relates to definable groupsof people.  Spitaels et al argue that'the lack of unity is at the same time the consequence and the acause of the break inthe spirit of solidarity which ought to characterise every system of social security.  Atfirst, it was because they did not feel solidarity with other insured people that certainsocio-professional groups claimed and obtained a special régime.  Subsequently, thisfeeling was strengthened, and it was in the name of these special interests that thebeneficiaries of these régimes refused every real reform of the structure.' (8)In contrast to Britain, poverty has not been a major element in the development ofFrench social security; references to poverty in recent political debates depend more oncultural diffusion (from Britain and the US) than on a home-grown concept.  The mainissue has been family policy (9).  The French concern with family policy can be justifiedin terms of solidarity, which implies the acceptance of social responsibility for child care;but it also reflects 'natalism', or a concern with the birthrate.  The development of familybenefits in France has, bizarrely, attracted political support from both left and right; theunlikely alliance in the 1930s of feminists and the catholic parties served to establishfamily benefits firmly (10).  The plethora of benefits which has developed since coversboth universal family allowances (the allocations familiales and allocation au jeune enfant
initiale) and means tested benefits (the complément familial, the allocation au jeune
enfant, the supplément de revenu familial, and the  allocation rentrée scolaire.)For those who remain, there are residual benefits, of which the most important untilrecently was aide sociale.  This linked discretionary assistance with personal support ona model related to social work (11).  However, the coverage of aide sociale has beenrestricted, and it has been suggested that half a million unemployed people were notbeing covered (12)  But concern with poverty in its own right has been a fairly recentdevelopment.  The socialist government under Mitterand has referred to the idea ofpoverty with increasing frequency, though there has been a tendency to translate theconsideration of poverty very widely into terms of 'exclusion' and 'inclusion' - whichmight be seen as a concern with solidarity in different ways.  Young offenders, by thisargument, enter a consideration of 'poverty' because they are socially excluded (13).  Theprincipal response has been the development of the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion -'l'insertion' representing here a concept similar to 'integration' - seeking to respond tothe marginality, or social exclusion,  as well as the economic position of the poor.  TheRMI has a wide remit, and the estimated number of people who should be able to benefitis about one and a half million, but if so the RMI has not reached all the groups intended,possibly because the emphasis on integration implies a set of conditions for entitlement(14).The French system is remarkably complex; it has made a virtue of diversity.  This sitsbadly with attempts to develop a more comprehensive framework of services, and it isfair to say that there has been some disillusion with the concept of 'solidarity' as a result,not least because it is as capable of justifying the exclusion of disadvantaged groups asit is of including them.
Social security in the United StatesThe US is sometimes characterised as the centre of free enterprise, competition and aindividualistic, residual  concept of welfare.  But this gives an incomplete picture of a
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diverse, complex system, and it would be difficult to explain some major policies - likethose of the War on Poverty - on that ground alone.  The cornerstone of the US systemis that it is pluralistic, though it is pluralistic in a different sense to France; French socialpolicy emphasises solidarity and group action, whereas the dominant ideology in theUnited States stresses individual choice and limitations on government.  In justifying theconstitution, Madison argued for a system of government at different levels, in whichpeople would be able to form coalitions of interests with others (15).  The principle thatthat people should be able to make their own arrangements is seen as the core of'American democracy'.   Pluralism in welfare implies that many bodies are involved inthe provision of services.  The role of government in the US is often residual, particularlyin relation to unemployment, but there are other examples - like those of health anddisability - where government seems to be far more active.  At the same time, theinvolvement of government even in these areas is patchy and ill-defined.  Thedevelopment of social welfare provisions in the US is described by Klass (16) in terms of'decentralised social altruism'.  The picture which emerges is of a patchwork of provision,some with some fairly gaping holes, strongly dependent on location, administrativestructure and the perceived locus of responsibility for people's circumstances.Social security developed belatedly in the United States, and it has never gained thelevel of institutional acceptance which it enjoys in Europe.  The United States is a federalsystem, where issues like social security would fall into the remit of the states rather thanthose of the central (federal) government.  The introduction of a national  insurancescheme in 1935, as part of Roosevelt's second 'hundred days', has been supplementedsubsequently only in the most limited fashion.  Federal interventions have often beenresisted by the States, under the banner of 'States' rights', and the strategy which hasbeen pursued by the federal government has been complex.  Some issues, like a residualbenefit for people without incomes - 'public assistance' or 'general assistance' - fallwithin the remit of the states.  Some issues, like the Social Security programmes for oldage, survivors, health and disability (OASDHI), Medicare (medical benefits for old people)or Food Stamps are controlled by the Federal government.  But many measures straddleadministrative boundaries.  The Federal programme for Supplemental Security Income(SSI), which provides a minimum income for old, blind and disabled people, is generallysupplemented by the states.  For Medicaid, which offers health benefits to people on lowincome, the eligibility levels and standards are set by the states (17).    Federal measureswhich fall into the remit of the states can be proposed, but have to be accepted by thosestates; Aid to Families with Dependent Children, the main means-tested benefit aimedat single parents, is generally implemented, but the limited AFDC programme forunemployed people, AFDC-UP, has not been accepted by many States - it applied in only25 states in 1985, two less than ten years before (18).  The States are able to vary theterms on which welfare is delivered, which has led to a certain amount ofexperimentation and variation; once the measure has been accepted by the States, thecontinuation of the programme can be subject to federal regulation; so, for example, inthe early 1950s the 'Jenner amendment' made it obligatory for AFDC authorities topublish the rolls of people receiving welfare (19), and most recently 'workfare', acondition that people in receipt of AFDC must work in order to qualify for it, has beenfairly generally imposed, albeit in a somewhat haphazard way (20).It is probably fair to say that social security, or at least that element of it described as'welfare', is primarily directed towards poor people.  Glazer comments, with a littleexaggeration:'The United States is not unique in having a division between the main nationalinsurance programs (Social Security, unemployment insurance, Medicare) and theresidual programs based on need (AFDC, Food Stamps, Medicaid). But the UnitedStates is unique in possessing so large a population of working age that is supported,along with their children, by residual programs, because it is not eligible forassistance by insurance programs.'  (21)The emphasis on residual benefits has been an important political issue in the States; theissue is not that other people do not receive government support and services, but thatthese services - like the Veterans' Administration or Agricultural Relief - are not seen as
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welfare provision.  By the same token, those benefits which are available for the poor areoften available on only the most restrictive terms.  One of the peculiarities of a pluralistic, fragmented system is that it is likely to beexpensive: the combination of extensive administrative conditions, the emphasis onpersonal supervision and professional intervention, overlaps between services and gapsin provision mean that the US systems offer staggeringly bad value for money.  Gilbertcomments that if public expenditure on welfare 'were directly distributed to the entirepopulation in the form of cash grants, nobody would have fallen below the establishedpoverty line of $6000 in 1978' (22).  The extent of welfare spending, and the number ofprogrammes sometimes gives critics the mistaken impression that the Federalgovernment distributes largesse on an unparallelled scale.  Charles Murray's book, Losing
ground, is based on the proposition that despite everything which has been done for thepoor since the 1960s, the numbers of poor people seem to be increasing.  He proposes 'scrapping the entire federal welfare and income support structure for working-agedpersons, inclusing AFDC, Medicaid, Food Stamps, Unemployment Insurance,Workmen's Compensation, subsidized housing, disability insurance, and the rest' (23)as if this demonstrated the extent of federal extravagance, rather an incompete,inadequate, even desultory set of responses.  
Social security in IsraelIsrael was a society founded in utopian ideals.  First, it was to be a Jewish homeland. Israel is Zionist, and largely  Jewish: over four-fifths of its population are Jews.  It wasfounded in large part as a refuge against persecution, and all Jews (and first generationdescendants) are deemed to have a 'right of return'; the absorption of immigrants hasbeen a major focus of policy.  However, as the balance of the population has shiftedincreasingly towards a settled population, the relative importance of immigrants hasdeclined, and with this change there has been a shift away from the concentration onbasic needs which providing for immigrants implied.  Another dimension of the religious nature of the state is that the principles of Judaismhave played an important part in the development of welfare.  Religion and stateintervention are not always at one: orthodox Jews initially opposed Zionism, and in Me'aSharim, the ultra orthodox quarter of Jerusalem, there is a prominent graffito on a wall:'Zionism and Judaism are diametrically opposed'.  The ultra orthodox do not accept theservices of the Israeli state: their housing is dilapidated, and they live as far as possibleby charity and mutual aid rather than by state welfare.  However, religious influences arestrong in the organisation of welfare.  Because of the way the Israeli political systemworks, the religious parties have always played an important part in government. Generally, they have been the only people really interested in social welfare, an issuewhich other parties have been ready to concede to them, and have been in control ofcentral government provision for over thirty years.  The influence of Judaism is evident in a number of ways.  There is a centralassumption that needs are in the first place going to be met by the family.  For example,it is assumed that children will support their aged parents, and children whose agedparents go into residential institutions are required by law towards the cost of keepingtheir parents, and may be prosecuted for not doing so.  Charity is emphasised as areligious duty, and voluntary work is a compulsory part of the school curriculum.  Itshould not be assumed, however, that the influence of religion is inevitably to pushwelfare into an individualistic or residual mould; Judaism has always fostered organisedefforts to provide welfare.  Most distinctively, burials are largely treated as theresponsibility of the state - the acceptance of communal responsibility in this area beinga long-standing element of the Jewish tradition.  The second aspect of the utopian aspirations was that Israel was to be socialist, andit would organise on principles of mutual aid.  The emphasis on socialism was derivedin large part from the ideal of the early pioneers in the kibbutz movement.  Much of thereference to socialism is rhetorical; the quote which follows comes from a propagandafilm I saw at the Histadrut, the Israeli general federation of labour.  
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'The young men and women who arrived in Palestine in the early years of thiscentury found their future home bleak and inhospitable.  ... Faced with theantagonism of veteran farmers hostile to their socialist ideals the newcomers wereforced to share what little work there was ... Some of them realised their socialistideals in collective farming.  They contributed to a common fund to provide medicalcare.  They formed a co-operative to supply food.'The Histadrut is substantially institutionalised within the system of government,providing many of the principal social services itself.  The health service is substantiallypaid for by union subscription and run by the Histadrut; mutual aid schemes coverfinancial assistance, and residential care for children and old people.  I was struck by therepeated reference to socialist ideals during the presentation of their material, and askedone of the trades unionists there about it.  He was at pains to correct me.  'Socialdemocratic', he said.  'Let's get it right.'  But the influence of utopian socialism is stillimportant for welfare, not least because it implies a very different approach from thatconcerned with the relief of poverty in other industrial societies.  Eisenstadt emphasisesthat the activities of the Histadrut 'were not defined as welfare activities but as part of the pioneering activities aimingat the construction by the settlers of a modern economy,  Welfare in the sense ofdealing with social problems was not acceptable, the assumption being that in thesocialist society envisioned there would not develop special, distinct social problems.' (24)Thirdly, Israel was to be democratic, and it would have equal citizens in a pluralistsociety.   This ideal owes much to the influence of the United States, a position which sitsuneasily with the socialist rhetoric.  The organisation of welfare in Israel is diffusedbetween central government, local government, the voluntary sector, and the tradesunions; Doron and Kramer suggest that one effect of the involvement of the labourmovement in practice has been to force government into a residual role (25).  There isno national sickness benefit, for example, because that falls within the remit of theHistadrut.  The National Insurance scheme, such as it is, is limited in both its contributorybase and its benefits, and those who have to rely on the nominally universal pensions(currently under threat of abolition) need supplementary provision to achieve a tolerablestandard.  Pluralistic systems are likely to have deficiencies at the best of times;  the morecomplex the system is, the more likely it is that someone somewhere is going to fallthrough the net.  But it would be unwise to pass over this observation withoutconsidering to some extent the divisions in Israeli society.  These divisions can be usedto justify a pluralist ethic, but they also imply very different patterns of provision fordifferent groups.  Israel, Cnaan writes, 'is a stratified society wherein ethnic origin andreligion are the best explaining factors of this stratification' (26).  There are threeprincipal issues in the structure of social disadvantage.  One is between European andNorth African Jews - Ashkenazi and Sefardi; 94% of Israeli youths in poverty are Sefardi. Second, there is the division between Jew and Arab  within Israeli citizenship.  Third,there is the distinction between citizens and non-citizens - which applies to most Arabsin the 'administered' or occupied territories; welfare services have been maintained(and, Macarov argues, improved) (27), but there is an evident discrepancy in thestandards which apply there and within Israel itself.  The tension between the concernfor defence security and the advancement of welfare permeates much of the socialservices - it affects not only the resources available for welfare provision, but also thekind of ethos under which certain services, particularly those to Arabs, are delivered.  Cnaan suggests that by now 'there are no expectations that the welfare state willcreate an egalitarian society.  The resources are simply not available.  However, as ameans for social integration, middle and upper classes are often included in universalsocial welfare programmes.' (28)  At first sight, this might be reminiscent of much ofwhat is written about the British welfare state.  But the impact of the social divisions andeconomic crisis in Israel is not only to undermine claims for equality, but also in manyways to undermine the extent to which welfare is capable of acting as a force forintegration.  In recent years, welfare in Israel has suffered substantial retrenchments. The massive expenditure on defence, the parlous state of the economy and the
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experience of hyper-inflation have led to serious reductions in the coverage of statebenefits.  Child allowances have been abolished for smaller families; the scope of supportfor unemployed people has been reduced; and there are plans to reduce the scope ofNational Insurance still further.  If Israel had acquired the characteristics of a welfarestate, as Doron once claimed (29), it is in the process of losing them.  'Five years ago', hehas written recently, 'I presented the thesis that the Israeli welfare state was atcrossroads ... Today it seems that Israel has made its choice.'  (30).
 GermanyIt is difficult, for a country in a state of flux, to give an accurate picture of the operationof its social security; but  the philosophy, approach and methods of West Germanydominate the new German state so fully that it should be possible to use that as the basisfor comment.  'The Federal Republic', Zapf suggests, 'has maintained to an astonishing degree thesocial politics tradition that dates back to the German Empire.' (31).  Germany was thefirst nation to introduce a national scheme of social insurance, under Bismarck.  When,after the second world war, Germany was being reconstructed, the tradition wasmaintained: a proposal for a different kind of scheme, modelled after the Beveridgereport, met 'intense opposition from bureaucrats and insurance fund officials, who had helpedtheir programmed survive the political turmoil of previous decades, from self-employed and higher-paid workers, who insisted on a separate identity for theirsocial insurance funds, and from leading politicians of the new Federal Republic, whodiscounted any need to rely on foreign models of a policy technique that the Germansthemselves had invented.'  (32)The German system has something of the diversity of the French, but benefits havedeveloped within a different kind of framework, more directly related to the needs ofindustry.  At a time when Britain was concerned with the 'welfare state', thereconstruction of the German welfare system was being justified in terms of a 'socialstate' (Sozialstaat), perhaps better understood as a 'social market economy' (33) ratherthan a 'welfare state'.  The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) provides that adequatepublic assistance should be available as of right.  This can be interpreted primarily as aresidual concept, but it is coupled with a strong commitment to the economic needs ofsociety and a heavy dependence on the role of industry in providing occupationalbenefits.  The focus falls on achievement in the market (34), and welfare provision isstrongly linked to the occupational status and employment record of the recipient.  Social security in Germany depends, as in many other places, on a combination ofinsurance based benefits, largely geared to the occupational structure, and asupplementary set of safety-net provisions (mainly Sozialhilfe, or social assistance, andWohngeld, a means-tested housing benefit.)   The adequacy of social assistance is limited,based on a restricted 'basket of goods', and takeup is limited (35).  Importantly, thesepolicies are backed up by an infrastructure geared to economic development and theprevention of unemployment, through job creation, employment training and fosteringreductions in working hours (36).  The heavy reliance of the German system on social insurance is an indication thatpoverty is less important as a justification for welfare than some other considerations,in particular social protection.  The level of benefits depends strongly on past workrecord; those without such a record rely on social assistance, which is mainly providedthrough regional governments, and which is generally represented, like Income Supportin the UK, as a stigmatised benefit.  But the coverage of this safety net is uncertain. Mitton et al comment, on the basis of a survey of the conditions of unemployed people,that:'Protection of living standards was the main purpose of the German system and it hadgreat success in this.  In preventing poverty, however, it was not so good.  Theminority with little or no pension under social insurance could apply for means testedhelp from Social Aid (Sozialhilfe) but few did so ... There remained ... an appreciable
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minority - slightly over one in ten - who were not being supported either by a pensionor by social aid.' (37) The economic success of Germany suggests that there are few working poor in the West(38), and the people who have not claimed social  assistance are seen as the main groupin poverty (39) - though one wonders how, if all this is true, the problems of poor areas,unemployment and homelessness described in the European poverty programme (40)could have arisen.  The general proposition that people in work are not poor needs to bequalified, too.  Evidence from the 1970s suggested that women were substantiallydisadvantaged.  Germany had an unusually high proportion of single earner households -61% in comparison with Britain's 42% (41) - which meant, in practice, that women hadvery much more limited opportunities for participation in the labour market.  Leibfriedand Ostner (42) believe it is still the case.  By contrast, Hauser and Semerau claim (on thebasis of an individualised analysis of income by age and sex) that the gap between maleand female has closed; they argue, surprisingly, that there is no feminisation of povertyin Germany (43).  Social security is primarily directed at the circumstances of people outside the labourmarket - pensioners, unemployed, disabled and single parents.  For the most part, it isthe success of the German economic system which has relieved the necessity for socialsecurity to be tested; the adequacy of occupational pensions has meant that the successor failure of the residual benefits to reach their targets has not been such a seriouspolitical issue as it might otherwise have been.  The economic pressures which resultfrom the re-absorption of the East may well put this to the test.
SwedenSweden is often presented as a model 'welfare state', with a considerable emphasis oncomprehensive social provision.   This comprehensiveness is expressed, Allardt suggests,in three ways: the direction of welfare programmes to the entire population rather thanspecific problem groups, the development of legal rights to welfare, and a broad coverageof welfare in relation to many different aspects of people's lives (44).   At first sight,Sweden appears to have a set of institutions very similar to the welfare state in Britain -with the difference that their relative generosity, efficiency and political support haveenabled Sweden to realise the ideal of the welfare state rather more effectively.  Hecloemphasises the similarities between the two countries, and plays down the relativeimportance of ideology.  Policies on social security have been put forward, not by theorganised political parties - which have at best a superficial grasp of the issues - and notthrough the electoral process; 'much of what has been specifically accomplished in stateprovision for old age and unemployment', he writes, 'has depended on calculations ofwhat the public would stomach rather than what it demanded.'  (45)  The developmentof policies in both countries, he argues, has depended more on the lobby and thedynamics of the bureaucracy.  But there are important differences in principle betweenSweden and the UK, which are marked by the relative involvement of the labourmovement in policy formation.  In the UK, the labour movement has left social policy tothe Labour Party; in Sweden, by contrast, the unions have played a more active role, oftenincluding the administration of unemployment benefits (46).The emphasis has fallen, in consequence, on attempts to tie in welfare systems to theoccupational structure - a system Mishra refers to as 'social corporatism' (47).  This isexpressed through substantial use of occupational and earnings-related benefits, anemphasis on incorporation into the labour market through education, training and equalopportunities.  The stress on the occupational base does, however, lead to a degree ofdifferentiation in the kinds of support people can expect.  Ringen describes the Swedishsystem as 'selective by occupational experience' (48).  On the face of the matter, thisshould mean that those who are left out of the occupational structure are likely to suffer;but Mishra argues that the effect of full employment policies is precisely to include thosewho would in other cases be marginalised (49).If there is a dominant theme within social security provision, it is not the relief ofpoverty.  Probably more important is the principle of solidarity.  The 1982 Social Services
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Act, which governs municipal welfare (including social assistance), is justified in thefollowing terms:'on the basis of democracy and solidarity, the public social service should furtherpeople's economic and social wellbeing; equally in living conditions; activeparticipation in the life of the community.' (50)'Solidarity', however, is understood in a different sense to its use in France.  It isinterpreted, not only as mutual aid and integration, but also to imply a degree ofegalitarianism.  Myrdal writes 'In a society which claims solidarity as a basic principle, is demanded organised co-operation and strengthened influence in society in order to strengthen the positionof the weak and in order that a redistribution of the unevenly distributed resourcesand opportunities can occur' (51)The 'solidaristic wage policy' advocated by the unions is intended to pursue united actionfor an improvement of living and working condition, the limitation of differentials, anda degree of income transfer (52).  Effectively, Sweden has become the model for whatTitmuss called the 'institutional-redistributive' model of the welfare state (53), in whichthe aim is not only to protect people against certain social contingencies, but also toproduce a more equal society.  Olsson (54) emphasises the extent to which the Swedish system has becomeuniversalised; it offers a mix of universal minimum benefits - including pensions for oldpeople, disabled and handicapped people, and child allowances - with earnings-relatedinsurance benefits for unemployed people and pensioners.  The system is not whollyuniversal, however; there are means tested benefits for single parents, children ineducation and housing needs; social assistance, administered by local authorities,provides a safety net for each group.  If there is an element of social rejection associatedwith this kind of arrangement, it is not evident from the literature; Wilson believes thatSweden does not have the problems of stigma and low take-up which bedevil benefits inthe UK (55).  It is difficult to be certain to what extent this is true; Gould suggests that themechanisms of public assistance, which treat claimants at an individual level and relystrongly on discretionary procedures, act as a barrier to claiming (56).  Under theconstraints of industrial recession there have been some attempts in recent years tocurtail the level of expenditure committed to social security, of which one of the mostimportant is de-indexation, which means that benefits might be eroded by inflation (57) However, these changes do not seem to have changed the basis of the system.
Social security systems in outlineThe sketches of social security systems presented here are sufficiently distinct for it tobe possible to outline some  of the dominant features of different systems, and the typesof issue which distinguish their approaches to poverty.  There are many different classifications which might be made.  Titmuss (58)distinguished three main models of social welfare: residual, institutional-redistributive,and the 'industrial achievement-performance' or 'handmaiden' model, which viewswelfare provision as the servant of the economic structure.  On that basis, the Swedenmight be considered institutional, the US residual, and Germany devoted to 'industrialachievement'.  It is difficult to classify the UK, France or Israel: the UK is institutionalwithout being markedly redistributive; France has elements both of institutional welfareand of the orientation to work; and Israel has strong elements both of institutional andresidual models at the same time, even if it is now lurching in the direction of the latter. These difficulties reflect some general problems with Titmuss's approach.  Institutionalwelfare is not necessarily committed to progressive redistribution; it may also be mainlyconcerned with social protection, which covers people at different levels.  And the'handmaiden' model does not exclude the possibility of residual or insitutional principlesbeing applied at the same time.  Palme modifies Titmuss's approach by making a fourfold distinction betweendifferent kinds of system: confusingly, he uses similar terms in a slightly different way. His classification includes systems which are 'institutional' (which entails both that basicneeds are met and that there is a degree of redistribution), residual (concerned only with
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basic needs), 'citizenship', which is concerned with basic security for all, and 'work-merit', where benefits are related to occupational status.  He classifies pensions inSweden on this basis as 'institutional', Germany as an example of 'work-merit', andFrance, the UK and the USA as 'residual'.  Australia, where pensions are based on a testof income, and Denmark, which has many similarities to Sweden, are classified asexamples of the 'citizenship' model (59).  This is a fairly idiosyncratic interpretation - Ithink I would have classified France and the UK as examples of 'citizenship'; but it helpsto illustrate the considerable ambiguities which can arise in the interpretation ofsystems.  As with Titmuss's scheme, there are some conceptual problems with Palme'sterms: 'work-merit', like the handmaiden model, does not exclude residual principles,and his definition of 'citizenship' confuses a safety net for people unable to provide forthemselves, which is associated with a residual model, and the principle that everyoneshould be helped, which is more commonly associated with the institutional model.  If the trouble was just that the terms do not fit the cases very well, it should bepossible to find others which fit better.  Unfortunately, the issue is not so easy to resolve. Any broad classification is likely to gloss over significant differences.  I do not think itwould be very convincing to put Israel, which relies centrally on mutual supportorganised through the trades union movement, in the same category as the United States,or France, which has a pluralistic, fragmented system of different solidarities, in the samecategory as the UK; but that is the consequence of relying on simplistic descriptions like'residual' or 'institutional'.  The central problem with classifications based on such'models' is that they try to do too much at once.  Welfare systems are multi-dimensional. Rather than trying to describe systems as a whole, it is probably better to identify someof the elements of systems.  This still has some problems - it relies on some very broadgeneralisations - but it makes it possible at least to get a handle on the material.The first distinction that might be made concerns the kinds of redistribution whichdifferent countries make.  Some offer provision for basic needs; others provide muchmore generous benefits, which is not so much as a means of redistributing from rich topoor as a way of protecting the living standards of people whose circumstances mightotherwise suffer.  The US, UK and Israel fall mainly into the former category; France,Germany and Sweden are mainly in the latter.Second, there is a difference between countries which offer benefits oriented to workand the labour market, and those which offer rights on the basis of citizenship.  Germanyand Sweden are in the former category; the UK and (I think) the US are in the latter. France seems to be moving from the first category to the second; Israel is difficult toclassify, but it may be moving in the other direction.Third, it is possible to classify these systems as representing individualist orsolidaristic approaches to welfare.  France, Israel and Sweden are solidaristic, althoughthis does not mean quite the same thing in each country; what they have in common isthat welfare is conceived and developed as a collective enterprise.  By contrast, the US,Germany and the UK tend to be individualistic (or 'liberal'), putting the stress onpersonal rights and responsibilities. Fourth, there is a distinction between residual and institutional systems.  This isrelated to the previous distinction, because liberal ideology tends to imply a marginalrole for the state, but it is not the same; policy in the UK, which often emphasisesindividual responsibility, also contrives to have institutional welfare by emphasising theright of each individual to welfare.  Sweden is clearly institutional; I think in view of theextension of its safety net that France can now reasonably be placed in the samecategory.  The US and Germany are, relatively speaking, residual.  Israel is again the mostdifficult to classify.  If one was to consider only the contribution of state provision, Israelwould have to be counted as 'residual', but welfare in Israel cannot be interpretedexclusively in terms of state activity; the element of collective solidarity through tradesunionism is much closer to the institutional model.  This points to a fifth dimension.  Provision by the state is not necessarily the mostimportant form of welfare provision; the distinguishing principle of welfare in Japan, forexample, is the extent to which it relies on support from its corporate occupationalstructure in place of the state.  Some systems - Israel, the United States, and France - arepluralistic in form; irrespective of whether or not systems are oriented to welfare or the
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market, they feature a diversity of provision.  Others - Germany, Sweden and the UnitedKingdom - have attempted to introduce a generally applicable, comprehensive system. There is no regular pattern here; none of the countries I have considered has thesame basic profile as another.  Sweden and the US are different in respect of each of thefive dimensions I have identified, and one could choose these two countries as models,or representatives of 'ideal types'; but it would be difficult to know what to do with thecountries which are left, because each of them differs from the others in importantrespects.  What this kind of analysis shows is, not simply that countries are different, butthat the differences defy categorisation in terms of basic models.  The comments I have made still rest on some pretty broad generalisations, and thereare major reservations to make about them.  Each of the systems is complex, and ofnecessity the characterisation I have made of each does not do justice to them.  Intentionsand practice often differ, and each of the countries might legitimately be represented indifferent lights.  For all that the UK appears to have a comprehensive, universal approach,it is actually much more pluralistic in its provisions than the ideology of the welfare statewould suggest; Israel, despite its historical tradition, is well removed from the model ofcollectivised redistribution that its socialist rhetoric implies; neither the United Statesnor Germany is truly 'residual' in the sense of concentrating on safety net provision; andSweden shares with France and Germany a stress on occupational status which it isdifficult to reconcile with the model of 'citizenship'.  At the best of times, then, classifications of this type need to be treated with a healthydegree of scepticism.  But there are also some fairly fundamental reasons why this kindof broad-brush approach can never be very accurate.  In the first place, the functions ofsocial security policies are complex, and they are not exclusively - or even primarily -associated with a single objective, like the relief of poverty; the effect is that no systemcan adequately be described in such simple terms.  Second, even when the aims ofsystems appear to be similar, different methods are employed which can produce verydifferent kinds of results.  And third, poverty itself is not a simple issue, but one whichcovers a wide range of different kinds of problem and contingency, so that a systemwhich appears to be comprehensive in one respect might fail to meet other needsaltogether.  Considering the ways in which social security systems actually work takesus a long way from the relative certainties of ideological analysis. 
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Chapter 10
Social security benefitsSocial security is not for the most part designed to offer people a minimum level ofresources, or even a minimum level of income.  It may serve these functions to a greateror lesser degree, but the characteristic pattern of most social security systems is not thedominance of 'safety net' benefits or benefits designed to offer a basic income, but thediversity of options within which a safety net plays only a limited role, covering thosecontigencies not otherwise provided for.  Poverty is dealt with, not through a closeconcentration or 'targetting' of benefit, but through the development of a framework ofincome maintenance which provides for people who are poor amongst others.There are three standard components within most social security systems.  The firstis social insurance, which is the most widely used form of provision for old people andsurvivors (like widows and orphans), and which also commonly extends to cases ofunemployment and invalidity where the people affected have been able to makecontributions.  Secondly, there are means-tested benefits, which by their nature arereserved for people with low resources.  Third, there are 'non-contributory' benefits,which have no test of contribution or of means, but which may have a test of need (likebenefits for disabled people).This categorisation is not really sufficient to understand the different patterns ofbenefit provision, because within the two later categories in particular there is a certainamount of variation.  Residual benefits - that is, benefits for those not covered by otherbenefits - include not only means-tested benefits, but also commonly include somediscretionary element.  A common pattern of 'social assistance' is that people receivesome kind of personal assessment of supervision on the social work model.  Despite theoverlap between them, these kind of benefit are sufficiently distinct to be treated asseparate categories here.  'Non-contributory' benefits', equally, include two very differenttypes of provision.  In the case of benefits for old people or children, the only test whichis applied is that a person is the right age.  I have referred to these as 'universal' benefits,though the term is not always confined to such cases.  In the case of disability orunemployment, a 'non-contributory' benefit also requires some kind of test of eligibility;this creates a set of problems more commonly associated with means-tested benefitsthan with universal benefits, and for that reason I have treated this kind of benefit as aseparate category.
Social insuranceThe dominant element within most systems of income maintenance is social insurance- 'dominant' both in the sense that it commands the greatest element of resources, andbecause it provides the structure or framework around which other benefits areorganised.  However, the nature of social insurance can be understood in different ways,and this is reflected in the scope and adequacy of the benefits.  The first model, which isthe original pattern of social insurance, was developed in Bismarck's Germany, where theprovisions were concerned less to provide against poverty than to offer protection toworkers in the event of contingencies which might interrupt their income.  Bismarck'ssystem is most usually presented as a veiled form of repression, not least because of hisown justifications for this kind of measure; it was presented as an antidote tocommunism, and a means of mollifying the workers.  One should beware, though, oftaking explicit justifications for policy of this type too seriously; it is far from clear whywe should be enjoined cynically to disregard political claims which claim to serve theinterests of the population and yet believe with a perfect faith protestations ofunderhand motives.  Bismarck equally described himself as a 'Kathedersozialist' - anarmchair socialist - and argued for independent benefits as a way of maintaining thedignity and rights of the recipients (1).  In justifying his actions to his Junker society, heappealed to their fear of socialism and their self interest - but that is hardly the same as
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proving that his actions were only motivated by such factors.  In so far as there was anideological motivation, it was probably neither capitalist nor socialist.  The feudaltradition, one which was still important in Europe in the nineteenth century - and which,some might say, is still fairly important now - demanded that landlords undertook someresponsibility for the welfare of their charges, according to their standing in life.  And thatis what the Bismarckian system of insurance, much to the scorn of more 'progressive'liberals, did.  It is difficult to see the hand of Bismarck in the current German socialsecurity system, but the tradition that social insurance is both a form of social protectionand a form of guaranteeing social stability has been important in shaping theunderstanding of social security in Germany - among critics of the left, such as Habermasand Offe (2), as much as those who would defend the position on the right.  This traditionwas to influence most European nations, and many countries outside Europe.  However, social insurance suffers from a major defect in its ability to offer socialprotection.  It relies on a basic test - a test of contributions, and so of work experience -which tends to exclude large numbers of people who may need protection, but who havenot met the basic conditions.  The people who are left out tend to be those unable to work- long term unemployed, school leavers, young mothers, chronically sick and disabledpeople.  As for guaranteeing stability, it is unclear how far social insurance can performany such function.  If payments are to be made on the basis of insurance, they must befinanced on an actuarial basis from funds based on contributions, or from the revenuefrm contributions on a dynamized or 'pay as you go' basis.  The former arrangementrequires a level of economic stability - both in the sense that people have to be able tocontribute (Beveridge demanded full employment as a condition of the success ofNational Insurance), and in the sense that funds have to be secure.  The latter requirespolitical stability, because future generations have to be prepared to pay benefits on abasis at least equivalent to that on which people contribute.  In other words, insurancerequires as a precondition the kind of stability it is supposed to guarantee.    The second main model is that represented by the Beveridge report.  The Beveridgereport is often taken as the model for other Western European countries - during thesecond world war, it was parachuted into occupied territory - though it is probably moreaccurate to say that the report reflected widely held views and reinforced existingdevelopments.  The rhetoric associated with the Beveridge scheme - not all of itBeveridge's - seemed to offer a broadly based response to poverty.  The scheme wastaken to promise coverage 'from the cradle to the grave'.  Beveridge fuelled thisimpression with some ringing statements about the 'Giants' of Want, Idleness, Ignorance,Squalor and Disease, and the claim that the scheme would be 'adequate' and 'universal'(by which he seems to have meant 'comprehensive').  Parts of the scheme proposed forsocial security were more concerned to reinforce the impression of comprehensivenessthan to develop a sound basis for insurance - for example, Beveridge devised 'classes' forthe insurance of children and old people, and 'credited' (or make-believe) contributionsfor some of those who were unable actually to pay their way.  Beveridge stresed theimportance of a basic minimal coverage, because, as he said,we need 'bread and healthfor all at all times before cake and circuses for anybody' (3).As an approach to poverty, however, there were important deficiencies in theBeveridge scheme.  Some of them are peculiar to the scheme itself; they were consideredin the preceding chapter.  Some, however, are of general application.  In the first place,universal coverage is hardly a realistic aspiration for an insurance scheme, because it isin the nature of insurance that it must be conditional to some extent on contributions,and many people are unable to contribute.   Beveridge himself recognised that'However comprehensive an insurance scheme, some, through physical infirmity, cannever contribute at all and some will fall through the meshes of any insurance.' (4).This, clearly, affects the ability of insurance schemes to repsond to poverty, especially asthose least able to contribute - those without regular patterns of employment - are oftenthose most vulnerable to poverty.  The second problem was adherence to thecontribution principle.  Beveridge had the option of earnings-related or flat-rate benefits;he opted for flat-rate as the best way of ensuring adequacy at minimum cost.  But this inturn had implications for contributions, because flat-rate benefits demanded flat-ratecontributions - earnings-related contributions on flat-rate benefits would have been
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equivalent to a concealed tax.  The contributions had to be set low, because too high alevel of flat-rate contributions would have excluded large numbers of people from thescheme.  In the words of a civil servant, contributions'are not fixed on any particularly rational basis but on the basis that you want areasonable test and do not want to make it too hard for people to get the benefits,because, after all, the contingencies are there ... None of us has ever paid, or ever willpay, ... the full value of our benefits.'  (5)There are problems in developing universal coverage even for those in work at a levelwhich can provide adequate benefits.  The third principal model of social insurance is represented by schemes whichemphasise mutual aid.  This is probably best represented by social insurance in France. The distinctiveness of the French system rests in the diversity which resuts from theapplication of the principle of solidarity to different groups.  Solidarity applies not onlyat the national level, but at other kinds of level - including local groups, professionalassociations, friendly societies.  The French system is characterised, then, not by theuniformity of basic provision, but its diversity.  In many ways, this reflects more faithfullythe pattern of insurance cover which has become commonplace in industrialisedcountries - including Britain, where private and occupational pension schemes are anincreasingly significant aspect of insurance provision.  The main advantages ofsocial insurance in practice are that it is largely self-financing, politically well established,and more likely to offer a higher rate of benefit where there is earnings-relation.  Butthere are important disadvantages, particularly from the perspective of the poor.  Thework test associated with contributions means that low paid workers (and women),people with marginal employment, or those who undergo spells of unemployment orsickness, are less likely to be able to contribute; where they can, they are less likely to beable to afford contributions.  Where they cannot, of course, it is neceesary to developfurther tiers within a benefit system, and many people are in practice left out.  The ChildPoverty Action Group used to argue that the strengthening of insurance was the beststrategy to protect the poor.  In recent years, however, they have moved away from thisposition.  Fimister and Lister acknowledge that the insurance principle '(a) ... does not protect benefits against cuts ... (b) ... excludes some of the most vulnerable people from entitlement to benefit ...  (c) ... creates complexities and administrative problems ... (d) ... is in any case a myth'.  (6)
Means-tested benefitsThe limitations of social insurance have meant that benefits have had to be developed totake over some of the roles which insurance fails to fulfil.  The most important of thealternatives is means-testing - the award of benefit which is conditional on a test ofresources, usually income, and sometimes capital.  Although different means-testedbenefits clearly act in very different ways, it is difficult to sub-classify means-testedbenefits in the same way as National Insurance.  Much depends on the categories ofpeople included or excluded, the relative generosity of the benefits, and on the type ofbenefit system in which the means tested benefit is applied.  The inclusion or exclusion of different categories of people defines the function ofparticular means-tested benefits.  Means tests tend to be associated with 'safety net'benefits, on the basis that most people do not require social protection and only thosewhose income falls below a certain level should qualify.  In other words, means tests tendto be residual in their nature.  Within this broad category, though, there are importantsubdivisions.  Some means tested benefits are available very generally to people on lowincomes, like Income Support in the UK, and can be seen as general safety net benefits. Some relate only to a limited set of potential recipients, like AFDC in the US.    There are also some exceptions to the general description of means-tested benefitsas residual.  An alternative pattern of means testing is directed not so much to theidentification of people on low incomes as to the screening out of those on higherincomes, with a system designed to include most: examples are the Australian pensionsscheme, or the UK student grants scheme.  (One might perhaps also include the upper
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limits on income used to determine the coverage of social insurance in Germany, thoughtechnically this does not fall into the category of a means-test.)  If the former pattern isresidual in principle, the latter is institutional.  The scope of means-tested benefits depends not only on the categories of peopleformally included or excluded, but on the level at which benefits are set.  The level ofbenefits matters in systems where either the benefit is used to determine a minimumlevel of income (like Income Support, or a number of French benefits for the family - thesupplLment de revenu familial, allocation au jeune enfant and allocation de parent isolL)or to establish a figure which is gradually withdrawn as other income increases (likeHousing Benefit); both principles imply that higher levels of benefits make more peopleeligible for consideration.  Effectively, the lower the level of benefits, the more residualthey are likely to be; the higher they are, the more people will be included.  If residualmeans-tested benefits are often linked with ungenerous provision - an accusationfrequently levelled at them, for example by Townsend - it is not least because the levelof means-tested benefits is one of the reasons they are described as 'residual'.The functions which means-tested benefits perform depend, too, on the kind ofsystem in which the benefit has a place.  In the UK, the central means-tested benefit isIncome Support - formerly National Assistance (1948-1966) and Supplementary Benefit(1966-88).  The benefit is, in principle, a supplement to other benefits, bringing peopleup to a level of income (and therefore effectively acting as a guaranteed minimum incomefor a wide range of people entitled.)  Although the benefit has become increasinglyimportant for a wide range of people, and has been adapted to a 'mass role', the centralpresumption behind the rules affecting the benefit is that people will receive it only whenthey do not have alternative sources of income through other benefits.  This means thatIncome Support is genuinely a 'safety net', coming into force only when other benefitsdo not.  In Australia, by contrast, the basic means tested benefit performs a very differentfunction, because there is no basic system of social insurance (7).  Effectively, then, themeans-tested benefit is the only form of provision for important categories of beneficiary- particularly pensioners - and the role of the benefit is substantively different from thatof Income Support in the UK, despite a number of factors in common.  Mitton et al write,on the basis of their work in the UK, France and Germany:'That some means-tested benefits are extensively taken up while others are notsuggests that it is not the means-testing itself that is the problem but rather the wayin which the means-tested benefits are administered.'  (8)The process of means-testing has been much vilified, on the somewhat questionablebasis that means-tests are an intrinsically unsatisfactory method of distributing benefits. Much of this relates to an ideological view of means-tests as being uniquely closely linkedwith a residual model of welfare.  But means tests, like any other administrative process,have both advantages and disadvantages.  The advantages of means tests are first, thatthey concentrate resources on those most in need, and second, that they are progressive,and redistribute resources vertically from rich to poor.  Both of these factors wouldsuggest that means-testing would be favoured by the left wing - but not a bit of it.The first accusation levelled against means-tested benefits is that they are complexand difficult to administer.  The French Allocation de Parent Isolé has been criticised fortaking up to six months to be delivered; benefits are often miscalculated, and if overpaidreclaimed from the unfortunate recipient who is unlikely to have known there was anoverpayment (9).  This is not difficult to cap.  Housing Benefit in the UK has beendescribed (in The Times) as 'the biggest administrative fiasco in the history of thewelfare state' (10); in one case I encountered in my housing practice, the benefitauthority (a London Borough) had taken eight years not to process the claims of anumber of elderly women in sheltered housing, a claimant group whose circumstanceswere about as stable as the authority could have hoped to find.  (11)  However, in fairness to means tested benefits, they are not necessarily the mostdifficult benefits to administer; much depends on the rules which affect each benefit. Drawing on Treasury figures,  Supplementary Benefit was expensive to administer, atabout £2.85 per beneficiary each week; but so were many insurance benefits, likeUnemployment Benefit at £2.50, Maternity Allowance at £2.40, or Sickness and InvalidityBenefits at £3.05 (12).  Belorgey notes problems in claiming sickness and unemployment
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insurance in France, not least because of the demands for documentation (13).  Thebenefits which were cheaper to administer in the UK - Retirement Pensions at 45p,Family Income Supplement at 50p, or Attendance Allowance at 80p - were cheaperbecause of the relative stability of individual circumstances and the use of postal claims,not because of the simplicity of the benefits.  The second objection to means tested benefits is that they create a poverty trap.  Ifbenefits are given to people on low incomes, they must be taken away from people whoseincomes go up.  In combination with the tax system, the effect in Britain has beeneffectively to remove any advantage in an increase in income for people who receive suchbenefits.  Getting out of poverty, Piachaud writes, is like getting out of a well; if you can'tjump up far enough you simply slide back to the bottom again (14).  Last, and most serious, they often fail to reach those in need.  The reasons commonlygiven for low takeup are complex.  Kerr suggests that there are a series of steps that aperson has to take before claiming.  Claimants have to feel a need.  They have to knowthat a benefit exists, and that they are likely to be entitled.  They have to feel that abenefit is worth claiming, which it may not be if the value of the benefit is too small.  Next are the beliefs and feelings of the claimant, which might include issues of socialacceptability, the desirability of 'managing', the person's role as a 'breadwinner', orgeneral attitude towards benefit support.  Finally, there is the perceived stability of thecircumstances - people may not claim if they think their circumstances are likely tochange (15).  He presents these as a number of hurdles which have to be surmountedconsecutively, but they can equally be seen as interlocking; there is an interrelationshipbetween lack of perceived need, knowledge of benefits and uncertainty about eligibility,and negative beliefs and feelings about the claiming process (16).  There are other reasons, too, why people might fail to claim.  Weisbrod suggests thatpeople weight the costs of claiming, broadly understood,  against the benefits (17).  Somepeople are afraid to claim, perhaps because of the consequences of asking landlords forevidence of rent, or employers about low wages.  The reasons for not claiming includedeterrence, degrading treatment and loss of rights; the history of means-testing, whichis associated by many with repressive administration and the Poor Law; a feeling ofbeing 'labelled'; and a dislike of 'charity', or pride.  (18)  These problems have led manycritics to reject means-testing altogether.  But the same criticisms could be levelled atbenefits which are not means tested, including both social insurance and thenon-contributory benefits which have often been developed to avoid the stigma ofmeans-testing.  
Non-contributory benefitsReactions to the failures of social insurance and the perceived limitations ofmeans-testing have led to a increasing concern to develop alternative kinds of benefits. These are usually referred to as 'non-contributory', though the defining characteristic ofsuch benefits is not only that they are not based on contributions but also have no testof means.  Some still have a test of need: a example is Mobility Allowance, where a personmust be unable to walk or virtually unable to walk, with or without aids, and able to takeadvantage of facilities for locomotion.  (The conditions are more stringent than this briefsummary suggests - for example, the benefit must be claimed before the age of 66,excluding the vast majority of people in Britain who are unable to walk; it must be for acondition likely to last for at least a year, a provision which excludes most stroke victims,who constitute the largest group of people with locomotion difficulties; and it is assessedonly on the basis of physical capacity, which probably excludes most people with amental handicap.)The central arguments for non-contributory benefits seem to be based in criticismsof other kinds of benefit; but there is little reason to suppose that they are immune fromsimilar kinds of complaint.  If they are less complex, it is not immediately apparent; anytest of need tends to create complexities of its own.  Benefits for disabled people are notmuch less expensive to administer than others, and they are regularly the subject ofcomplaint about administrative hurdles (19).  The average delay in the payment ofSupplementary Benefit in the UK was two days for a person coming into the office, ten
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days for someone who wants a home visit.  By contrast, a number of non-contributoryclaims took much longer: Attendance Allowance claims took an average 45 days to clear,Retirement Pension 47 days, and Mobility Allowance 53 days (20).  I do not have similarinformation for other countries, but Belorgey notes of the French system that in relationto the Allocation d'adulte handicapé, where cases are contested, the process can drag onfor years (21).  Non-contributory benefits may avoid a 'poverty trap' in the strict sense of the word,but problems are still likely to occur at the points where people cease to be entitled tobenefits.  In the case of Mobility Allowance, for example, a person who became able againto walk would lose benefit.  It seems inappropriate to describe this as a 'disincentive' torehabilitation, as there are very few people who would choose not to walk if they could,but it is an extra cost of rehabilitation during a stressful period.  They are supposed to befree of stigma, but this stretches credibility - can it really be more stigmatising to declarethat one's income is below a certain level than it is to have to declare that one is unableto use the toilet unaided? The important distinguishing feature of non-contributory benefits is not that they areprima facie more universal, more generous, or easier to administer; it is that by removingtests of qualification associated with work record or income, some of the worst obstaclesto more comprehensive coverage can be removed.  If their role has been limited, it isbecause their reliance on finance through taxation is difficult to justify in terms ofredistribution (because the redistribution is not necessarily from rich to poor). Non-contributory benefits, where they have been used, have often been greatly restrictedby qualifications on the basis of need, residence, or category of claimant, largely becausethe cost of non-contributory provision is liable to exceed the willingness of governmentsto test the goodwill of the electorate.
Universal benefitsNon-contributory benefits are sometimes referred to as 'universal', but there is adistinction to be made between non-contributory benefits like mobility allowance, whichdepend on some kind of qualifying test, and those benefits which are available toeveryone with no test of contribution, need, or means.  These are more legitimatelydescribed as 'universal'; another way of referring to them is as 'demogrants' (the termis, I think,  Canadian, though it also featured in McGovern's 1972 election campaign in theUS).  It puts the situation too strongly to say that they go to 'everyone'; universal benefitsare better considered as categorical benefits, relying on membership of a demographiccategory - like children or old people.  This implies that social security is provideduniversally for certain classes of people, and it implies a minimum level of income forpeople in that class.  The central advantages of such an arrangement are simplicity andstability - the benefits are simple to administer because people are old, or children, foran extended period of time.  The same principle cannot easily be extended tounemployed people, single parents or sick people, because these circumstances change. Unemployment and disability, furthermore, would have to be defined - which implies theintoduction of some kind of test.Child Benefit is the principal demogrant in the UK system, and it attracts a wide rangeof support.  Ostensibly, this is  because it protects people against poverty - the principalpressure group which supports it is the Child Poverty Action Group - but in practice thesupport is for other reasons.  Viewed as a benefit for those who are poorest, it isspectacularly unsuccessful.  It is inefficient: three-quarters goes to people above theIncome Support level.  Poor families who are on Income Support do not benefit, becauseit is deducted directly from their benefit.  The only families which gain from it whenbelow the IS level, then, are those who are working for less than IS rates - a tiny numberof people.  Among those who receive marginally more, very few are families withchildren.   In redistributive terms, the intended effect of Child Benefit is horizontal - frompeople without children to people with children.  Because people with more childrentend to be older, and older families tend to be better off, the broad effect of Child Benefitis moderately regressive.  
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There are, however, other arguments for Child Benefit, which carry very much moreconviction.  First, Child Benefit works.  Takeup is very high; it is simple to administer.  Itis difficult to generalise from this to other benefits: the extra One Parent Benefit whichis paid as a supplement to Child Benefit has a much lower rate of takeup (perhaps 70%). Second, Child Benefit is expressive of solidarity.  It represents an acknowledgement ofsocial responsibility for childrearing.  Third, it is paid to the mother.  The view has beenexpressed that women in wealthy households who have no personal income should beconsidered to be 'poor' (23), which is unpersuasive.  But there is a case of a different kindto be made for the redress of power between males and females; it is a means ofprotecting women's rights rather than of meeting their needs.  The main objection toChild Benefit, on this argument, is that it is child-related instead of being gender-related- though this may be the only way in which benefits for women can be legitimised.  Cassoffers a depressing observation:'Australia ranked with the United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany in providingrelatively parsimonious child support; Belgium, France, Luxembourg and theNetherlands were the most generous in their level of support; Italy and Ireland werethe least generous.  What is significant about this listing is that in Belgium, France,Luxembourg and the Netherlands, family allowances are increased in line with anindex, either on prices or earnings - and in all but Belgium, allowances are paid to thefather.  Of the less generous countries, allowances are not indexed and in all countriesbut Italy are paid to the mother.'  (23).The principle of the demogrant is valuable, not least because it serves as a marker fora different type of social security system.  It is perfectly feasible to envisage a system inwhich there are no special qualifying conditions, where every person receives anindividual demogrant (as children do now), and the system is entirely tax-financed.  If thebenefits are sufficiently generous, no other benefits should be necessary.  This is theprinciple of the Social Dividend, or 'Basic Income' scheme (25).  The advantages of sucha scheme are administrative simplicity, and the avoidance of problems like stigma, thepoverty trap, or low takeup.  But there are also important disadvantages.  The costs areviewed by some as prohibitive.  The removal of conditions like availability for work areseen as a massive disincentive, particularly for those who the decision to work iscurrently marginal.  The scheme cannot engage inequalities very fully; on the contrary,many of the beneficiaries would be non-working spouses in relatively wealthyhouseholds.  And there is a risk of oversimplification - people's lives are complicated andsome supplementary response for special needs would still have to be available.  
Discretionary benefitsLastly, a range of benefits may be available for people in special circumstances on adiscretionary basis.  The advantages of discretionary benefits are that they can beadapted to the needs of individuals in a way in which formal regulations cannot.  Wherean individual's circumstances  fall into a lacuna in the rules, nothing is likely to be done. The development of discretionary procedures can deal with exceptional circumstances. It can be argued that no scheme can hope to have truly universal coverage withouthaving some provision for exceptional contingencies.  Equally, they can be associatedwith other kinds of policy, like community care, which depend on assessment andresponses being made for a particular set of needs, rather than on the basis ofentitlement.The term 'discretion' requires some clarification here.  In the UK, the SupplementaryBenefits Commission administered, until 1980, a range of payments under a'discretionary basis', a term which was taken to mean that there was no formalentitlement to payment and that the issues fell within the decision of officers.  But thejudgment of officers in any individual case was limited by the creation of administrativerules which defined the limits of judgment no less strictly than a legal entitlement mayhave done.  It is in the nature of discretion that it cannot be used consistently withoutbeing bound by rules - in which case it ceases to be 'discretion' in any meaningful sense. But decisions which are not consistent are not predictable, and uncertainty about thelikelihood of receiving benefits, balanced against the costs, is a major element in the
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failure to take up benefits.  Discretion on this model was largely (not wholly) abandonedin the period 1980-1988; the government hoped at the time that this might limit thenumber of claims received.  It had the reverse effect, and by 1988 the government haddecided to reintroduce a discretionary system, the Social Fund.  Discretion has only ever played a marginal role in benefit in the UK.  In the US, anumber of states have tied public assistance programmes to social work; and in Francediscretionary elements linked to individual casework have played an important partwithin the system of public assistance.  As part of Aide Sociale, provision was made tooffer advice to recipients about budgeting, counselling for personal problems; theassumption seems to have been that those who were on low incomes had somepathological problem.  The new system, the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion, begins fromthe premise that poor people are 'excluded' from the course of society and have to bere-integrated - a position which is less reliant on the pathological elements but which stillnevertheless sees the problem in terms of patterns of behaviour rather than relativelevels of resources.  If discretionary policies have not worked well, it is not least because too often, theshortage of money induced by the inadequacy of existing systems generates problemswhich are not 'exceptional' in any sense - for example, the difficulty under the UK schemeof paying for the replacement of clothing or furniture - and implies a pathological reasonfor the lack of resources.  In the US, Richard Nixon (one finds light in the most unexpectedquarters) justified his proposals for reform in precisely these terms.  He condemned 'snoopy, patronising surveillance by social workers which made children and adultfeel stigmatised and separate.  The basic premise of the Family Assistance Plan wassimple: what the poor need to help them rise out of poverty is money'.  (25)Discretion is an inadequate response to the situation of people who are poor; rules neednot to be bent, but to be changed.
Benefits in combinationBenefits are not delivered in isolation; there is in every system a network of benefits,sometimes overlapping, sometimes alternative.  On retirement, a claimant may receiveeither a insurance based pension, a means-tested benefit, or some combination of thetwo.  On the face of it, the National Insurance Retirement pension effectively brings aboutthree-quarters of its recipients out of poverty.  But if they did not receive the RetirementPension, they would receive other benefits instead.  Fry et al detail the effects ofreductions in the value of pensions on eligibility for other benefits.  They suggest thatover half of any marginal reduction in spending would be needed to pay for means testedbenefits (26) (Atkinson, by contrast, puts the figure at 30%) (27).  Which is moreeffective - the Retirement Pension, which actually provides the bulk of the income, orIncome Support, which would provide the income with less 'wastage' if there were noRetirement Pension?  It is difficult, then, as a general proposition to attribute to any oneclass of benefit a greater or lesser degree of success in the relief of poverty.  (Theargument that any particular benefit should be increased is of a different kind - itassumes that there is already a context in which the benefits will have an identifableeffect.)  Many writers have represented social security benefits as institutional when they arebased on categories, and 'residual' when they use the methods most commonlyassociated with residual welfare - in particular, means-testing and discretionaryadministration.  However, the situation is more complicated than this implies.  Mostsocial security systems do not have benefits which fall exclusively into the category ofinstitutional or residual welfare, but some mixture of both.  The institutional benefits arethose which are addressed to general contingencies, like old age or sickness.  Residualbenefits are those provided for those who are unable to make provision in other ways. Benefits which are exclusively addressed to the issue of poverty might seem to beresidual, but that is not the way that things work in practice; for any benefit which wasaddressed to the issue of poverty in a context where there were no other benefits would,of necessity, address the same issues which are addressed by institutional benefits.  Inthe UK, National Insurance represents the insitutional aspect of benefits for pensioners
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- because National Insurance is sufficient in itself to deal with the circumstances of nearlythree-quarters of all the pensioners; Income Support, the means-tested benefit whichdeals with about a fifth (though it should deal with rather more) is residual because it isaddressed to those who are left out.  In Australia, by contrast, the means-tested pensionapplies to virtually the whole population of state pensioners - and as such, it falls into thecategory of an institutional rather than a residual benefit.  (Australians sometimes havedifficulty, on this basis, recognising their benefits as 'means-tested'.  The problem is notthat there is not a means test, but that it is difficult to identify in their system many of thekinds of issue associated with 'means testing' in Europe.)  In order to identify the functions of different kinds of benefits, one has to examine thepattern of provision for each dependent group.  The limited coverage of different typesof insurance, or non-contributory benefits, and the limited adequacy of universalbenefits, means that there is often a complementary role for a residual benefit - whethermeans-tested or discretionary.  The case of elderly people might be taken for an example. In the UK, the US, Germany, France or Israel old people receive a basic pension which isdependent on insurance contributions.  In Sweden, the basic pension is universal, thoughmost pensioners also have an contributory supplement.  The next question is whathappens to those who are not covered, or are only covered inadequately, by these basicpensions.  In most of these countries, there is a residual scheme of social assistancewhich meets the contingency; the main exception is the US, not because there is no suchassistance but because it depends on the discretion of State governments as to what leveland on what terms supplements are available.  There are, however, important differences in the pattern of provision for differentclient groups.  Provision for elderly people may follow a fairly common pattern, but thepattern of provision for single parents varies enormously between countries: France andSweden have universal family benefits backed up by means-tested additions (as does theUK, though the universal element is so tiny as not to count), the US has a means-testedbenefit, and Germany and Israel have no special provision.  An understanding of the wayin which systems operate requires some examination of the provisions which are madefor different kinds of contingency. 
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Chapter 11
The principal contingenciesMost social security systems contain several kinds of provision for differentcontingencies.  Where some  contingencies are not adequately allowed for - likeunemployment in the US, young single people in the UK, or part-time workers in France -there will be deficiencies in that respect, even though the system might be adequate inothers.  If one wishes to assess the adequacy of systems solely from the point of view ofpoor relief, then it seems clear that the number of  contingencies covered, and the termson which they are covered, becomes very important.In chapter 5, I described the situation of a number of groups vulnerable to low incomeor poverty.  These included elderly people; chronically sick and disabled people;unemployed people; single parents; and people on low earnings.  This does not define thesame areas which are most commonly deal with by social security systems.  Althoughmost developed social security systems address these problems to some degree, andmake some provision for destitution (e.g. benefits for people who are homeless, ordisaster relief), there are often significant gaps - most easily identified, admittedly, whenthey become the subject of campaigns to remedy them: disabled people, for example,received little specific help under the British system before 1970; gaps in provision forpoor people in France have been responded to only recently by the RMI; males sufferingfrom long-term unemployment are little helped in the US).  Equally, there are importantgroups which are often deal by social security who are not prominent in analyses ofpoverty.  These include benefits for widows and orphans; short-term sickness andmedical benefits; maternity benefits, and benefits for families with children.  This is notan exhaustive list.  A number of countries have special provision for ex-service personnel. In Britain, there are also benefits for students and (bizarrely enough) for people whocannot afford local taxes.  In Greece and Italy, crop insurance for farmers has been seenas a form of social security.  The pattern of provision for each principal group tends to be different, not onlybecause their needs are different, but because their relationship to the labour market is. Those who have been able to contribute towards insurance schemes - primarilypensioners - are in a different position from those who have not.  Groups who have noreasonable prospect of entering the labour market - like many single parents, orchronically sick people - are in a different position to those who have, like students,unemployed people or low earners.  And women, because of their particulardisadvantages in the labour market, are liable to have a different set of options andoutcomes than men do - an issue which affects a range of benefits, including thoseaffecting low earners, single parents, maternity and child care. 
 Pensions.  Because pensions are given at the end of a person's working life, it is usuallypossible to relate them successfully to the labour market, with fairly few exceptions. Pensions are commonly provided by means of social insurance, or at least contributorybenefits - 'insurance' is something of a misnomer, as the issue is less one of protectionagainst a contingency than of individual saving and collective provision to meet apredictable need.The first issue concerns the question of whether pensions should be based on flat-rate or earnings-related benefits.  Flat rate benefits are egalitarian; they have the effectof levelling out the incomes of old people after retirement.  Earnings-related benefits aresolidaristic; they are justified mainly in terms of social protection, avoiding the situationin which individuals are required in retirement to take a substantial cut in income.  At thesame time, they are potentially inegalitarian, because they reflect the inequalities of thelabour market - Titmuss's fear of 'two nations in old age'.  Closely related to this issue is the question of whether contributions should be flatrate or earnings related.  If the scheme is to be a true insurance scheme, with benefits
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strictly tied to contributions, then flat-rate benefits demand flat-rate contributions - anearnings-related contribution would imply a concealed tax - and earnings-relatedbenefits demand earning-related contributions (flat rate contributions would beregressive).  If, on the other hand, the scheme is to involve some form of progressiveredistribution, then earnings-related contributions or a tax subsidy are necessary, withthe benefits being either flat-rate or at least limited in the differentials they establishbetween different recipients.  Most countries have favoured earnings-relation, and earnings relation has probablyproved to be the most effective way of guaranteeing adequacy - the best exemplar isSweden.  The UK moved substantially in that direction in the pension plan of 1975,though more recently there has been some retrenchment (1).  Second, insurance of this kind may be funded or solidaristic.  Funded schemes arebased in a principle of saving - the benefits which a person receives are directly basedin the contributions which that person has paid in.  A solidaristic or 'pay as you go'scheme is one in which pensions are paid for directly out the contributions received atthe time; the continuation of the arrangment rests on the commitment of each generationto pay for the pensions of the preceding generation.  Although most occupational andmutual aid schemes rely on funding, it is unusual for a national scheme to do so;dynamisation, or allowance for inflation, is easier in the case of solidaristic pensions thanof others, because adjustments to benefits can be paid for by adjustments tocontributions.  The third dimension is between pensions which are publicly provided and thosewhich are provided on an occupational or commercial basis.  Although there is somescope for commercial schemes in areas other than old age - most notably for healthinsurance - it is difficult for such schemes to insure against unemployment, singleparenthood.  The problem is partly one of moral hazard (people can behave in wayswhich increase their liability of losing their incomes in this way) and partly a reflectionof the length of the contribution period.After insurance, the standard fall-back position is likely to be a means-tested benefit. Sweden is distinguished by a non-contributory minimum pension; in other cases, aminimum for pensioners is a residual benefit dependent on alternative sources ofincome.  A widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of dependency in old age means thatthe terms on which old people receive benefits are less restrictive than others.  However,the level of supplementary benefits varies.  The figures from the Luxembourg IncomeStudy seem to show that pensions in Sweden and West Germany are more successful inimproving income than those in Britain or the United States, although the British systemdoes reach many people at a relatively low level of benefit.  Superficially, the systemswhich are used are very similar.  All have a core scheme run by the state (though that inGermany is not universal); all, with the exception of Sweden, are financed through thecontributions of workers and employers rather than taxation (though the UK and Francealso have an exchequer contribution); all of the systems can be supplemented byoccuptional schemes.  The US and Germany have earnings-related benefits (in the caseof the US subject to a means test), whereas Sweden and Britain have a basic flat-ratebenefit supplemented by a further earnings-related addition.  If one wishes to explain theapparent differences in the successes of the different schemes, it probably rests not inthe mechanisms which are used to supply pensions, but in factors like the political andeconomic history of the systems, the levels at which they are set (and so the level ofpublic expenditure), and the extent to which people have been able to participate in thelabour market.  Disappointingly, there is no existing mechanism of distribution whichwill automatically guarantee adequate benefits for the elderly population.  
Disabled people.  Unless disabled people are to receive the same benefits as everyoneelse, and on the same terms - which might include requirements to be available to work -benefits of this kind have to be subject to a test of need, because one cannot otherwisedefine people as 'disabled'.  Of necessity, the assessment which is made is going toinvolve an element of judgment; it is possible to have a scheme for disabled people whichlimits the scope for administrative or expert discretion (the UK Industrial InjuriesScheme gives points for different parts of the anatomy lost), or benefits based on a
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particular kind of judgement (like ability to work), but only at the expense of sensitivityto individual need or the type of disability.  The level of definition which is needed depends on the purpose of the benefit. Benefits for disabled peple have been founded on a range of principles beseides financialneed - including, for example, insurance, desert (e.g. war pensions), compensation forharm, and rehabilitation (2).  Historically, the most important of these have beeninsurance and compensation.  The central problem with insurance based benefits is thatpeople who become disabled are not necessarily able to insure themselves throughcontributions or a work record.  Those who have been able to do so can receive somekind of sickness or invalidity benefit, but those who have not - like people withdisabilities from childhood, or those with incomplete work records - have to receivesome kind of non-contributory benefit.  Systems of compensation for disability have provided a major alternative, mostnotably in the context of industrial injuries, or through the courts.  The central limitationof such schemes has been the problem of attributing a cause to different kinds ofdisability.  Most mental handicap, for example, has no attributable organic reason; butthere have been controversies as to what extent vaccinations or avoidable birth defectsmight cause mental handicap.  The legal system, in such cases, offers a hard and difficultroad, because of the problem of satsfactorily establishing causation.  The deformationscaused by thalidomide, which were pursued in different courts, are now clearly anduniversally identified, but the process of establishing compsensation took many years. (The thalidomide scandal was also to play a major role internationally in highlighting theproblems of disabled people. (3))  The main alternative, developed in New Zealand, was the establishment of a no-faultsystem of compensation for disability (4).  The intention of this was to avoid theproblems of establishing causation, concentrating solely on the level of impairment.  Thescheme has been less imitated than might be imagined - Sweden has introduced a similarscheme, but in the UK it applies only to those who are the victims of criminal injuries. (The Pearson Commission, which considered the prospects of introducing a similarscheme in the UK, rejected the idea on the basis that it wished to maintain personalliability for compensation (5).  Lord Pearson defended the principle on the grounds thatNew Zealand was a smaller country than the UK and that besides victims enjoyed havingtheir day in court.)  There are problems with such a scheme; there are inequities betweenthose who have become disabled as the result of some identifiable event or accident, andthose who have become progressively disabled through long-term sickness - likebronchitis - who are not eligible for compensation.The development of non-contributory benefits has seemed to be the only equitablemethod of compensating people for disability without making invidious distinctionsbetween groups.  The problem has been that such benefits are liable to be expensive,because so many people are disabled; the initial generosity of Attendance Allowance(introduced in the UK in 1970) was not repeated in later benefits, like Mobility Allowanceor Severe Disablement Allowance, introduced after economic crises, which have beendenied to elderly disabled people - who constitute the majority of disabled people.  The Disability Alliance argues for a universal Disability Allowance for all disabledpeople.  The advantages of this are it will treat people more equitably, according to needrather than the cause of their disability; it should offer a basic minimum; and it will besimpler than the present system.  The disadvantages are that it would be very costly ifit was to be at all adequate; that there would be considerable resistance, as manydisabled people, like war pensioners, have privileges they would not want to see erodedby a more rational system; that it will still require a test of need, with the accompanyingproblems of definition, barriers to access, and stigma; and that it will separate out the'deserving poor'.
Unemployment.  Unemployment is a complex set of issues rather than a single issue initself, and people whose unemployment is casual, frictional, seasonal, short-term orstructural have different needs.  Beveridge's analysis of unemployment, which wasintroduced in chapter 5, may be unsatisfactory as a definition of the problem - becauseit mixes analysis of causation, presenting problems, and different patterns of work - but
107
it offers a useful starting point for understanding the organisation of benefits. Beveridge's own scheme was principally concerned with casual, seasonal and short-term'frictional' unemployment; for the rest, he had assumed full employment.  The'assumption' of full employment in his report meant, he wrote, 'that if there is massunemployment, Social Security by income maintenance does not meet the needs;unemployment benefit is adequate treatment only for short interval unemployment'.  (6). Many benefits are concerned with social protection, rather than with unemployment asa cause of long-term poverty.  The system of benefits for unemployment this produced was geared to short periodsof unemployment.  Within the detailed provisions of the National Insurance scheme,casual unemployment was accounted for by the calculation of unemployment benefitson a daily basis (a quirk of social insurance in the UK which has only recently beenchanged), and coverage for seasonal unemployment depended on the number ofcontributions made in a period between 9 and 21 months beforehand rather thanimmediately before the period of unemployment - the relevant period has since beenextended to up to 33 months.  (There was an administrative rationale behind this, but thepoint is really rather too obscure to be worth pursuing in detail here.)  Most important,entitlement to Unemployment Benefit was time-limited, which meant that people whowere unemployed for long periods of time ceased to be eligible for UnemploymentBenefit, and then had to rely on means-tested benefits.  In practice, this has meant thatthere are fewer long-term unemployed women than men, because women whose benefitentitlement is exhausted cannot claim and cease to be officially unemployed.  In recentyears, the numbers of people dependent on Unemployment Benefit while unemployedhave been limited in comparison with those who receive Income Support, or those whoare not entitlted.Despite the very different provenance of social security in other countries, there aresome notable patterns in provision for unemployed people.  In Sweden or Denmark,where unemployment insurance is administered through the trades unions, insurancebased benefits tend to be generous in comparison with the UK or US, where it falls to thestate (though it would be dangerous to generalise - the same cannot be said for Israel). Even there, there is some variation, because much depends on the terms of the fund fromwhich the benefit is administered.  Unemployed benefits have to be tested by some kindof work criterion - if not, then people who had withdrawn from the labour market, orwho opted to work part time, could claim.  Insurance based benefits effectively imposea test of a prior work record - this is, after all, how insurance is defined.  Perhaps lesspredictably, for those who qualify most schemes are time limited, which means not thatall benefits subsequently stop (as they may in the US) but rather that the rate of benefitmay be reduced (as in Denmark) or transferred to another benefit (as in France,Germany and the UK).  Effectively, then, virtually all systems of support forunemployment are stratified in two or more tiers.Residual benefits have been important for those who fail to meet the requirementsof an insurance programme, either because they lack an adequate contribution recordor because their entitlement to insurance is exhausted.  In conditions of massunemployment - conditions which negate Beveridge's assumptions - both problems arelikely to arise, because initial access to the labour market is affected along with re-entry. However, the level at which such benefits are provided is likely to be low, partly becausethey are residual, and partly because of moral judgments about unemployment or a beliefthat incentives to work may be undermined.  There is no evidence to show that moregenerous unemployment benefits are likely to foster unemployment; on the contrary,countries with higher benefits (like Sweden and Austria) have been more resistant tounemployment, while those with more restrictive policies (like the UK and the US) havedone relatively badly.  This probably says more about the political agenda than it doesabout economic forces; the countries with more generous benefits also tend to be thosecommitted to policies for full employment (7). 
Single parents.  People become single parents through a variety of circumstances, andtheir benefit entitlements are likely to be different.  The first case to consider is that ofunmarried mothers.  A number of circumstances are variable: whether the mother has
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a work record; whether the mother is able to work while responsible for a child; andwhether there is financial support from the child's father.  The second main set of circumstances is divorce.  The dimensions of the argument aresimilar to those of an unmarried mother - the relationship of the divorced parent to thelabour market, and the extent to which the divorced parent is supported by the ex-spouse.  It might be possible besides to consider a spouse's work record in place of theresponsible parent's.  Beveridge thought that divorce was not an insurable risk, on thebasis of moral hazard - people could control whether they became divorced or not; thereasoning behind this seems defective, because even if it were true it suggests a differentstandard is being applied to those who have self-inflicted sickness or injury.  It is true,too, that large numbers of people divorce; but then, large numbers of people becomepensioners.  The main distinction seems to be that divorce is disapproved of socially;effectively, a moral element seems to have intruded in the scheme.  This seems, again, tobe reflected fairly universally in different social security schemes.Third, there is the position of survivors - widows and widowers.  The issue of theclaimant's relationship to the labour market remains; the spouse is (evidently) not ableto offer regular maintenance, though it is possible to make provision through privateschemes.  Unlike the circumstances of divorced parents, widowhood is considered aninsurable risk, and it is generally dealt with through insurance based benefits.  Theadequacy of these benefits depends, like pensions, on a number of factors, includingprotection against inflation and whether the benefits are earnings-related. The main kinds of benefits introduced for single parents tend to be either universal,or means-tested.  On paper, the UK seems to have a core of universal benefits - anallowance for each child supplemented by a special addition for single parents - but thisis not sufficient in practice to make a significant difference to the circumstances of singleparents, and in many cases, because it is directly deducted from the value of otherbenefits, it will yield no net value to single parents who claim.  The French and Swedishsystems appear to be more generous; the universal family allowances are supplementedby means-tested additions for single parent families, though in the case of France themeans-tested provisions are also subject to availability for work after the child reachesthe age of three.   In the US and, in practice, the UK, the main form of benefit for singleparents is means-tested and residual.Although single parents may receive benefits of different kinds, it is a necessaryfeature of any benefit which is designated as being intended for single parents that theremust be a cohabitation rule.  The difference between a single parent family and a twoparent family is the absence of the other partner.  If single parent benefits are not to bepaid to everyone, there has to be a rule disqualifying couples.  The problem can beavoided, in principle, by treating women and men within households independently forthe purposes of benefit, but this has other implications: it would mean that all spouseswho were not working would be entitled to benefit, and that the special income needsof single parents were not recognised.  The attempt to introduce non-means testedbenefits for single parents, then, is probably unlikely to overcome the maindisadvantages of benefits for this group.  It is necessary to maintain a cohabitation rule,and it is very uncertain whether a benefit which picks out a stigmatised group can avoidbeing stigmatised itself.Probably the most important difference in the rules between countries concerns theposition of single parents in relation to the labour market.  In the US, the rules for AFDCattempted, at one stage, to offer single mothers incentives to work (through the WINprogramme); WIN had negative sanctions for mothers with chldren over six, andsubsequent changes have pushed single mothers into 'workfare' on similarly punitiveterms.  The history of workfare has not, Brown comments, been particularly successful,which makes its extension hard to fathom; workfare offers low status jobs, few positiveincentives, limited subsequent prospect of employment and creates potential problemsin child care (8).  The atmosphere is punitive.  In Germany and France, single parents areexpected to be available for work once their children are over the age of three, and thereare relatively high rates of participation in the labour force (9).  By contrast, the UnitedKingdom's residual scheme, which accepts that single parents with dependent childrenshould not have to be available for work, seems almost liberal.    
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Provision for low earners  The problems of ensuring an adequate income for those inwork go well beyond the scope of income maintenance; they have implications for theeconomic structure, and can probably be more effectively tackled through wage rates andregulation of industry.  There is a strong case to argue that most provision or low earnersis, or should be, largely unnecessary.  A minimum wage should remove any necessity forspecial support of the incomes of employees through the benefit system.  In conjunctionwith universal family benefits, a minimum wage provides a minimum level of incomeadjusted for family size.  It is the dominant pattern in the European Community, withonly two countries (Britain and Ireland) not having one.  A minimum wage would notrelieve all cases of working poverty, because there may be those who are self-employed (often, in practice, those in agriculture).  This means that relief programmes for self-employed people might be represented as a form of social security (as they have been inGreece and Italy).  In UK government reviewed the prospects for a minimum wage in 1969, but rejectedit for two (or possibly three) main reasons.  The first was that it was feared thatincreased wages would reduce the demand for labour, and thereby increaseunemployment (though there are reasons to doubt this in a Keynesian analyis).  Thesecond was that most of the beneficiaries would not be those who were poorest, butwoman earning a second wage for a household (an argument which can be seen to haveaggravated the trend towards the feminisation of poverty).  The third reason, which wasnot explicit, was probably that the public sector would be one of the employersprincipally affected by general minimum wage legislation, and the government was notprepared to pay increased wages (10).The main alternative is  the introduction of benefits geared specifically to those onlow incomes.  In France, despite the existence of a minimum wage, there is also a means-tested supplement to family incomes, the supplément du revenu familial, for families withmore than two children.  In principle, the same effect could be achieved by relatingminimum wage levels to the level of the universal family allowance (the allocationfamiliale).  The existence of the supplement indicates an unwillingness either to increasethe minimum wage or the family allowance to the level necessary. The option selected in the UK was Family Income Supplement, introduced in 1971. It was based loosely on Friedman's proposals for a Negative Income Tax (a related planin the US, for a Family Assistance Plan, died at about the same time) (11).  FIS was basedon a bizarre calculation in which people received 50% of the difference between theirincome and a set level.  There were a number of problems with this approach.  Thecalculation gave the unfortunate impression that the government was deliberately givingworking families less than it thought they needed.  It was capable of giving money tofamilies on higher incomes it was refusing to families on lower incomes.  It relied onstatement from employers which they might be reluctant to give (12).  And incombination with the tax system - because people on very low incomes in the UK are stillliable to tax - it created a major poverty trap, with those whose incomes increased losingafter the expiry of benefit a substantial amount, often more than the increase in earnings. FIS was replaced in 1988 by Family Credit.  Many of the problems were the same.  Itavoided the problem of giving people less than a set level by replacing the calculationwith a different formula by which a maximum benefit is reduced as earnings increased -it comes to much the same thing - but suffered from a new problem: claimants could nolonger determine at what point they were likely to become eligible for benefit.It is difficult to say to what extent this kind of complication is a necessary part ofprovision for low wages; there are few precedents, and those which there are scarcelyunambiguous.  When the Nixon government was considering the introduction of theFamily Assistance Plan in the US, they went back to 1795, to the Speenhamland systemin England, for some kind of comparison (13).  The problems of administration, takeup,and the poverty trap seem overwhelming; administration through employers, which wasproposed for Family Credit, gives employers a substantial incentive to cut wages.  The main alternative, in theory, is the introduction of a social dividend scheme.  Byensuring a basic income unrelated to the world of work, the issue of low earnings wouldbecome irrelevant to the subject of poverty.  But this has not been practised anywhere,and it remains an option only in theory.
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Provision for emergencies  Provision for emergencies looks very different from otherkinds of benefit.  It is in the nature of emergency relief that it has to be immediatelyavailable, and that it should not rely on an extensive set of conditions which have to beverified.  Financial relief is not necessarily the most appropriate response in anemergency - both because it suggests that people should be able to make their ownarrangements with the money, and because it assumes that the money can buy the kindof help which is necessary (which is not necessarily true after, for example, a town hasbeen flooded).  The kinds of cases in which people are most likely to need urgentpayments are cases where they have been cut off from other resources - for example,some cases of fire, domestic violence, summary eviction, or robbery - although, inpractice, the 'urgent needs payments' which used to exist in the UK were often usedwhere people were short of resources simply because of the inadequacy of the basic rateof benefits, and the system of 'crisis loans' which has replaced them is subject to the samecriticism.Emergency relief is probably the contingency which provides the strongest case fora personalised response.  In many countries, including France, Germany and Sweden,because discretionary benefits are related to casework, the issue of additional provisionfor destitution does not arise; the main objection to this kind of provision is not that itdoes not exist, but that too often it is applied inappropriately to people whose povertyis of a more constant, less personal kind.
Benefits as social protectionAlthough the categories above include people who are likely to become poor, theyequally provide for many who are neither  poor nor seem likely to become so.  Benefitshave many functions besides the relief of poverty.  When this is related to principalcategories of recipient, the most important seem to be benefits for sickness; survivors;and family benefits.  These are not major categories in the consideration of poor relief,and in comparison with the previous sections I shall consider them only briefly.
Benefits for sickness.  Benefits for sickness fall principally into the category of protectionof earnings; they cover the circumstances where a person undergoes a temporaryinterruption in the capacity to earn.  This should reduce the  risks of poverty, though inpractice its effects are limited; where people have a substantial household income, short-term sickness benefit offers some protection but is unlikely to be sufficient to be crucial,and where they do not, the protection is only partial because jobs are not necessarilysecure.  Sickness benefit has other important functions, however.  Beveridge recognised thatsickness and unemployment benefits could not exist in isolation from each other.  If aperson became unemployed in a system where there was a sickness benefit but nounemployment benefit, that person would have to present as sick in order to receive abasic minimum income.  Alternatively, if a person became sick in a system with nobenefits to cover for it, that person might  have to present as unemployed.  If sicknessbenefits have a role in income maintenance, it is not least that for low paid workers inparticular they bridge the periods of sickness and make continuity of employmentpossible.  (By contrast, sick pay at the employer's expense creates an incentive foremployers to discharge sick workers).
Survivors: widows and orphans.  Survivors benefits have much less to do with poverty, oreven earnings replacement, than with social protection; they are generally insurance-based, sometimes earnings-related (particularly in private schemes).   Since it oftenrefers to older people, who may have accumulated resources, the distributiveimplications are very similar to those of pensions.  
Family benefits.  Benefits for families with children are often represented as acounterbalance to poverty, but this is questionable.  Although there may be some poorfamilies, families do not necessarily represent a major category among  people who arepoor (if only because the parents tend to be of working age).  The families with the
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greatest problems are those in which the woman in the family is unable to work becauseof child care responsiblities; this usually refers to families with young children.  Largefamiies may have difficulties where this means that the woman's earning capacity isinterrupted for a long period of time, and one of the most common justifications forfamily benefits as a means of relieving poverty is that they compensate people with largefamilies for their extra expenses and reduced incomes.The principal justification for the institution of family benefits is solidarity, ratherthan the relief of poverty.  The argument from solidarity is that children are the concern,not only of the family into which they are born, but of the whole society, in which theyare raised and to which they will subsequently be expected to contribute.  But this doesnot necessarily imply that redistribution will be progressive; it is horizontal, going fromhouseholds without children to those with, and many of those who are poor do not havechildren.  Moreover, more money tends to be given to larger and older families, when thecentral problem is much more likely to be the position of the woman in the labourmarket, which is most affected by having very young children.   It is questionable, as aresult, whether family benefits can be generally seen as having a major impact onpoverty.  
Provision for contingencies as poor reliefEven if all the contingencies considered here are covered within a social security system,there may still be gaps,  which have to be filled by some safety-net provision if they areto be filled at all.  It can be difficult to envisage the kinds of circumstances in whichpeople would not be covered, but the experience of most social security systems is thateven when the evident contingencies are provided for, there will be people whosecircumstances are sufficiently unusual not to be covered adequately.  Often, theirsituation is complex: what happens, for example, to the disabled child of a twice-divorcedparent, the self-employed person on a low income who cannot afford to retire, the widowwho is intermittently employed because of the demands of caring for an elderly relative,or the migrant worker who becomes a single parent?  By the time Supplementary Benefit,the basic safety-net benefit in the UK, was abolished, it had accumulated more thansixteen thousand paragraphs of rules, trying to cover a huge range of differentcontingencies.  One of the objections to a 'basic income' scheme is that, despite itsconsiderable appeal, it cannot hope to deal with the complexities of real people's lives;it is in the nature of general schemes that there will be exceptions.  The most effectiveschemes administratively tend to be those which generate fewest exceptions, but nosystem is immune.  There are three main strategies which are available to cover the circumstances ofpeople who are poor.  First, it is possible to increase the value of benefits and reduce thequalifications for entitlement so that even if people have special circumstances which aremissed, they are unlikely to be poor as a result.  Sweden achieves this in the case of mostold people, though not in its benefits system overall.  A second option is to continue tomultiply the number of different types of benefit, or at least of categories of peopleentitled, so that virtually every conceivable case is minimally covered which one wouldwish to have covered; there are many countries with a proliferation of different benefits,but if this strategy has succeeded in eliminating poverty for a group I do not know whereit has happened.  Third, it is possible to provide a general safety net in addition to otherprovision.  Unlike the other strategies, this approach requires a commitment specificallyto the relief of poverty.  The importance of a residual benefit of this type depends on therelative adequacy and coverage of other benefits.
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Chapter 12
Social security systems and the relief of povertyThere is a strong case to argue that 'poverty' should not be the central concern of socialsecurity policy; claims for social protection, rights to welfare or the reduction ofdisadvantage are no less important than the relief of poverty, and to a large extent theycan be taken to deal with poverty indirectly.  If this is right, it seems unreasonable tojudge policies on the basis only of the extent to which they succeed in alleviating thecircumstances of the poorest.  The problems of the poor remain an important test,because the persistence of poverty implies a negation of the other aims of welfare inrespect of those people who remain poor; but the danger of focussing too closely on thepoor is that one may lose sight of other objectives in the process.In reviewing how successful a system is in relieving poverty, there are two maincriteria which might be applied.  One is coverage - the extent to which the benefits coverthe range of contingencies in which people are likely to be poor.  Second, there isadequacy - the level of benefits which are provided.  
Coverage.  It could be argued that in cases where coverage is restricted - for examplewhere, as in the US, public assistance is not available to a wide range of people - theeffective minimum is nothing, which implies that the system is necessarily inadequate.  The comprehensiveness of a system depends crucially not on how many people arecovered by the main form of benefit, but by how many people are picked up by thealternative provisions.  The weakness of provision in the US, for example, reflects asmuch the absence of an adequate system of social assistance as it does the patchy andinconsistent coverage offered by the insurance benefits.  In Germany, basic insurancecover extends only to a limited proportion of the population - about 85% of those in theWest (1).  Many of those not included, however, are those whose incomes are abovecertain limits, who are expected to make alternative arrangements.  It can be argued thatthis does indeed undermine the comprehensiveness of the system, because by excludingthe better-off it undermines any concept of welfare as a right of citizenship or expressionof solidarity; but if the test is to be the relief of poverty, then this kind of selection doesnot intrinsically threaten the scope of the social security system.  There is a difference between comprehensiveness on paper and in practice.  Evenwhere entitlement to benefit is established, many of those who are entitled do not, forone reason or another, receive the benefits they should.   Atkinson argues that thepreoccupation of the literature with takeup is in many ways a mis-identification of theproblem, because one cannot assume that all of those entitled are those whose povertythe benefit was intended to relieve, or conversely that all of those for whom the benefitis intended are actually entitled.  (2)The Luxembourg Income Study enables one to identify the extent to which those onthe lowest incomes are receiving transfer payments to a sufficient extent to bring themabove 50% of median income, in most of the countries I have considered (France,unfortunately, is not yet included).  This is not, I have suggested, equivalent to 'poverty',but one can at least establish that how many of the people on the lowest incomes arebeing reached by social security benefits.  Table 12.1 shows the results.  It shows, fairlyclearly, that the US is notably unsuccessful in bringing people above the level used as ameasure; this does not necessarily demonstrate that the US is unsuccessful in addressingthe problems of poverty (though there is plenty of other evidence to suggest that this isindeed the case), but it does show very clearly that the comprehensiveness andredistributive effects of the social security system are seriously deficient.  Within thefigures, it emerges that provision for pensioners - an area in which the US has federalprovision through Social Security - is comparable in its effects to many of the othercountries; it is for the non-pensioners that problems are most evident.  Sweden hasclearly the most effective system.  Germany, interestingly, has a system which seems tobe more comprehensive and adequate than the system in the UK, despite the less than
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universal remit of social insurance and what seems to be a less favourable ideologicalclimate.
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Table 12.1: The effect of transfers in reducing the numbers of
people in 'poverty' Percentage of persons who are 'poor':Total Elderlyfamilies Singleparentfamilies Twoparentfamilies OtherSweden Pre-transfer 41 98 55 21 31Post-transfer  5  -  9  5  7%reduction 88 100 88 77 77UnitedKingdom Pre-transfer 28 79 56 18 13Post-transfer  9 18 29  7  4%reduction 69 77 48 63 68Israel Pre-transfer 29 57 53 26 14Post-transfer 15 24 19 15  6%reduction 50 58 78 43 62UnitedStates Pre-transfer 27 72 59 16 15Post-transfer 17 21 52 13 10%reduction 38 72 12 19 36WestGermany Pre-transfer 28 80 35 13 20Post-transfer  6  9 18  4  5%reduction 79 88 47 70 73
Source:  from T Smeeding, M O'Higgin, L Rainwater (eds), Poverty, inequality and incomedistribution in comparative perspective, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p 67   
Adequacy.  Traditionally, adequacy has been assessed in terms of a 'poverty line' - thatis, a regular income.  The LIS uses its measure of income to identify not only how many
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people fall below a certain level of income, but by what extent.  Table 12.2 shows thereduction in the 'poverty gap' (so-called) for those who remain.  The discrepancies whichemerge from a consideration of coverage alone are striking.  Although the Swedishsystem appears to have the greatest effect in reducing the numbers of people who arebelow the 50% level of income, those who are left have a low relative income.  Bycontrast, the UK and Israeli systems seem to do well in reducing the gaps.  The authorsnote that both systems 'are characterised by universal transfer systems that offer highcoverage but fairly low benefit rates' (3).  It is not clear from the figures, though, that theywill bear this interpretation; where large numbers of people fall just below the level ofincome selected as a reference point, the average 'poverty gap' can be expected to fallsubstantially.  
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Table 12.2: The effect of income transfers on the 'poverty gap' The 'poverty gap' among persons remaining at a level 50%below the median income after transfers:Total Elderlyfamilies Singleparentfamilies Twoparentfamilies OtherSweden %remaining  5  -  9  5  7Gapbetweenincomeand 50%level
40  45 33 28 43
UnitedKingdom %remaining  9 18 29  7  4Gapbetweenincomeand 50%level
16 11 18 11 24
Israel %remaining 15 24 19 15  6Gapbetweenincomeand 50%level
16 13 14 20 13
UnitedStates Pre-transfer 17 21 52 13 10%remaining 40 29 43 33 51WestGermany Gapbetweenincomeand 50%level
 6  9 18  4  5
Gapbetweenincomeand 50%level
31 29 31 23 48
Source: from T Smeeding, M O'Higgins, L Rainwater, op cit, pp 67, 70.
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There are reasons to be cautious about this kind of approach.  Though low income isa good indicator of poverty, it is not equivalent; it may mislead both in terms of commandover resources and over the extent to which a person's needs are actually met.  It seemsclear that many of the kinds of problem associated with poverty - problems likehomelessness, poor environments, a lack of security, or lack of positional goods - are notnecesarily taken into account by this analysis.  At best, the figures provide indicators ofpoverty in different countries. 
The determinants of effective poor reliefIn Chapter 9, I outlined the systems of a number of countries in very broad theoreticalterms.  On the face of the matter, one might expect countries with more comprehensivecoverage to perform better than countries with pluralistic aspirations; this is largelyborne out.  Then one might expect egalitarian policies to be more generous to those withleast than institutional ones, and institutional policies to offer more than residual.  Thecase of Germany is the clearest exception, for it seems to do better in helping people onlow incomes, despite its residual ethic, than the UK.  This can be explained in severalways.  One option is to seek to challenge the figures or the construction put upon them,which it is not difficult to do; the UK does close 'poverty gaps' further.  A second is tochallenge the way in which the countries have been represented - which would be whollyreasonable, for in none of the countries do policies fit the simple characterisation I madeof them.  A third option is search for other factors which may influence the results, ofwhich there are only too many.   Wilensky finds that the main determinants ofexpenditure on social security are the age of the system, the percentage of the populationover the age of 65, and national income per capita (4).  This casts some doubt on whether the ideology of a govenment makes muchdifference to the level of social security payments.  Wilensky thinks it does not.  Againstthis, Barnes and Srivenkataramana point out, by reworking Wilensky's figures, that theamount a country spends on social security is inversely proportional to its distance fromVienna.  This, they suggest, shows evidence of cultural diffusion - countries draw ideasand practices from their neighbours - which, in turn, suggests that ideology does play apart (5).      The kind of 'ideology' which is being considered, though, is far more complex than asimple distinction between 'left' and 'right' might identify.  Much of what I have writtenshould call into question the existence of a simple association between 'residual' and'institutional' models with patterns of provision of differing adequacy. The level ofresources which is committed relies, in so far as it depends on ideological influences, ona much more complex set of influences than a division between 'residual' and'institutional' models; ideas like social protection, solidarity or a commitment to familysupport may cut across the divide.  The economic context, and political interpretationsof it, limit what is considered feasible or even desirable.  Organisational arrangements,themselves owing much to historical developments within countries, play a major part;the influence of federalism in the US, or the involvement of the labour movement inSweden or Israel, are examples.  And the problems of poverty are understood differentlyin different countries: 'poverty' is a socially constructed concept, which has been takento refer not only to a lack of resources but also to issues like inequality, social exclusion,problems within families and social exclusion.  Responses to poverty are conceivedwithin a different contexts, for different purposes; unsurprisingly, policies differ.  By the same token, there is no reason to suppose that left wing and right wingpolicies, because they are linked with these differing views, should be more or less likelyto provide poor relief at a level sufficient to mitigate the problems of poverty.  Many ofthe associations are based not in irrefutable truths about the way in which social securityoperates, but in a historical and political framework.  The principles which distinguish'right' and 'left' - issues like the interpretation of freedom, the role of the state, and theworkings of the economy - are all of considerable importance to social security, but theyare not the only principles which apply.  Other conflicting principles, like values ofsolidarity, work, family, or country, are liable to intrude, and they do not necessarily fall
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within the 'left-right' divide.   In the development of pensions policies in the UK, theuncertainty of the parties as to what weight to put on progressive redistribution, socialprotection, financial constraints, and poor relief have led to a jockeying of different,sometimes contradictory policies which cannot be simply explained in terms of 'left' or'right' wing (6).  In France, the emphasis on the family has cut across the divide.  In Italy,the Communist party have opposed expanding unemployment benefits on the basis thatincrease in productive employment is a greater priority.  And in Belgium, a proposal bythe christian democrats for a basic minimum benefit was opposed by socialists on thebasis that the money would only benefit 'drunkards, whores and nuns' (7).  
Comparing social security systemsThe similarities between countries are in some ways more striking than their differences. Most developed countries have a similar set of problems to deal with - notablyretirement and the dependency of older people, support for people who are long-termsick or disabled, unemployment, and in general the inadequate incomes of peopleexcluded from the labour market or marginal to it.  They draw on a common range ofresponses, partly as a result of imitation, and partly as a result of common pressures;although there are exceptions to every generalisation, most developed countries have thebasic framework of an insurance system (the main exception is Australia), asupplementary framework of means-tested benefits to fill in the gaps (though the US stillhas notable deficiencies in its coverage), and a potential range of other non-contributorybenefits for special needs groups.  The similarities between policies have supported aview of modern industrial states as 'converging' (8).It should be possible, on this basis, to offer some insights into social security systemsand their effectiveness in dealing with poverty.  Insurance benefits work well in a widerange of conditions, but they leave gaps which have to be filled by other benefits: forexample, research in Britain, France and Germany found, in each case, that insurancepayments failed to protect people suffering from long periods of unemployment (9). Universal benefits, an important part of provision for families in France, have majoradvantages, but the relief of poverty is not foremost among them.  On the other hand,there is evidence that some common beliefs are misleading.  Despite the claims made foruniversal benefits, there is no basis on which to believe that they become more generousbecause they represent an institutional ideal.  The British experience seems to suggestthat means-tested benefits suffer from intrinsic disadvantages; the cross-nationalcomparison with France and Germany calls this into question, as well as casting doubton the supposed advantages of insurance-based benefits.  (The Australian system, thoughit does not show that all of the problems can be avoided, also seems to challenge someof the propositions which are made. (10))There are grounds for caution about such conclusions.  Generalisations about thelevel and coverage of benefits can be seriously misleading.  It is hardly possible toconsider the relative strengths and weaknesses of a maternity benefit withoutconsidering the impact of maternity benefits in context.  Maternity benefits are only partof a package of support available to mothers, which might include maternity pay, medicalcare, and benefits for the child.  The role of maternity benefits depends on their role asincome replacement, and their duration, their relationship to other benefits (likeunemployment and sickness benefits) and their adequacy in relation to wages has to beconsidered.  The issue of wage replacement points to further issues which need to beconsidered - the wages which are being replace, the role of women in the labour market,and the options which women have after childbirth.  The problems of comparison become significant whenever it is intended to adopt ameasure from one country and apply it to another.  The ideological gloss put on differentkinds of policy cannot be expected to travel without alteration, because theinterpretation of such policies depends on the context in which the benefits are set. Family benefits in the UK are strongly advocated by the 'left', most notably by the ChildPoverty Action Group.  In much of Europe, family benefits are the concern of the christianparties of the right.  Conversely, loans are identified as a 'right-wing' policy in Britain
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because they have been used by a right wing government to limit the availability ofbenefits to claimants with pressing needs and because benefits are inadequate to permitpayment without hardship.  Loans in the Netherlands, by contrast, have sprung out ofmutual aid societies - the nearest in Britain is the principle of the 'credit union' - whichhas more of a left-wing flavour, even if their practice tends to be conservative (11).  If one was to begin the formation of policy with a blank sheet, it might be possible todescribe the policy in idealised terms - the kinds of ringing phrase, like 'welfare state','solidarity7 or the 'social market system', with which I introduced social securitysystems.  But in real life, one is rarely if ever privileged to begin anew.  The  kinds ofpolicy which are introduced are usually specific, introduced into a system in which otherbenefits exist, and - most important - into a well established social and economic context. An understanding of the way in which different kinds of benefit work depends on a setof parameters which are liable to change.  Benefits do not operate in isolation, but withina system of other benefits, in the context of different kinds of welfare provision, withindifferent economic and social settings.  The most effective comparisons, then, depend onconsideration of the overall pattern of provision in different countries.  This isintrinsically difficult to do.  Different administrative systems, different patterns ofconsumer response, the nuances of difference in eligibility and the purposes of benefit,make comparison difficult.  More seriously, the social and economic conditions in whichthe systems operate are so different that generalisations about different patterns ofbenefit cannot easily be extended from one country to another.   A range of factors needto be treated as parameters for the purposes of making comparison possible.  Theefficiency of the administration, access to communications, or the existence of alternativeservices or sources of income might all affect the way in which a social security systemoperates within any particular country.  
Social security in practiceWhatever the appearance of a social security scheme on paper, the process ofimplementing the scheme is liable to lead to complications, and potentially even tochange its character.  The scheme must be administered, and administration takes time,manpower and resources.  It must be received, which generally means that it must beclaimed (though there is no obvious reason why the onus of initiating a claim must fallon the claimant), and there are a number of obstacles to overcome in order for claims tobe made. From the point of view of the claimant, the kinds of factors which affect theirbehaviour were referred to in the context of means-testing, though they extend no lessto other types of benefit.  Claimants have to identify whether or not a claim can andshould be made; whether it is worth claiming; and then must undergo the process.  Thefirst step implies that claimants have to know about the benefit, and have some idea thatthey might be entitled.  In some cases, this will be related to the structure of the benefits;the more complex a system is, the less likely that the claimant will know about particularbenefits, and the more important appropriate signposting becomes.  Equally, the morecomplex an individual benefit is, the less chance claimants have of working out whether or not they are entitled.  How people feel about benefits is no less important at this stage;if people do not think they are the sort to whom a benefit applies, they will not learnabout it.  The next step, whether a benefit is worth claiming implies a calculation of costsagainst benefits.  The value of a benefit relates primarily to the amount of money it yieldsand its duration.  The costs include the direct costs of going through the claiming process(like travel and time), overcoming fear of landlords or employers where declarationshave to be made, and the social costs of stigmatisation.  Third, to complete a claim theclaimant has to pass a number of obstacles, including access to offices, filling forms,undergoing assessments (like income tests or medical examinations) and if necessary(and possible) appealing. The importance of the administrative process stems from the central requirementthat benefits, in order to relieve poverty,  have actually to be delivered.  There is not inmost systems only one type of benefit to deliver to one type of claimant, through one type
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of process.  Rather, there are several different kinds of benefit for which the conditionsdiffer.  It is not difficult to say, for example, that non-contributory benefits should be easyto administer, because there are few preconditions to check, and that maintaining arecord of contribution conditions should lead to benefits being delivered more rapidlythan would be the case for means testing, because the process of recording contributionsis cumulative over time, whereas the process of means-testing demands a freshassessment of the status quo.  But this is not necessarily the case, because there are alsoconditions attached to non-means-tested benefits, which have no less to be assessed.  The kinds of factors which distinguish the effectiveness with which a benefit can beadministered are both internal and external.  Internal factors include, first, thecomplexity of the benefit - like the number of steps required, the clarity of the rules, thelength of the procedure required to process the benefit, and the scope for error.  Second,they include the terms on which people qualify, and the extent to which the benefit dealswith an identifiable and stable client group.  Some conditions are relatively easy toidentify, like childhood and old age - they are also incidentally the most stable; somerequire a test or assessment, like disability; some may be ambiguous, like certainpatterns of unemployment.  It is also important to know to what extent there is aninfrastructure of complementary agencies (like doctors) able to make assessments,which can substantially affect the operation of benefits for sickess, disability, housing. Third, there is the extent to which the benefit works to defined rules.  As a broadproposition, rule-based systems should be easier to administer than those which rely onthe exercise of judgment; they have also the advantage of relative consistency.  Butsimpler systems are also easier to administer than more complex ones; the situation inthe UK was that the rule-based system for single payments became so complex thatadministrators effectively began treating the scheme as discretionary in any case,because of their ignorance of the rules (12).  External factors are more wide-ranging; they include, for example, the number ofclaims, and the number of cases which require special treatment (though this could alsobe seen as a reflection on the benefit's rules).  Decisions on discretionary benefits shouldin principle be capable of being delivered within hours, but the larger the number ofclaims, the less feasible this becomes.   This implies that the operation of a system maydepend not just on on the kind of methods which the system operate, but also thepressures on it - factors which are conditioned by the size and makeup of populationcovered, and the economic background.   Ultimately, the operation of a benefit - and soits practicality - depends on the social and economic context.Information about the practical aspects of social security in different countries variesconsiderably in quality and quantity.  Some, notably Britain and the United States, havebeen looked at critically in some detail; some, like France, have hardly been touched on(13); and for others, like Israel, although there may be such evidence, the problems oflanguage make critical commentary difficult to find.  Even once the issues are identified,it is difficult to put them into perspective.  There may be some administrative problems,but do they vitiate the scheme's effects overall?  On paper, for example, social securityin Sweden seems easily the most effective of the various systems.  But Gould suggeststhere are a number of problems in receiving benefits; the political concern withdependency and self-improvement is associated with a number of barriers to claiming. Claimants do not receive assistance as of right: the model on which benefits are given is'therapeutic', which justifies an insistence on the presence of claimants and spouses. They are subject to personal assessment and interrogation about their circumstances(14).  What it is not clear from this account is how important the administrativeproblems are in relation to what the system achieves.One important attempt made to overcome the difficulties is in the study by Mitton,Wilmott and Wilmott of Britain, France and Germany (15).  This covered three samples,each including about three thousand people, and it provided insights that would havebeen difficult to establish from an examination of social security systems alone - forexample, that large families in France were likely to be poorly off despite apparentlygenerous benefits because of their weak relationship to the labour market (16).   Thequalitative elements of the study serve to place information about the different schemes
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in a social and administrative context, which a purely statistical exercise cannot hope todo.
Effective poor reliefThe tests of coverage and adequacy can be applied in many ways: one of the simplest, fora policy-maker, is to consider who is left out within preent provision, and amongst thosewho are included to consider who receives the least support from the available range ofservices.  But this approach can, if applied repeatedly, produce undesirable results initself, because a complex system devoted to covering contingencies as they arise is all toolikely to leave further gaps.  Inevitably, there has to be some residual provision for thosewho are not catered for in other ways; and this provision is likely itself to be complex,difficult to administer and stigmatised.  The problem stems from the attempt to consider benefits in isolation.  Benefits haveto be seen as part of a system.  In the first place, benefits are necessarily interrelated: onecannot distinguish the impact of housing benefit or food stamps wholly from that ofgeneral income support.  There may be alternatives: if there is no sickness benefit, peoplemay have to claim unemployment benefits instead - or vice versa.  Secondly, the benefitsinteract with other measures - like the provision of health care, employment or housing. Family benefits in conjunction with minimum wages have effects in maintaininghousehold income which neither measure has in itself.  In practice, it is usually theportfolio which matters, not the structure of individual benefits.  The focus on certainbenefits as 'residual' or 'institutional' in themselves fails to identify what role they playin relation to other benefits.  Child Benefit may be an 'institutional' benefit, but it is notequivalent to institutional provision for children, because it is limited in its scope and itseffects.  Unemployment insurance cannot be considered without other provisions forunemployed people.To the extent that benefits extend coverage and increase the adequacy of resources,they can be considered to be effective in relieving poverty.  But if one is examining therelative performance of different benefits - like unemployment insurance and incomesupport - in achieving the same ends, one cannot achieve greater effectiveness by optingfor one benefit in preference to the other.  (It is more efficient to select a benefit thattargets a client group more selectively, but that is not the same thing.  Efficiency impliesa minimum of waste; effectiveness, the maximum achievement of goals.)  Rather, one hasto consider how the benefits work together.  It follows that if policy-makers wish to introduce an institutional system of poorrelief, rather than a residual one, they must consider means by which the whole rangeof benefits might act on an institutional basis - which implies a comprehensive range ofbenefits backed up by the necessary safety net provision.  This, I think, is what Titmusswas driving at when he wrote:'the real challenge resides in the question: what particular infrastructure ofuniversalist services is needed in order to provide a framework of values andopportunity bases within and around which can be developed acceptable selectiveservices provided, as social rights, on criteria of the needs of specific categories,groups and territorial areas ... ?' (17)Effective poor relief - or the development of any effective welfare system -  requires thedevelopment of a structured scheme in which the coverage is fully comprehensive, andthe effect of different provisions, either in combination or as alternatives, is to increasethe command over resources of those who are poorest to the greatest extent possible.  There are many ways in which this might be achieved.  In practice, it seems mosteffectively to have been achieved in Sweden, in a very different way, and then only forone group (pensioners); it relies on social insurance, solidaristic financial arrangements,an orientation to the workplace, a substantial element of progressive redistribution,backed by residual provision.  It is difficult to see how this could be duplicatedsuccessfully in another country without having very similar economic and socialarrangements in place.  In principle, it might also be achieved by an extensive basicincome or social dividend scheme, although the criticisms I have made of such schemes
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suggest that at least two other elements would be required - a progressive system offinancing, and some kind of supplementary safety net provision to provide for theinevitable complexities of people's lives.Reforming systems takes time, and partial moves towards a different kind of systemwill not necessarily yield partial improvements in poor relief.  It is unlikely that anexpansion of the range of benefits would reduce either coverage or adequacy directly. But an expansion of the range which takes insufficient account of the context in whichbenefits are introduced can increase the complexity of a system overall, which can affecttakeup; and it can create overlaps between benefits, which cause confusion and limit themarginal value of residual benefits.  A non-contributory benefit which is inadequate - likeOne-Parent Benefit - could still reduce entitlement to means-tested supplements, and thevalue of those benefits.  At the same time, it changes the direction of resources, and thepattern of future claims of resources - increases in benefits for all old people necessarilycost far more than increases only for old people on low incomes.  Worse, the limitationit implies on residual benefits can limit their coverage, their scope, and their capacity tomeet need.  'Second-best' solutions are not always preferable to an original position.In the short term, then, probably the best way to relieve poverty is to concentrate noton the reform of systems but rather on the benefits which currently relieve poverty mosteffectively.  In most cases, these benefits are residual, means-tested benefits, like IncomeSupport or Sozialhilfe.  Some people fear that, if this approach was extended indefinitely,it would lead to a residual system by default; but there is no reason to suppose that it willbe extended indefinitely, and it is abundantly clear that the alternative strategy of tryingto develop universal benefits incrementally does not deliver resources to poor peoplerapidly enough.  In the long term, the expansion of coverage and increasing commitmentof resources should make it possible to consider structural reform; but there is a longroad to travel, and people who are poor now need help now.The development of poor relief is not an 'answer' to the problem.  Poverty is not oneproblem, and there is not one solution to it.  But relief is a more limited, and moremodest, aim.  It is far from being impracticable; most developed countries have beendoing it for some people, if not for most, for much of the last century.  But poor peopleremain who are not reached by the existing systems, or who are helped onlyinadequately.  By reviewing the aims and methods through which poor relief isundertaken, it should be possible to extend provision for them.
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